

Epistemological Issues in Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza's Early *De fide*

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ABSTRACT*

During the late 1610s, the Iberian philosopher and theologian Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641) authored *Disputations on Faith*, now preserved as a manuscript in Dublin, The Library of Trinity College Dublin, ms. 298. The text, apparently originating as part of Hurtado's teaching in Salamanca, included a comprehensive account of theological virtues and is currently the earliest known witness to Hurtado's theological career. As part of his discussion of theological issues relating to faith, Hurtado addresses a wide range of epistemological issues, including the general accounts of certainty and evidence and issues specific to the topic of the treatise, such as epistemic authority and testimonial knowledge.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641) was a prolific and influential Jesuit author whose intellectual and academic career is tied to the Iberian scholasticism of the first half of the seventeenth century. His career is currently held to have unfolded as follows, some details remaining conjectural: Hurtado studied philosophy between 1598 and 1601 and theology between 1601 and 1605; he was a teacher of philosophy between 1606 and 1614 and a teacher of theology in Valladolid from 1615 and in Salamanca from 1618. From a three-decade career, only three of his many works have been issued in print, needless to say each being quite extensive. First, his comprehensive philosophical *cursus*: there is the 1615 Valladolid edition entitled

Disputtationes a symmvlis ad methaphysicam, approved by Alonso Carillo in 1614 (an early version of the *Physicae disputationes* being preserved in a 1608 manuscript) and a revised second edition published in Lyon in 1624 under the title *Vniversa philosophia*, approved by De Ville and Perrochel in 1622, with several reeditions of these two elementary forms of the text. Second, there is the two-volume *Scholasticae et morales disputtationes de tribvs virtvtibus theologicis*, the manuscript of which was approved by Petrus de Andrade in 1625 and Gaspar de Vegas in 1628, the final errata being dated 2 December 1630 and the edition itself dated 1631. Third, there is the 1634 Antwerp edition of *Disputtationes de Deo homine sive de incarnatione filii Dei*, approved by Gaspar de Vegas in

1630, and Willem de Wael and Steenhuyse in 1634.¹

There are several surviving theological manuscripts written by Hurtado in the 1620s and 1630s, most of which are unique and some of which have been covered in recent scholarship. (Schmutz 2003 and forth.; Knebel 2000, *ad indicem*; Hanke 2021 and 2022) In comparison, there seems to be relatively little information regarding Hurtado's early theological career, i.e. his theological teaching and writings prior to 1620. The only exception identified hitherto is the 1619 manuscript of *Disputations on Faith*, preserved in Dublin, The Library of Trinity College Dublin (henceforth: TCD), ms. 298, which can be attributed to Hurtado with relative certainty. Note that while there are parallels between this text and the first volume of Hurtado's *Scholasticae et morales disputationes de tribus virtutibus theologicis*, the two texts are different, even though they must have originated less than six years apart, to judge from the colophon of the manuscript and the date of approval of the printed edition.²

- 1 See Hurtado de Mendoza (1608, 1615, 1624, 1361a, 1631b, 1634). For Hurtado's biography and bibliography, see Novotný (forth.), Schmutz (2003, 623–628; 2009b; forth.). As regards Hurtado's name, his printed works typically use the Latin "Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza" in the titles and "Puente Hurtado de Mendoza" when signing dedicatory epistles, while the handwritten sources seem to somewhat favour "Puente Hurtado de Mendoza". As that seems to be common practice, and as recommended in peer review, he will be referred to as "Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza" throughout this paper.
- 2 Incidentally, there are references to *De fide* in the 1624 edition of Hurtado's philosophical *cursus*; to mention but

The present paper has two general goals relating to this text. The first is to elaborate on our current knowledge of the manuscript of the *Disputations on Faith* and the respective codex, to outline its structure, and to confirm its authenticity, which will also contribute to our knowledge of Hurtado's early theological career, as it will include an exploration of the references in Hurtado's text.

one specific example: "Secundò, quia actualis locutio est actualis significatio rei, et expressio (vt ostendi suprà, §. 21) non est autem actualis significatio sine actuali perceptione audientis. Nec verò ramus appensus significat aliquid actu, nisi quando actu ex illo cognito deuenitur in cognitionem vini: nec ramus est signum iumento, sed poratori, vide **disput. 13. de fide §. 37**, vbi fusè agitur hac de re." (Hurtado de Mendoza 1624, 109, emphasis mine). This fits relatively well the printed edition that would be issued seven years later: "Secundò adverte, ad loquendum non exigi voluntatem in loquente, vt audiens percipiat rem ignoratam ab ipso audiente. Id est, non requiritur in audiente ignoratio rei, vt cognita à loquente; sed possumus loqui cum aliquo de rebus, quas scimus ab audiente scitas, non aliter ac à nobis: saepè enim amici colloquuntur obiecta reciproce cognita. Est autem necessaria voluntas faciendi signum, ex quo possit audiens cognoscere obiectum, vt est cognitum à loquente; haec tamen voluntas est difficilis explicatu." (Hurtado de Mendoza 1631a, 103) The manuscript does not contain the passage at all, and its thirteenth disputation has only three paragraphs in total; see *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 416v–417v (disp. 13). Provided that the text of Hurtado's philosophical *cursus* had already been approved for publication in 1622, this suggests that at least some parts of the manuscript of *Scholasticae et morales disputationes de tribus virtutibus theologicis* must have been in pretty much their final form. If so, the gap between the two versions of the disputations on faith would shrink to less than three years.

The second goal is to analyse some of the epistemological issues discussed in the text. While the text is primarily theological in its scope and motivation, it covers some noteworthy general epistemological issues, such as the definitions of certainty and evidence. Furthermore, there are certain topics which seem to be less common in classical Aristotelian epistemology, such as the problem of testimonial knowledge. While this problem is not uncommon in modern epistemology,³ it seems to have been relatively marginal to the tradition which holds syllogistic proofs to be the paradigm of evidence. However, the problem of testimony is crucial in the theological context, where the mysteries of faith are held to be backed up by various forms of testimony. Finally, a topic straddling logic and epistemology will be discussed, namely Hurtado's solution to a logical sophism including compound epistemic and doxastic modalities. As the text is only preserved in the manuscript, the extensive quotations should also be helpful in and of themselves.⁴

2 THE MANUSCRIPT

2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE MANUSCRIPT

Dublin, TCD, ms. 298 (reference no. IE TCD MS 298) is a seventeenth-century Spanish codex of a total of five hundred and thirty-five 207×138-mm leaves

written on paper in clear cursive, with abbreviations.⁵ The top margin of fol. 1r contains, apparently by a single hand, the inscription “H. Juan de Oribe su segundo año de Theulugia” presumably designating the scribe and the first owner of the codex. The chronology of the manuscript (based on the colophons of the respective texts) indicates that Juan de Oribe studied in Salamanca around 1620. Provided that the study of theology commonly lasted four years in that era, the second year being 1618–1619, he was probably a theology student between 1617 and 1621. At any rate, the codex appears to mirror the teaching of theology in Salamanca between 1618 and 1619.⁶

5 For a description of the codex, see Colker (1991, 1351–1352), where the claim of the codex being written by a single hand is made. (I lack the necessary palaeographic expertise to confirm or refute such a claim.) A short description of the codex is also available via the electronic version of the catalogue <<https://manuscripts.catalogue.tcd.ie/CalmView/Record.aspx?src=CalmView.Catalog&id=IE+TCD+MS+298>>.

6 I was unable to establish this person's identity with certainty. Sommervogel's *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus* contains a brief note on a certain “ORIVE, Jean de, né à Logroño en 1594, admis en 1611, professa la théologie, fut recteur et mourut à Pampelune, le 17 décembre 1654. 1. Deux épigrammes latines; - au fol. 18, 1^{ère} partie, de: *Compendio de las sollenes fiestas...* 1615. (Voir *Cerda, Emm. de la*, t. II, col. 984, n. 2)”; see Sommervogel (1894, col. 1934). More research is needed to confirm that this was the scribe who wrote the Dublin codex. In 1618, the Sommervogel Juan de Oribe was twenty-four years old, which means that he could very well have been a second-year theology student, based on a comparison with Hurtado's biography researched thoroughly by Jacob Schmutz (see above).

3 See Leonard (2023) for a modern debate on testimonial knowledge.

4 The transcriptions of Baroque sources, both manuscript and printed sources, do not alter the spelling but do, occasionally, alter the punctuation; as with any part of this study, they are open to criticism.

The codex contains five theological texts:

(I) Anon.: *Assertiones huius materiae de auxilijs* (fols. 2r–3r)

incip. *Assertiones huius materiae de auxilijs. 1^a assertio.* Ex triplici capite indigemus auxilijs diuinae gratiae: primo ex nostrae naturae abiecta conditione; secundo ex diuinorum perfectione; tertio ex obiectorum supernaturalium excellentia, quae tractare natura proportionate nequit sine gratia auxilijs.

explic. Tribuo etiam aliam maioritatem physicam beneficij in eo, qui convertitur, vt subest speciali cui-dam beneficentiae diuinae, quam constituo, et defendo in omni, qui convertitur.

The pages between 3r and 5r are blank.

(II) Valentín de Herice:

Tractatus de auxilijs diuinae gratiae per Christum (fols. 5r–145r)

incip. *Tractatus de auxilijs diuinae gratiae per Christum a P. Valentino de Herize Soc. Iessu, Anno 1618.* D. Anselmus aureo libello de concordia praescientiae, et praedestinationis cum libero arbitrio haec habet in primo c. prima verba de tribus quaestionibus, in quibus Dei praescientiae, et praedestinationi, nec non et gratiae liberum arbitrium repugnare videtur, quod Deus mihi dignabitur aperire curabo scribendo ostendere.

explic. Denique afferunt orationem quamdam Ecclesiae, qua Deum orat, vt nostras etiam rebelles compellat

voluntates. Quod verum est non vi praedestinante adversaria libertati, sed vocatione congrua emolliente, atque convertente aversas a Deo liberas voluntates.

coloph. Propter contentionem huius materiae profiteor me nihil in ea scripsisse animo adversarios lacesse, atque offendendi, aut notandi, sed puro indagandae Catholicae, veritatis studio. Cedant labores in gloriam Dei nostri, et in sanctae ecclesiae vtilitatem. Anno a Christo nato 1619, die 8. mensis Iunij.

Valentín de Herice (1572–1636) was a Jesuit theologian and a teacher at the universities of Salamanca and Valladolid.⁷ Another copy of the same text seems to be preserved in Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca (Spain), Biblioteca General Histórica, ms. 120[3], fols. 361r–481v.⁸

Page fol. 145v is blank.

(III) Anon.: *Assertiones huius materiae de eucharistia* (fols. 146r–149r)

incip. *Assertiones huius materiae de eucharistia. 1^a assertio.* Augustissimum eucharistiae sacramentum esse, distinguere ab alijs, atque inter illa eminentiorem obtinere dignitatem ille solus inficiari audebit,

7 For Valentín de Herice's biography, see Schmutz (2019a) (but note that the Scholasticon webpage has been unavailable for some time now, as is also the case with other sources authored by Schmutz used in this paper).

8 See Lilao Franca and Castrillo Gonzáles (1997, 113). I have not consulted the Salamanca manuscript, but the description in the catalogue fits.

qui ab orthodoxa fide recedere non formidat.

explic. Huiusmodi autem effectus, quos ex opere operato eucharistia [eucharistia] gratiam *ante correctionem* MS] confert, non sunt in omnibus illam suscipientibus aequales: maiorem etenim gratiam confert vtrique species, quam altera. Vnde is qui vtramque speciem sumit, maiorem gratiam recipit, quam ille qui vna tantum specie cibatur.

The pages between fols. 149r and 151r are blank.

(IV) Barnabas de Matute (1578–1629): *De Eucharistia* (fols. 151r–303r)

incip. Ad q. 73. et sequentes quibus materia de Eucharistia continetur Disputationes a P. Barnaba de Matute Societ. Iessu Anno 1618. In alijs materijs D. Tho. reliquos scholasticos, hic se ipsum superavit, quam ab hac quaestione 73. vsque ad questionem 83. inclusiue explicat. Est vero eucharistia non solum sacramentum, sed etiam sacrificium.

explic. Alias plures rationes congerit ibidem Pater Vazq. Nobis id sufficiat, cui non video quid responderi possit. Ad rationes in contrarium ex ipsa facile respondetur.

coloph. Dicta vero pro nostro modulo, et temporis angustijs de tota materia sufficiant. Ad laudem, et gloriam Dei die 22 mensis Iunij 1619.

Barnabas de Matute (1578–1629) was a teacher of philosophy in Pamplona and

of theology in Salamanca.⁹ Another copy of the same text seems to be preserved in Salamanca, Universidad de Salamanca (Spain), Biblioteca General Histórica, ms. 120[10].¹⁰

Between 303r and 304r, there are seven non-foliated blank pages.

(V) Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza: *De fide* (fols. 304r–535v)

incip. Quaestio prima de fide. Disputatio 1^a significatus vocis. Varios fidei significatus reffert Valenc. tom. 3 initio. Accipitur fides proprie, et satis latine pro assensu, quo credimus loquenti.

explic. Actus autem piaie affectionis fit per auxilium extrinsecum. Prima vice in adulto recens converso, quia habitus non infunditur nisi dependenter a dispositione morali alicuius actus.

coloph. Haec quae de fide Catholica dixi, ipsius fidei arbitro Romano Pontifici subijcio. Absoluta est materia dei 29 mensis Iulij anno 1619.

No other copy of this text is currently known. The text contains relatively rare corrections. There are only a few major corrections where several words or even lines are deleted (see fols. 464v–465r and 467r) and on several occasions there are long marginal notes which are meant to complete the main

9 For a Barnabas de Matute bibliography, see Schmutz (2019c).

10 Lilao Franca and Castrillo Gonzáles (1997, 113). I have not consulted the Salamanca manuscript, but the description in the catalogue fits.

text by giving additional references and supporting arguments (see fols. 336v, 337r–v, 357r, 358r, 404v, 459r, 483r, 498v). The interpretation of these marginal notes shall remain unclear until another copy of *De fide* is found.

2.2 STRUCTURE OF *DE FIDE*

De fide is divided into disputations, sections (some of which include subsections), and numbered paragraphs that allow precise references and cross-references, which is an opportunity the author frequently exploits. With a pinch of salt, *De fide* can be viewed as a Baroque counterpart to medieval *quaestio*-commentaries, elaborating on the opening questions of Aquinas' *Secunda secundae*.¹¹ The difference is that *De fide* is a collection of *disputationes*, rather than disputed questions, but other than that, the analogy is quite close. Among others, it is possible to compare the topics discussed by Hurtado with those discussed by Aquinas and point out the overlaps and omissions, for which the original titles indicating correspondence with Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae* can be used.¹²

The first of these titles is “quaestio prima de fide” (fol. 304r), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 1, entitled “de obiecto fidei” or “on the object of faith”. What follows is the short introductory disputation explaining the elementary terminology:

Disp. 1a *Significatus vocis*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 304r–v

Following the first disputation, the second title is “Articulus primus. Vtrum obiectum fidei sit prima veritas” (fol. 304v), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 1 a. 1, i.e., “utrum obiectum fidei sit veritas prima”, discussing whether the object of faith is the first truth. (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 7–8 and 1923, 380–381) This article is developed into twelve disputations:

Disp. 2a *Vtrum obiectum formale fidei sint ipsa mysteria revellata*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 304v–310v

Disp. 3 *Vtrum revelatio, et autoritas diuina sint obiectum formale fidei*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 311r–316v

Disp. 4a *Vtrum autoritas diuina sit obiectum primum fidei*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 316v–327r

Disp. 5a *Vtrum Dei revelatio, an autoritas humana ecclesiae sit obiectum formale primum fidei*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 327r–350r

Disp. 6a *Vtrum revelatio priuata sit obiectum formale fidei Catholicae*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 350r–355v

Disp. 7a *Vtrum omnis assensus fidei pendeat a revelatione actualiter cognita*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 355v–359r

Disp. 8a *Vtrum fides vtatur duabus propositionibus reuelatis, an sola reuelatione*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 359r–367v

Disp. 9a *Vtrum revelatio vniuersalis sufficiat ad actum fidei circa obiectum speciale*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 367v–377r

11 On the literal forms of medieval philosophy in general, see Sweeney (2019).

12 The titles of the questions and articles in the subsequent description are taken or adapted from the 1895 Leonina edition and the 1923 English translation of *Summa Theologiae*; see Thomas Aquinas (1895, 1923).

Disp. 10a *Vtrum fides vtatur revelatione diuina et altera praemissa naturali*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 377r–383v

Disp. 11a *De revelatione*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 383v–405v

Disp. 12a *De conditionibus ad credendum*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 405v–416v

Disp. 13a *De resolutione fidei*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 416v–417v

The third title is simply “articulus secundus” (fol. 417v), referring to II^a-II^{ae} q. 1 a. 2, i.e. “utrum obiectum fidei sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis”, discussing whether the object of faith is something complex by way of a propositional content. (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 11 and 1923, 381) This article is developed into two disputations:

Disp. 14a *Vtrum obiectum fidei sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 417v–418r

Disp. 15a *De obiecto materiali fidei, siue formali quod*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 418r–419v

The fourth title is “Articulus tertius. Vtrum fidei possit subesse falsum. Conclusio negatiua.” (fol. 419v), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 1 a. 3 of the same title, discussing whether anything false can be the subject matter of faith (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 12–13 and 1923, 381–382), and is developed in two disputations:

Disp. 16a *De infalibilitate autoritatis diuinae*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 419v–435r

Disp. 17a *Vtrum fidei possit subesse falsum ex alio capite*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 435r–440r

The fifth title is “Articulus quartus. Vtrum obiectum fidei possit esse aliquod visum. 1^a conclusio. Credibilitas est visa. 2^a conclusio. Mysteria non sunt visa.” (fol. 440r), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 1 a. 4 of the same title, discussing whether the object of faith can be something seen (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 13–14 and 1923, 382–383), developed in two disputations:

Disp. 18a *De evidenti credibilitate*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 440r–449r

Disp. 19a *De cognitione evidenti revelationis*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 449v–467v

The sixth title is “Articulus quintus. Vtrum ea quae sunt fidei, possint esse scita. Conclusio negatiua, quia etiam possent esse simul visa, et credita.” (fol. 467v), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 1 a. 5 of the same title, discussing whether those things that are of faith can be the objects of scientific knowledge (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 16–17 and 1923, 383–384), and developed in a single disputation:

Disp. 20a *De oppositione fidei cum evidenti cognitione*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 467v–472r

The sixth title, “In quaestionem secundam” (fol. 472r), corresponds with II^a-II^{ae} q. 2, entitled “de actu interiori fidei”, discussing the internal act of

faith (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 26–39 and 1923, 390–400), developed in two disputations:

Disp. 21a *Vtrum fides vtatur discursu*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 472r–479v

Disp. 22a *De pia affectione*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 480r–484r

The seventh title is “In quaestionem quartam D. Thomae” (fol. 484v), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 4, entitled “de ipsa fidei virtute”, discussing the virtue of faith itself (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 43–53 and 1923, 402–409), developed in two disputations:

Disp. 23a *Vtrum fides sit vna*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 484v–491v

Disp. 24a *De fidei certitudine*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 491v–501v

The eighth title is “In quaestionem quintam de habentibus fidem” (fol. 501v), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 5 of the same title, discussing those who have faith (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 54–59 and 1923, 410–413), developed in two disputations:

Disp. 25a *In quibus sit fides*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 501v–504r

Disp. 26a *De oppositione fidei, et infidelitatis*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 504r–529r

Finally, the ninth title is “In quaestionem sextam” (fol. 529r), corresponding with II^a-II^{ae} q. 6, entitled “de causa fidei”, discussing the cause of faith

(Thomas Aquinas 1895, 61–63 and 1923, 413–415), developed in the last two disputations:

Disp. 27a *Vtrum fides sit habitus per se infusus*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 529r–531v

Disp. 28a *Quibus actibus disponamur ad fidem*: Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 531v–535v

The text is concluded with a colophon (cited above), and thus there is no reason to doubt whether it is complete. Purely on the basis of the titles, *De fide* does not focus on all the issues related to the treatise on faith from *Secunda secundae*. First, the treatise on faith takes the first sixteen questions of *Secunda secundae*, as compared to *De fide* ending, at least nominally, with the sixth question. Furthermore, II^a-II^{ae} q. 1 contains ten articles, of which only the first five are mentioned in the titles of *De fide*. The subsequent questions are only introduced as wholes and II^a-II^{ae} q. 3 (entitled *de exteriori actu fidei*, discussing various aspects of confessing the faith) is not mentioned explicitly at all. (Thomas Aquinas 1895, 40–41 and 1923, 400–401) Future comparative analysis of Aquinas’ *Secunda secundae* and *De fide* should focus on a more detailed analysis of topics addressed in the two corresponding texts in order to see whether these preliminary observations can be further supported or are only based on superficial similarities.¹³

13 As a preliminary note, in the discussion relating to II^a-II^{ae} q. 4 it is noted that only the material of the eighth paragraph

2.3 AUTHENTICITY OF *DE FIDE* AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

In modern scholarship, the Dublin copy of *De fide* has been attributed by Jacob Schmutz to Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza.¹⁴ The text of *De fide* is attributed to “P. Hurtado” several times in top-margin inscriptions, but apparently not elsewhere in the codex; in particular, the text is not even attributed to “P. Hurtado”, let alone “Petrus” or “Puente Hurtado de Mendoza”, either in the incipit or the colophon of the manuscript, as opposed to the texts of Valentín de Herice and Barnabas de Matute. As no other copy of the text containing an explicit attribution to Hurtado is currently known, the authorship cannot be established indirectly. However, as was usual in the Baroque period, the text of *De fide* contains multiple detailed references, including cross-references and, most importantly, references to texts which the author holds to be his own. On the basis of an analysis of these, the authenticity of *De fide* can be established in a relatively convincing way.¹⁵ At this point, the only useful re-

ferences are to what turns out to be the first edition of Hurtado’s philosophical *cursus*. These are typically made in a personal way, such that the author of *De fide* claims that he had stated something in the referenced passage. Also, in many cases, specific paragraphs of the text are referenced, which renders negligible the possibility of a coincidental misidentification. The most significant cases will now be reviewed. Whilst this list is not claimed to be exhaustive, an attempt has been made to review the most specific references and no potential counter-evidence to the claim to authenticity has been omitted intentionally.

As the first example, there are references to the opening passages of Hurtado’s *Logic* and *Metaphysics* (parts of his philosophical *cursus*), discussing the problem of “obiectum”, i.e. the subject matters of scientific disciplines, which also play the role of the semantic contents of declarative sentences.¹⁶ The emphases in all the quotations that follow are mine:

will be discussed and the study of other scholastic sources is suggested: “D. Tho. quaestione 4. art. 8 disputat de fidei certitudine. Omitto materiam aliorum articulorum, quia non indiget multo explicatu, sufficiat autem oculis lustrare Lorcam et Patrem Luysium. Certitudo autem indiget examine methaphisico.” *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 491v (disp. 24, §. 1).

¹⁴ See Schmutz (forth.) Colker conjectures that the author was Gaspar Hurtado (see Colker 1991, 1352), but Schmutz’s attribution seems better warranted.

¹⁵ Technically, the text could still be a well-designed forgery, but forging a text by

a then relatively young and insignificant author makes very little sense.

¹⁶ See Hanke (2018, 2020b, forth(b)) for the logical aspects of the theory of “objects”.

Dublin TCD, ms. 298	<i>Logica</i> , disp. 1, sect. 1 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 65–66)	<i>Metaphysica</i> , disp. 1, sect. 1 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 911)
fols. 304v–305r: Disputatione et sect. 1a <i>Logicae</i> et <i>Metaphysicae</i> , multa dixi de obiecto. Est quod cognoscitur, aut amatur.	§. 1. (...) Solum enim, quod per quamuis potentiam cognoscitur, vel amatur, proprie obiecti nomen accepit, vt lux, et color sunt visus obiectum. §. 2. Aliud <i>formale</i> , <i>materiale</i> aliud, <i>formale</i> est, <i>quod</i> <i>primo</i> , et <i>per se attingitur à potentia</i> , et <i>propter</i> <i>quod caetera attinguntur obiecta</i> : vnde ratio formalis obiectiua appellatur, e.g. aeger, qui vult curari, primo, et per se vult sanitatem, et propter sanitatem vult scisionem venae, potiones etc. Ecce hic amantur ab aegroto sanitatis, venae scisio, potiones etc. Sed quia <i>id</i> , <i>quod primo</i> , et <i>per se amatur</i> , est sanitas, reliqua vero non propter se, sed propter sanitatem amantur, ideo sanitas est obiectum formale illorum actuum, quod in omni fine, medijsque contingit, est enim finis formale voluntatis obiectum. Idem patet in intellectu: in syllogismo e.g. cognoscuntur praemissae, et conclusio, sed ratione diuersa: praemissae enim per se primo, et propter illas conclusio. Quare medium syllogismi est obiectum formale. Idem cernis in fide supernaturali, cuius ratio formalis obiectiua partialis est diuina reuelatio, quae per se primo cognoscitur, et propter illam mysterium reuelatum. Tandem vno verbo, obiectum formale est <i>id quod cognitum</i> vel <i>amatum ducit in cognitionem</i> vel <i>amorem alterius</i> , obiectum vero materiale est <i>id in</i> <i>cuius amorem</i> , aut <i>cognitionem nos formale ducit</i> , vt in exemplis adductis media sunt materiale voluntatis obiectum, conclusiones scientiae, fidei vero reuelata mysteria. (...) § 6. Rursus obiectum materiale diuide in proximum, et remotum . Proximum est <i>quod vere et proprie secundum suam rationem attingitur</i> <i>à potentia</i> , vt medium à voluntate, et ab intellectu conclusio: remotum obiectum dicitur, quod vere, et proprie non attingitur secundum suam rationem, sed dicitur cognitum, quia cognoscitur aliquod eius accidens , dicitur corpus visum, quia videtur color, quo est delibutum. Huiusmodi obiecta proprie non cognosci euidenter probatur , quia ijs mutatis immutata manet cognitio, à qua cognita denominantur, vt patet in Eucharistia, cuius accidentia eodem modo sentiuntur ante et post consecrationem, cum substantia panis, et vini per consecrationem euanescat.	§. 1. Obiectum est, <i>quod percipitur</i> <i>per potentiam,</i> <i>vel amatur</i> , subiectum autem, <i>est ea propositionis</i> <i>pars de qua aliquid</i> <i>praedicatur</i> , subiectum ergo est obiecti pars. Sumitur autem pro materia scientiae subiecta: siue pro toto obiecto alicuius scientiae. De quo late egi, disputat. 1. Logicae section. 1. Quibus hic nonnulla adijciam. Obiectum formale est, quod ratione sui amatur, vel cognoscitur: materiale vero quod ratione alterius : inde obiectum materiale non est causa motiua ad formale: sed è contra: quamuis aliquando materiale sit causa physica obiecti formalis, vt medicina sanitatis. §. 2. Obiectum materiale proximum terminat ad se immediate actum: sicut medium in se amatur.
fol. 309v: Excludit autem obiecta materialia remota , quae non cognoscuntur proprie, sed dicuntur cognosci, de quibus egi in Logica disputatione 1 sectione 1.		
fol. 317r: Dixi disputatione et sectione 1a <i>Logicae</i> , et <i>Metaph.</i> obiectum formale absolute esse quod per se primo cognoscitur, aut amatur , caetera vero propter ipsum.		

The reference appears to fit Hurtado's text but, admittedly, one might expect to find a similar passage in an introduction to any similar treatise of that era. However, there are other more specific claims

relating to the theory of objects; for example, the same object is held to be expressed in premisses and the respective syllogistic conclusion is utilised with a specific reference that fits Hurtado's *Logic*:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 362r	<i>Logica</i> , disp. 11, sect. 9 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 200)
Conclusio deducta immediate ex duabus praemissis de fide est immediate revelata a Deo. Sed omne obiectum immediate revelatum a Deo est obiectum fidei. Ergo. Probo maiorem. Ea conclusio obiectiua est idem cum obiecto vtriusque praemissae . Sed obiectum vtriusque praemissae est immediate revelatum a Deo. Ergo obiectum conclusionis est immediate revelatum a Deo. Maior constat ex disputatione 10. Logicae a §. 84. et disputatione 11.	§. 46. Obiectum cuiuscumque praemissae non esse adaequatê idem cum obiecto conclusionis non esse adaequatê idem cum obiecto conclusionis est certum: difficultas est de obiecto vtriusque praemissae simul sumptae, quod idem esse cum obiecto conclusionis , probatur primo, quia in conclusione sunt duo termini, et illorum vnio, sed illi duo termini, et illa vnio est formaliter in praemissis: ergo obiectum conclusionis est idem cum obiecto praemissarum : quia nihil formaliter cognoscitur in conclusione, quod non cognoscatur in praemissis.

An even more specific application of the notion of the object (or, more precisely, the adequate objects) of a scientific discipline references the opening part of *Physics* (another part of Hurtado's *cursus*); admittedly, this is another

example of something any scholastic author would probably write in such a context and the terminology does not fit completely – note the difference between *obiectum adaequatum* and *obiectum attributionis*:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 519v	<i>Physica</i> , disp. 1, sect. 1 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 206–207)
Obiectum ergo adaequatum Philosophiae est corpus mobile vt sic, vt includit aggregationem omnium corporum mobilium, vt ostendi in proaemio Physicorum.	Precognoscenda sunt, quae dicuntur in logica, et metaphysica disputatione, et sectio. 1 de obiecto et subiecto, è quibus infertur aperte, obiectum adaequatum Philosophiae naturalis esse corpus de praedicamento substantiae cum omnibus suis proprietatibus, et causis, actionibus, eorumque contrarijs : quia haec omnia omnes physici actus attingunt. (...) Igitur, si consideremus solos hos octo libros, illorum attributionis obiectum est corpus de praedicamento substantiae in communi...

On a similar note, the opening passages of *Logic* and *Metaphysics* are referenced

as sources for what constitutes the unity of virtues:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 491v	<i>Metaphysica</i> , disp. 1, sect. 7 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 927)
Video posse omnes virtutes dici vnam iustitiam , sicut multae provinciae vnum imperium, de quo egi in Logica, et Methaphysica, disputatione 1a.	Confirmatur ex Arist. 5. Ethicorum, et communi vsu integrante vnam iustitiam communem ex virtutibus collectim acceptis : quia illae omnes tendunt ad componendos mores, ergo ex omnibus scientijs fiet vna: quia omnes tendunt ad perficiendum intellectum...

Furthermore, while objects are held to be identical in the premisses and in

the respective conclusions, the way they are present in the premisses is claimed

to be different from the way they are present in the conclusions; again, Hurtado’s *Logica* is referenced in this context:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 419v	<i>Logica</i> , disp. 10, sect. 1 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 152)
Nam si eodem modo sit obiectum in praemissis, et in conclusione, non est modus sciendi, id est non est manifestatiuus ignoti, vt explicui disputatione 10. <i>Logicae</i> , sectione 1a.	Erit igitur proprie modus sciendi, <i>cognitio manifestans ignotum</i> , nec arbitreris definitionem hanc in quamcumque cognitionem quadrare: licet enim omnis cognitio quodammodo manifestet ignotum, id est, exprimat intellectui obiectum, quod prius non exprimebatur (...) clare manifestat obiectum, obscure cognitum per alium actum...

Developing this theory of inference, the conclusions are held to be equally certain as the premisses, and *Logic* and *De anima* (a part of Hurtado’s *cursus*) are referenced:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 474r	<i>Logica</i> , disp. 11, sect. 3 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 191)
Ostendi disputatione 7 <i>De anima</i> , et 11 <i>Logicae</i> vtramque praemissam non esse certiozem conclusione; sed hanc esse aequae certam, ac illas.	Potest in controuersiam reuocari. Vtrum praemissae certiores sint, at clariores conclusione? aut aliqua conclusio sit certior suo principio? (...) Nullam demonstrationem constare vtraque praemissa euidentiori, aut certiore conclusione cum multis sentio, et probo. Primo, quia...
	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 7, sect. 9 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 746) Conclusionem non posse esse perfectiorem vtraque praemissa patet ex dictis in logica disputatio. 10. sectio. 9. vbi probaui obiectum conclusionis esse idem cum obiecto praemissarum: cum ergo obiectum sit idem, et conclusio pendeat ex praemissis, non est cur sit illis perfectior. Item est liquidum posse vtramque praemissam esse perfectiorem conclusione, quia licet obiectum sit idem, tamen singulae illarum sunt, vel immediatae, vel melioris obiecti partialis, vt in conclusione Theologica patet, quae in supernaturalitate inferior est praemissa de Fide, item in euidentia est inferior principio naturali, ergo. Hic abstineo à quaestione de supernaturalitate conclusionis Theologicae: non enim est huius instituti, sed I. part. quaest. 1.

Other examples relate objects to the theory of representation (or *species*):

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 320v	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 7, sect. 7 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 745)
Vocare autem obiectum illud mediatum vel immediatum est quaestio de voce. De hoc genere hauriendi species ab obiectis egi disputatione 7. De anima , §. 49 et disputatione 12, §. 18.	§. 49. Dico secundo, sine actualibus praemissis potest intellectus adsentiri obiecto conclusionis: sed non per actum conclusionis. Patet ratione dubitandi pro prima sententia: quae hoc probat, et non plus. Secunda pars probatur ex nostra sententia. Rogas id quo pacto fiet? Respondeo ex assensu conclusionis in intellectu relinqui speciem impressam repraesentantem illud obiectum , sicut ex primo iudicio relinquitur simili species per quam intellectus determinatur ad iudicandum sine actuali appraehensione: quae species immediate potest excitari, quin excirentur species praemissarum: ille actus formaliter non est scientificus, sed in virtute, et in radice: fertur autem immediate in suum obiectum , etque distinctae speciei, ab actu conclusionis, qui habet speciem impressam: quae in ratione principij actui essentialiter differt à praemissis. Videantur quae dixi sect. 1. de excitatione specierum. Haec tamen cognitio non est simpliciter immediata, quia licet actu deducatur sine medio, adhuc eius species dependet à medio: dici tamen potest immediata formaliter, et radicaliter mediata: non tamen est tam perfecta, quam illa conclusio, quae relinquit speciem: quia species non potest esse principium cognitionis perfectioris ea à qua species relinquitur. Potest autem intellectus excitari, et per praemissas, et per illam speciem ad conclusionem duobus quidem actibus diuersarum specierum, vtrum autem fiat vnum ex vtroque principio? non est hinc.

and to the identity-conditions of acquired dispositions:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 486v	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 16, sect. 4 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 879–880)
Visio enim albedinis eiusdem speciei in quocumque subiecto sit. Haec autem obiecta materialia terminant in naturalibus diuersos habitus, vt ostendi disputatione 16. De anima.	§. 33. In intellectu autem in mea sententia tot sunt habitus, quot sunt species ita ordinatae, vt promptum reddant intellectum ad actus. Agendum admissa distinctione inter habitus et species: respondeo tot esse habitus intellectuales, quot actus specie distincti cum Nominalibus. (...) §. 34. Negotium facessit B. Thomas I.2, q. 54, art. 2 constituens discrimen habituum ex obiectis formalibus, non vero materialibus. Respondeo ab eo distingui ab obiectis proximis, non vero à remotis, vt visiones distinxit per colores, non vero per subiecta illorum.

Another group of references relates to Hurtado's epistemology. The first two examples relate to his theory that a particular truth-value is essential to a state-

ment and hence does not change. First, there is a pair of references focusing on statements being true *per essentiam*, referencing Hurtado's *De anima*.¹⁷

¹⁷ See Embry (forth.) for Hurtado's theory of truth and Embry (2015) for more general aspects of Baroque theories of truth.

Dublin TCD, ms. 298	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 8, sect. 4 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 751)
<p>fol. 336v: Possunt actus esse veri per essentiam, vt dixi <i>disputatione 8. De anima</i>.</p> <p>fol. 337v: De falibilitate humanorum actuum egi <i>disputatione 8. De anima §. 25. et 26.</i>, vbi ostendi eorum incertitudinem, etiam si sint per essentiam veri.</p>	<p>§. 25. Vrges; omnem determinationem actus veri ad veritatem esse certitudinem; sed actus probabilis verus, est determinatus ad veritatem: ergo est certus. Maior à nobis videtur poni. Minor probatur, quia tunc est actus determinatus ad verum, quando illi actui repugnat falsitas, sed illi actui repugnat falsitas: ergo est determinatus ad verum. Respondeo admissa opinione, asserente nullum actum posse mutari de vero in falsum, aut è contra, siue veritas sit de essentia actus, siue non, adhuc esse actus certos, et incertos, neque enim vnquam ex ea opinione id negandum censuit aliquis, nec potuit, nam et communis loquendi modus, et vsus id attestatur.</p>

Another pair of references to the same passage emphasises the immutability of a statement's truth-value:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 436r–v	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 9, sect. 4 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 759–760)
<p>Secundum argumentum, quia ante ortum Christi hic actus fidei est verus, Christus nascetur tempore futuro. Christo nato perseueret idem numero actus: iam erit falsus, quia Christus non nascetur tempore futuro, quia natus est tempore praeterito amplius non nasciturus. Ergo actus fidei potest e vero esse falsus per solam mutationem obiecti. Quod argumentum est Almaini opinantis eundem actum posse successiue esse verum, et falsum, quod contra Patrem Suar. et alios impugnaui late disputatione 9. De anima, sectione 4. et 5^a.</p>	<p>Dico primo, nulla propositio potest mutari de vera in falsam, aut è conuerso. (...) Dices, illam successiue esse veram, et falsam: quia illa durante mutatur obiectum, itaque ego per dimidiam horam dico <i>Petrus currit</i>: prima parte horae currit Petrus, posteriori vero parte non currit: ecce propositionem veram in prima horae parte: falsam vero in secunda. Contra: ergo iam <i>Petrus currit</i> significat Petrum currere tota dimidia hora, qua durat propositio, et facit hunc sensum, <i>Petrus currit tota dimidia hora</i>, quod si hunc non facit abs re est obiectio: et non currente Petro toto tempore, quo propositio durat, illa est falsa, currente vero est vera. Necesse est autem Petrum toto illo tempore currere, vel non currere: si currit est vera semper, falsa autem si non currit. Itaque propositio illa semper connotat vel totum tempus quo durat collectiue, vel aliquam partem illius diuisiue.</p>

Another epistemological reference relates to the theory of assent as related to the theory of representation:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 356r–v	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 7, sect. 3 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 739)
<p>Hic assensus productus per speciem est actualiter immediatus. Et quantumcumque sit de aliquo accidenti demonstrabili a priori, tamen per habitum illum tam est indemonstrabile, ac si vacaret causâ, quemadmodum est indemonstrabile in scientia a posteriori. Quando vero illa obiecta</p>	<p>§. 21. Rogas, cur dicamus haberi aliquas propositiones per se notas? Respondeo, quia cognita substantia per discursum ex accidentibus, relinquitur in nobis species impressa ipsius substantiae, per quam speciem substantiam illam</p>

habent causas, aut quasi causas, non dicuntur absolute immediata, et per se nota, quia quamvis respectu illorum actuum sunt immediata, et per se nota, tamen per alios habitus possunt demonstrari a priori, aut quasi a priori. Hanc doctrinam de immediato assensu per has species late tradidit disputatione 7. De anima a §. 21. , sine qua nullum possumus gradum facere in phylosophia nec in theologia.	cognoscimus, sine actuali discursu: et quia eam cognitionem actu non habemus à posteriori, neque habemus cognitionem alterius obiecti, quod sit causa talis substantiae; ideo ea cognitio dicitur <i>immediata</i> , et <i>per se nota</i> , vt haec homo est <i>rationale</i> , quia actu non deducitur ex aliquo medio: sed fit per speciem relictam ex primo discursu...
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Furthermore, there are references relating to Hurtado's semiotics, referencing several passages from the eighth disputation of Hurtado's *Logic*:¹⁸

Dublin TCD, ms. 298	<i>Logica, disp. 8, sect. 3</i> (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 133–134)
fol. 391r–v: In quo consistat locutio. Haec quaestio non est tam de re, quam de nomine. Constat enim qui actus interni, et externi in loquente, et audiente reperiantur. Varia tamen sunt hominum placita: de quibus videri potest Vazquez tom. 2. 1 ^{ae} . partis, disputatione 211. Ipse censet (et suo iudicio cum Aristotele) verba, et locutionem esse sonum productum labiorum motu. Scotus opinatur non distingui locutionem ab auditione; sed vtramque esse eundem actum intellectus existentem in audiente: qui vt dicit respectum ad loquentem, est locutio, vt recipitur in audiente, est auditio. Quod explicari potest exemplo actionis, et passionis. Huic opinioni in <i>Logica</i> subscripsi disputatione 8, et nunc.	§. 9. Ratio signi actualis, siue in actu secundo, consistit in actuali expressione, et perceptione rei significatae per illud... docere est, quando audiens actu percipit, et discit rem doctam, et quando discipulus non discit, magister quidem non docet, quia si docet: ergo aliquis docetur, ergo qui docetur redditur doctus, at non redditur doctus, nisi quio actu percipit rem doctam: ergo: atqui eadem est ratio de significatione. §. 10. (...) Secundo, quia actualis locutio est actualis significatio rei, et expressio (vt ostendi supra, §. 9.), non est autem actualis significatio sine actuali perceptione audientis.
fol. 386v: Voluntas virtualis de aliquo obiecto est voluntas efficax alicuius causae, ex qua sequitur necessario talis effectus: sed ex voluntate proferendi voces significatiuas sequitur necessario in audiente cognitio de conceptu loquentis circa rem dictam. Ergo voluntas efficax loquendi est virtualis voluntas de manifestando conceptu loquentis. Maiorem late probaui in disputationibus de actibus humanis et peccatis. Minor constat ex disp. 8. <i>Logicae</i> §. 13. et 15. , quia locutio pendet essentialiter ex conceptu loquentis de re, quam loquitur; quem conceptum significat necessario locutio. Omnis enim effectus significat necessario suam causam...	§. 13. Dico primo, voces non possunt significare res, nisi vt conceptas, ita vt conceptio sit conditio, sine qua voces non significarent, sicut ignis calefacit vt applicatus. Haec conclusio, sic explicata, probatur, tum ex Aristotele, quia voces sunt notae (id est signa) eorum quae sunt in mente (id est, rerum cognitarum, quae obiectiue sunt in mente, formaliter per cognitionem earum) tum probatur, secunda et tertia ratione, D. Thomas quae nihil aliud probant, quia, qui loquitur, vult explicare rem, quam ipse concipit.

¹⁸ Hurtado's semiotics is discussed in Leblanc (2016), available via URL = <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upWYcDcZDcs&list=PL_cU2Gsvem3kXpJTThbPpfyP2e_kwnAP&index=8>.

	<p>(...) §. 15. Dico 3. voces significant aliquando ipsos animi conceptus, ut <i>haec intellectio actus intelligendi</i>. Dico quarto, qui audit alium loquentem potest per discursum intellectiones illius cognoscere, sed non pro libito, sed naturaliter, probatur, quia, qui videt alium loquentem, potest discurrere illum bene aut male cognoscere ea, quae loquitur, eumque deceptum, aut non deceptum. Hanc cognitionem esse naturalem inde patet, quia vox articulata ex natura sua indicat apprehensum esse id, quod profertur, sicut voces animantium indicant naturaliter internas illorum imaginationes. Hunc autem discursum non fieri semper experientia testatur. Ad tertium, pro prima sententia respondetur, nos vti voce ad exprimenda obiecta actuum, nempe quid de illis sentiamus. Hoc est autem pandere sensa: vt cum dico sentio hoc, aut illud. Ad quartum, in tali casu cognosci etiam albedinem actu abstractiuo, quin cognoscatur abstractio loquentis.</p>
<p>(fol. 387v) Maior patet, quia locutio non significat conceptum mentis, sed in recto rem conceptam; connotatur autem conceptio rei, non vt obiectum significatum, sed vt causa locutionis; de quo abunde in <i>Logica</i> disputatione 8. a §. 14.</p>	<p>§. 14. Dico secundò, voces formaliter repraesentant res ipsas, et non ipsos actus, id est obiectum vorum sunt res, non verò notitiae rerum, ita, D. Thom. Opus. 56.</p>

As the last three examples, there are several passages relating to the epistemo-logy of faith. First, the question whether general beliefs imply specific beliefs:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298, fol. 371r	<i>Logica</i> , disp. 10, sect. 15 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 170)
At ea propositio de fide potest multifariam cognosci: iam per actus fidei, iam per Theologiae, iam per methaphysicae pro diuersitate modi, et obiectorum formalium. Primo haec maior propositio omnis homo est conceptus in peccato potest per fidem ita cognosci , vt nullus indiuiduus homo apprehendatur in	<p>§. 74. Poterit responderi, ex doctrina P. Vazquez, tom. 1, in 3 part., et tom. 2. in 1. part. disput. 135. Vbi ait mysterium Trinitatis non posse demonstratione cognosci ex reuelatione euidenter cognita, quia conclusio nihil infert et à praemissa distinctum. Nam qui euidenter noscit omnia Dei dicta esse vera, etiam scit hoc dictum esse verum, quia continetur in vniuersali propositione, vnde videtur infferri non esse propriae syllogismum, qui constat praemissa vniuersali, et conclusione singulari, quia non distinguuntur illae propositiones. Verum eam doctrinam impugnaui disput. 41 in 3. part. sect. 3. subsect. 1, quia nulla demonstratio posset componi ex vna praemissa vniuersali, et altera particulari, nam aliquis homo currit, tam continetur sub hac omnis homo currit, quam haec Petrus currit, sunt enim subalternae. Ratio à priori, quia nihil refert omnem hominem currere, vt Petrus currat, nisi</p>

<p>particulari: vel saltem non apprehendatur Petrus. Hic actus fidei solus non sufficit ad inferendum hanc conclusionem, <i>ergo Petrus est conceptus in peccato</i>: vt patet ex §. 9. Eaque ratione ostendi disputatione 10. <i>Logicae</i> §. 74.</p>	<p>Petrus sit homo, itaque concesso omnem hominem currere, negari potest Petrum currere, quia negari potest Petrum esse hominem, donec enim non probantur, hae duae propositiones: <i>omnis homo currit, Petrus est homo</i>. Nulla est necessitas concedendi hanc: <i>ergo Petrus currit</i>. Ratio à priori, quia per solam vniuersalem non bene probatur idemtitas extremorum cum tertio termino, sic autem deficit medium ad deducendam idemtitatem extremorum inter se, itaque conclusio non continetur adaequate in sola vna propositione, sed in duabus. Quam ob rem supra probaui syllogismum constare duabus praemissis.</p>
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Second, the compatibility of faith with scientific knowledge (regarding the same problem) is addressed:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 10, sect. 5 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 786, 789)
<p>fol. 414r: Dices posse esse propositionem prudentem, cum qua possit esse formido absque peccato: ea tamen non sit actu; vt dixi disputatione 10 <i>De anima</i> posse simul componi scientiam, et opinionem absque formidine actuali.</p>	<p>Vtrum fides possit esse simul cum scientia? §. 44 Haec quaestio communis est cuius actui obscuro fidei humanae, diuinae, et opinionis. D. Th. 2.2. q. 1. ar. 4. et 5. docet aperte, non posse eundem intellectum habere simul scientiam et fidem de eodem obiecto, quem sequuntur Caieta. ibi Capreo. et alii apud P. Valentiam tom. 3. disp. 1. q. 1. pun. 4. §. 2. initio, in quam opinionem eunt omnes fere Thomistae. (...)</p>
<p>fol. 468v: Vtrum fides et scientia de obiecto materiali possint esse simul. §. 3. Negat D. Tho. art. 5. et cum illo tota concio, et Pater Luys. disp. 8. Pater Vazquez distinguit, et admittit fidem, et scientiam abstractiuam, non tamen intuitiuam. Oppositam sententiam docui disputatione 10. <i>De anima</i>, sectione 5. et doceo, quia haec propositio <i>Deus est</i> potest cognosci simul per duo media, quae non habent oppositionem inter se, sed possunt simul componi, ergo vtrumque medium est simul ratio illam cognoscendi.</p>	<p>§. 58 Ex dictis patet habitus scientiae, et fidei non esse oppositos, quod in omni sententia est verum; quamuis qui aiunt actus opponi, et habitus esse distinctos ab speciebus impressis, consequenter dicent, habitus esse oppositos in gradu intenso, quia ex actibus colligitur habituum oppositio, non quidem tanta, quanta in actibus. Nam duae inclinationes ad actus oppositos non opponuntur sicut actus ipsi, qui connotant obiecto contradictionem.</p>

Third, Hurtado's *De anima* is referenced while the theory of infused and supernatural habits is being discussed:

Dublin TCD, ms. 298	<i>De anima</i> , disp. 16, sect. 8 (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 884)
<p>fols. 473v–474r: Adde nullum esse inconueniens admittere habitum supernaturalem per se</p>	<p>§. 55. Non erit abs re ostendere discrimen habitus naturalis,</p>

<p>acquisitum, qualis constituitur Theologia a Patre Molina, nullum inquam esse absurdum a ratione, qua evidenter probatur nullum esse discrimen inter actus naturales, et supernaturales in gignendo habitu. Quodsi de facto non gignitur per supernaturales actus, non est ex defectu illorum, sed quia Deus non vult, de quo egi disputatione 16. De anima sectione vltima. Igitur fidei [fidei] habitus <i>ante correctionem</i> MS] actus est ex natura sua productivus habitus, quamvis per accidens eum non producat.</p>	<p>et supernaturalis. Habitus supernaturalis communiter vocatur per se infusus, quia à solo Deo infunditur in potentias hominis, vel Angeli, illis mere passivae concurrentibus. Dicuntur <i>infusi per se</i>, nam et habitus naturales sunt aliquando infusi, sed per accidens: quia ex natura sua non petunt infundi, sed per actus acquiri.</p>
<p>fol. 510r: Probationi praemitto nullum habitum per se infusum dare potentiae facilitatem ad operandum, nec inclinationem propriam[?] aptitudinis, sed praecisse dare simpliciter posse, quam doctrinam docui disputatione 16. De anima a §. 60, cum Patre Vazquez 1^a 2^{ae} disp. 78. n^o. 3. et disp. 187, n. 4, quam ex Scoto, et alijs docet Aureolus in 1. distinctione 17, 2^a parte § quod charitas disponit.</p> <p>fol. 529r: Infusio late sumpta vsurpatur pro quocumque dono Dei collato speciali illius gratia. Vnde ecclesia petit a Deo, vt nobis infundat affectum charitatis. Infundere enim perinde est ac fundere in aliquid, v.g. aquam infundere in cacauum. Gratia autem Dei saepe explicatur per aquam, <u>et fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam</u>. Proprie autem accipitur a Theologis pro collatione alicuius habitus facti a solo Deo. Haec autem collatio est duplex, alia per se, altera per accidens. Per accidens est productio alicuius habitus, qui natura sua potest nostris actibus effici vt causa principali: Deus autem eum ordinem invertens eos nobis donat. Vt si habitum scientiae alicui donaret, antequam illam proprio compararet studio. In quo genere sunt habitus supernaturales, qui non dant simpliciter, sed facile posse, distincti quidem ab habitibus per se infusis, quorum memini disputatione 16. De anima, sectione vltima.</p>	<p>§. 60. Tertium discrimen est: habitus per se infusus non faciliat potentiam ad operandum (vt docet Pat. Vazquez prima secundae disput. 78. num. 3. et tomo 2. disp. 187. num. 4^o et quae. 113. art. 3. in commentario, nu. 65.) quia id quod complet potentiam in ratione potentiae, non faciliat, neque inclinat proprie. Nam inclinatio supponit potentiam, quam inclinet: docet enim Beatus Thomas 1.2. quaest. 49. art. 4. corp. id quod disponitur debere esse potentiam eius ad quod disponitur per habitum: voluntas autem secundum se non est potentia ad actus supernaturales: ergo habitus per se infusus non est proprie facilitas ad prompte et delectabiliter operandum, sed complet ad simpliciter posse. Quod patet in specie impressa, quae intellectum non inclinat ad actum.</p>

While some of the examples may not be entirely persuasive in and of themselves, as a collection of arguments they appear to confirm Hurtado’s authorship of *De fide*. The authenticity of the text has interesting implications, which will now be outlined.

First, the manuscript of *De fide* contains multiple references to works by Hurtado which are currently lost. As such, it is a valuable source of information regarding Hurtado’s early

theological works. As of now, six interesting references have been identified. Three of them reference what could be a single text, referenced as “disputationes de peccatis”, “disputationes de actibus humanis et peccatis”, and “disputationes de actibus humanis”, or perhaps two separate texts, i.e. one on sins and the other on human action;¹⁹ in his

19 “Duo testimonia explicat Augustinus ibi: ob quae credit Holc. Achab, et Aegyptios, deceptos a Deo 3. Reg. 22.20, vbi Deus

later period, Hurtado wrote two separate texts on these topics. (Schmutz 2019b and forth. and Hanke 2021 and 2022) The existence of “disputationes de actibus humanis” is confirmed by the 1624 edition of Hurtado’s philosophical *cursus*.²⁰ Second, “disputationes de

iustificatione” is referenced;²¹ the existence of the text is confirmed in the 1615 edition of Hurtado’s philosophical *cursus*.²² Third, Hurtado references “disputationes de charitate”.²³ Finally, Hurtado references “the third part”, possibly disputations on Aquinas’ *Tertia pars*; the existence of the text is confirmed by

dixit diabolo *egredere, et praevalerebis*, id est cura decipiendum Achab, quod obtinebis. Quod testimonium ex sacris interpretibus de sola permissione **explicui disputatione 8. de peccatis**, expugnans praedeterminationem ad materiale peccati, eapropter ab ea supersedeo.” *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, *De fide*, MS Dublin, ms. 298, fol. 424v (emphasis mine). “Secundo probatur idem antecedens e §. 38 nempe Deum fore vitiosum, quia fallere est intrinsece turpe, ergo qui vult libere fallere est turpis, et vitiosus. Probationi antecedentis praemitto doctrinam late **probatam a me in disputationibus de actibus humanis et peccatis...**” *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 434r–v (emphasis mine). “V.g. ego sagitto animal videns esse periculum sagittandi hominem, quia nondum percipio animal illud ab homine distingui: si cum ea consideratione sagitto, iam quantum est ex me volo hominem sagittare, et habeo formalem, aut virtutalem conditionem sagittandi animal, etiam si homo sit, **de quo copiose egi in disputationibus de actibus humanis**, quia contra virtutem exterius consummatam peccatur cum ignorantia vincibili.” *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 525r–v (emphasis mine).

20 “...ostendi enim in **disputationibus de actibus humanis, et peccatis** inde expendi bonitatem, et malitiam: quod de malitia fundamentalis, ob quam obiecta prohibentur, negat nullus: nisi rancidus aliquis et antiquatus Theologus, ita vna veritas erit melior alia: quia conuenientior naturae rationali; non tamen maior.” (Hurtado 1624, 151–152, emphasis mine). The reference is not included in the 1615 edition, where the passage is different, and the same holds true for other instances (see, e.g. Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 238 vs. Hurtado de Mendoza 1624, 186). While a more thorough analysis of the differences between the 1615 and 1624 editions is needed, this seems to support the hypothesis that the

referenced text was written between the 1615 and 1624 editions.

21 “Mitto aliquorum argumentum opinantium non opponi naturalia, et supernaturalia, quia naturalia educuntur de potentia naturali, supernaturalia vero de obedientiali, quae sunt oppositae sententiae. **Hos late impugnaui in disputationibus de iustificatione**. Primo exemplo gratiae habitualis, et peccati mortalis actualis. Secundo exemplo actus fidei, et erroris circa idem obiectum. Tertio a priori, quia potentia obedientialis, et naturalis sunt idem quo ad substantiam recipientem effectus formales...” *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 512r (emphasis mine).

22 “Item per actus malos corrumpuntur physice omnes habitus per se infusi (excepta Fide, et Spe: quae re ipsa non corrumpuntur nisi per desperationem, et haeresim) quia per peccatum mortale gratia expellitur ex natura rei, à qua pendent habitus, illius comites indiuidui. **De quo egi disp. 12. de iustificatione.**” (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 885). The same edition references disputations on q. 113 of I^a–II^{ae}, which could be the same text, as the question discusses justification: “...de hac morali actu permanentia egi abunde **in 1.2. q. 113. disp. 1. sect. 4** agens de essentia peccati habitualis.” (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 133). For another example from the 1624 edition, see Hurtado de Mendoza (1624, 108).

23 “Innititur autem prophetia haec auctoritati diuinae non vt obiecto primario, sed vt principio actiuo locutionis Dei, quae est obiectum prophetiae. Et quamvis in substantia est habitus, vocatur a D. Thom. dispositio, quia non datur permanentemente, **vt de lumine gloriae dixi in disputationibus de charitate.**” *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 460r (emphasis mine).

a similar reference in the 1615 edition of Hurtado's philosophical *cursus*.²⁴

Second, one might wonder why there are two separate Hurtado texts on the topic of faith prepared about five years apart (1619 and 1625, respectively); at any rate, there are other examples of the consecutive production of texts on the same topics in Hurtado's career, such as the treatises from the 1630s on divine knowledge and predestination. (Schmutz 2019b and forth. and Hanke 2022) Only a detailed comparative analysis can show how close the two versions are to one another and inform us better regarding to what extent the printed treatise on faith utilised pre-existing material.

3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL ISSUES IN DE FIDE

3.1 GENERAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Faith being a specific kind of belief, its relation to other types of belief naturally

becomes an issue. A significant part of that debate consists of relating faith to scientific knowledge and rational discourse. While many of the topics most relevant to *De fide* are theological as far as their original intention and motivation are concerned, such as the debate on *evidentia credibilitatis* and *evidentia in attestante*, certain parts of the text are concerned with general epistemological issues, such as the notions of truth (as opposed to falsehood), certainty, and evidence.²⁵ The main source for this debate is the twenty-fourth disputation of *De fide*, entitled *De fidei certitudine*. In accordance with the context, Hurtado's analysis opens with the notion of certainty. The Latin term "certitudo" (or the Spanish adjective "certera") is held to have three different meanings. The first is related to a firm voluntary decision towards a certain line of action. The second equates certainty with evidence, but is held to be in discord with the common scholastic understanding of these two notions, which holds them to be different from each other. Third, certainty is related to the ability to attain a goal reliably, such as an archer who rarely misses a target. Similarly to an accurate archer, cognitive acts are considered certain if they are reliably related to truth, the target, so to say, of intellectual activities.²⁶

24 "Ea ratione qui negat principium aliquod evidens, dicitur ignorare terminos, quia si eos caluisset, non potuisset id negare. Certe abritror haec esse evidentia, quia negare non possum. Vide hanc doctrinam in Patre Valent. disputatione 1^a, quaestione 5. punct. 1. [et alijs apud ipsum, et Turrianum [?]] disputatione 9. Adverte contra ipsum Turrianum [?] ex veritate propositionis perfecte, et quiditatie [?] cognita inferri necessario cognitio [?] obiecti, **de quo egi in tertiam partem (...)**" *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 458v–459r (emphasis mine). (The passage in square brackets is a marginal note and a small part of the margin seems to be missing, making certain parts of the text illegible.) "Nam si ego haberem euidentiā physicā de credibilitate mysteriorum, eamdem haberem de mysterijs ipsis: ostendi enim **in 3. part. disp. 42** mysterium Trinitatis euidenter cognosci..." (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 187, emphasis mine).

25 For further analysis of Hurtado's epistemology, see Hanke (2021, 2022, and forth(a)).

26 "Varie accepta certitudo a bene Latinis. Primo pro voluntate efficaci, et firma alicuius rei faciendae. (...) Secundo accipitur certitudo pro evidentia. Res enim clarae et quae negari minime possunt, dicuntur certae. (...) Haec tamen

Second, Hurtado introduces three features of perfect cognitive acts, namely truth in the sense of conformity with an object of these acts, evidence in the sense of the necessity of assenting to such an object and the impossibility of dissenting, and certainty in the sense of the impossibility of an error. Elaborating on the notion of evidence, Hurtado defines evidence as clear and distinct cognition, which, as a consequence, implies the impossibility of dissent.²⁷ A parallel passage from the earlier

nineteenth disputation introduces the same three notions, i.e. truth, certainty, and evidence, and defines evidence in modal terms (or in terms of its effects): something is evident if it is necessarily undeniable. In other words, evidence forces assent. The passage is significant for at least two other reasons. First, *evidentia* is distinguished from *probabilitas*, such that probability is captured in epistemic terms. Second, evidence and probability are related to deductive validity, such that both *consequentia evidens* and *consequentia probabilis* are mentioned in this context. That results in a threefold division of inferences into evident, probable, and non-evident: evident inferences cannot be denied, non-evident inferences can be denied, and probable inferences are such that one is in doubt regarding whether they can be denied or not.²⁸

vsurpatio non est communis in schola distinguente evidentiam a certitudine. Tertio accipitur certitudo pro dexteritate attingendi scopum. V.g. sagittarius, aut sclopetarius, qui raro aberrat ab scopo, dicuntur habere sagittam certam, aut ictus certos, Hispane *certeros*. (...) Hinc per translationem actus intellectus dicitur certus, qui non potest aberrare a veritate, quae est scopus intellectus." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 491v–492v (disp. 24, sect. 1, §§. 2–4).

27 "In actibus perfectis intellectus reperiuntur tria. Primo conformitas actus cum obiecto. Secundo necessitas assentiendi obiecto cum impotentia disentiendi. Tertio necessitas attingendi veritatem, ita vt non possimus exercere actum falsum. Conformitas cum obiecto vocatur veritas; necessitas assentiendi evidentia; impotentia errandi certitudo. Evidentia proprie est quaedam actus perfectio, qua tam clare, et distincte cognoscitur obiectum, vt negari non possit. Itaque per [per] [?] *ante correctionem* MS] effectum secundarium explicatur ratio evidentiae, nam de prima ratione principij evidentis non est reddere intellectum impotentem disensus: nec enim principium evidens primario connotat negationem actus oppositi, sed primario tendit in obiectum perfecte; ex qua perfecte colligitur vt conceptus secundarius impotentia disentiendi: obscuritas autem est tendentia in obiectum tam imperfecta, vt possit illud negari." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 492v (disp. 24, sect. 2, §§. 5–6).

28 "...evidentia absolute est necessitas absolute cognoscendi aliquid, nempe quando ita cognoscitur, vt non possit negari. (...) Probatur maior e §. 26, quia consequentia evidens dicitur, quae negari non potest, quae autem negari possunt, dicuntur inevidentes. Quando autem est dubium vtrum possint negari nec ne, dicuntur consequentiae probabiles. Ergo iam hoc genus evidentiae consequentiam est necessitas illas non negandi. Secundo probatur, quia in actu perfecto reperiuntur tria, veritas, certitudo, et evidentia; in imperfecto autem reperiuntur duo, probabilitas, et falsitas. Veritas est repraesentatio obiecti, vt est: falsitas aliter ac est: quae nec probabilitas, nec certitudo vt sic non cogunt intellectum ad assensum: cogit autem evidentia, ergo determinatio intellectus ad assensum est proprius effectus evidentiae." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 456v–457r (disp. 19, sect. 1, subs. 3, §§. 26–27). For further analysis of probabilistic

The etymology of “evidence” (*evidentia*) introduced by Hurtado relates evidence to perfect visual apprehension of an object (*perfecta videntia*), and sight is also the first paradigm of evidence: seeing light clearly entails not being able to deny that there is light. As opposed to that, one could clearly see that an object is an animal, while being in doubt as to whether that animal is a human being, if it is not seen perfectly.²⁹ Similarly, self-evident principles (such as the law of the excluded middle) are evident, provided that we understand their meaning correctly; haptic evidence excludes the possibility of denying the existence of fire, and a syllogistic conclusion cannot be denied once its premisses have been granted.³⁰

To further elucidate the relationship between truth, certainty, and evidence, Hurtado stresses that certainty does not consist solely of excluding the falsity of a certain cognitive act as impossible, but also requires such an act to be brought forth by principles which cannot generate a false cognitive act. (Recall the metaphor of an archer’s certainty in hitting the target.)³¹ From the point of view of the principles, cognitive acts are either certain or uncertain (or, in some cases, probable), depending on whether they can generate a false cognitive act or not, regardless of their truth-value and modal value. As an example, the belief that God is real can be merely probable if derived from merely probable principles, despite its truth and necessity.³²

inferences and literature, see Knebel (2000) and Hanke (2020a).

- 29 “Explicantur haec primo in visu, a quo sumitur nomen *evidentia*, id est quaevis perfecta videntia, vt eloquentia est perfecta loquentia. Visus inquam, aliquando tam perfecte attingit obiectum, vt necessitet intellectum ad assensum. Cum enim ego lucem video, et in intellectu excitatur intuitiva apprehensio eius lucis, non possum dissentiri esse lucem. Aliquando vero imperfecte videtur obiectum, adeo vt negari possit, quae visio externa, et apprehensio intellectus sunt indifferentes, vt componitur cum disensu, atque assensu obiecti visi; v.g. cum minus intuemur animal, non possumus negare illud esse animal; possumus tamen negare, et affirmare esse hominem; quod oritur, quia obiectum est imperfecte visum.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 492v–493r (disp. 24, sect. 2, §. 7).
- 30 “Idem patet in principiis per se notis, quae negari non possunt ex suppositione rectae apprehensionis terminorum, quia hoc principium quodlibet est, vel non est cognoscitur per speciem tam perfectam, vt si recte apprehendatur, non possit negari. Idem dixerim de principiis per se

notis experientiâ. Nam cum apprehensione vehementi vitionis orta ex tactu non potest esse disensus de existentia ignis. In discursu est eadem ratio, quia praemissae in primo syllogismo sunt per se notae, conclusio vero, si syllogismus sit legitimus, non potest negari.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 493r (disp. 24, sect. 2, §. 8).

- 31 “Dixi §.5. reperiri in actu intellectus necessitatem attingendi veritatem, quam necessitatem dixi esse certitudinem (...) Item in omni sententia (...) sunt multi probabiles, quibus repugnat falsitas. V.g. est controversia vtrum in Deo sit iustitia proprie: asserunt hi, negant illi: vtraque opinio est probabilis, neutra certa. Altera tamen est vera, quae nec diuinitus potest esse falsa. Ergo in omni sententia ad certitudinem plus requiritur, quam repugnantia, vt actus in actu secundo sit falsus. Requiritur ergo, vt principia, a quibus oritur, sint ita determinata ad veritatem, vt neque hunc, nec alium actum falsum possint producere.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 494v (disp. 24, sect. 2, §. 12).
- 32 “Itaque principia quibus operamur actum verum, sunt bipartita: quaedam habent

As a supplement to the general passage, Hurtado discusses a series of objections to his account of certainty and evidence, the first of which helps when reconstructing Hurtado's epistemology. Bearing on the definitions of evidence and certainty, the objection suggests that evidence and certainty are identical, as evident principles cannot generate a false cognitive act, which effectively constitutes certainty. Hurtado replies that every piece of evidence constitutes certainty (thus acknowledging the point of the argument), but not vice versa. As

an example, supernatural cognitive acts are reliable, and yet they miss the clarity of evident principles.³³

In a different context, Hurtado discusses a similar problem, namely whether Christian faith is more certain than scientific knowledge. In what he perceives to be in opposition to other scholastic authors (including Aquinas and Bonaventura), Hurtado claims that faith is more certain than scientific knowledge both in itself (*quoad se*) and for us (*quoad nos*).³⁴ At first sight, this might seem unwarranted: if certainty is defined in terms of the relation of a belief

potentiam operandi illum actum cum impotentia operandi oppositum falsum: quaedam vero habent potentiam operandi verum actum, et carent impotentia operandi falsum: quia simul habent potentiam ad actum verum, et falsum. Principia primi generis sunt certa: suntque in genere superiori perfectionis; quam perfectionem communicant actibus in actu secundo. Actus ergo, qui vt relatus ad sua principia ita est verus, vt ex vi principiorum sit verus necessario, ita vt ab illis nec ipse potuerit esse falsus, nec alius loco ipsius: sed ita oritur vt ab illis principiis nullus actus falsus possit oriri, ille, inquam, est certus. Principia autem secundi generis sunt incerta: et omnes eius actus incerti: esto multi sint veri, et de obiecto necessario. Nam illa veritas, quamvis sit essentialis actui vero, est accidentaria principiis, a quibus oritur: quae natura sua potuerunt componi cum actu falso circa idem obiectum, illumque elicere. Exempli gratia circa hoc obiectum *Deus est* cognitum per medium probabile possumus exercere assensum, et dissensum: ergo actus affirmatiuus *Deus est* ita oritur a principiis, vt potuerit oriri oppositus. Ergo veritas illius actus non oritur ex praecisa vi principiorum, ergo non habet tantam perfectionem, quantam haberet a principio certo. Patet consequentia, quia principia certa et infalibilia perfectiorem actum exercent, quam incerta." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 494v–495r (disp. 24, sect. 2, §. 13).

33 "Dices primo, hōc non differre certitudinem ab evidentia. Nam principia evidentia ita sunt determinata ad assensum, vt non possint exercere actum falsum. Respondeo omnem evidentiam esse certitudinem propter hanc rationem: at vero omnem certitudinem non esse evidentiam. Quia possunt esse principia determinata ad actum verum, quin determinant intellectum ad exercendum illum actum. Certitudo oritur ex conceptu supernaturalitatis, quae non potest errare a vero: indeterminatio vero ad actum oritur ex obscuritate, quia per species confusas repraesentatur obiectum. Est ergo hoc discrimen, quod principia evidentia nec [nec] [?] *ante correctionem* MS] possunt elicere actum falsum, nec illum patiuntur secum componi etiam ab alijs principiis." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 495r (disp. 24, sect. 2, §. 14).

34 "Dico tamen fidem tam quo ad se, quam quo ad nos esse certiore omnino principio naturali per se noto. Prima pars cum D. Tho. docetur ab illius sequacibus P. Valent. Quaestione 2. art. 8. Secunda est contra eosdem. Item contra Bonau., Alens. et Dur., eam tamen docet Gabr. in 3. dist. 23. quaestione 2. litera D, vbi docet nec visionem beatam esse certiore fide: haec omnia etiam intelligo de certitudine speculationis." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 498v (disp. 24, sect. 3, §. 22).

to its principles (i.e. in objective rather than subjective terms), there appears to be no room for the difference in certainty between faith and science. However, Hurtado claims that while the certainty of natural principles (including self-evident conceptual truths) is only granted *ex parte obiecti*, supernatural principles are, moreover, granted certainty *ex parte potentiae*, thus gaining additional degrees of certainty on the basis of their being determined by additional principles; recall that certainty is defined precisely in terms of relation to principles.³⁵ Natural principles are held to lack certainty *ex parte potentiae* in the sense that intellect as such is viewed as neutral towards truth and falsehood, as human cognition is in and of itself fallible. As opposed to that, supernatural acts are such that human intellect is supported by a supernatural principle, and this supernatural boost is what gives faith an additional degree of certainty.³⁶

35 “Probatur, quia principium naturale etiam si sit per se notum ex terminis, tantum habet vnum gradum certitudinis ex parte obiecti; ex parte autem potentiae nullam habet certitudinem: omnis autem actus fidei praeter gradum certitudinis ex parte obiecti habet alium ex parte potentiae. Ergo est certior fides omni principio per se noto naturali. Consequentia patet, quia certitudo est determinatio actus ex suis principiis ad veritatem: et vbi sunt plura principia determinantia ad veritatem, sunt plures gradus certitudinis.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 498v–499r (disp. 24, sect. 3, §. 23).

36 “Ex parte autem potentiae nullam esse certitudinem illi principio naturali. Probatur, quia potentia secundum se considerata absque informatione speciei perfectae, aut apprehensionis simplicis etiam perfectae, est indifferens ad actum verum et falsum: non est enim potentia in

3.2 EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE

Another interesting epistemological topic discussed in *De fide* is the issue of authority and testimonial knowledge, addressed in the fourth disputation. Given the context, it is not surprising that the primary form of authority in which Hurtado is interested is the divine authority which grants supernatural revelation the status of a reliable source of (otherwise unattainable) information. That said, Hurtado’s introduction to the discussion of revelation includes a general analysis of testimonial knowledge and witness authority. Authority in general is the state of a person’s excellence, for which the person is honoured, obeyed, or trusted.³⁷

suo conceptu infalibilis, sed falibilis. Ergo in suo conceptu non est certa. Antecedens patet, quia saepe fallitur. Consequentia liquet, quia omnis certitudo proprie sumpta est infalibilitas. Infalibilitas est impotentia errandi a veritate. Falli enim est aberrare a vero. Certitudo autem est etiam impotentia errandi, quia est determinatio ad verum vt verum. Ergo nullum principium naturale relatum ad suam potentiam habet infalibilitatem. (...) Actum supernaturalem habere certitudinem ex parte potentiae probatur, quia potentia illius non est intellectus secundum se, sed complexum ex intellectui, et principio supernaturali illum eleuante, vt pono ex conceptu actuum supernaturalium: sed complexum illud est determinatum ad verum. Ergo actus fidei oritur a potentia determinata ad verum.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 499r–v (disp. 24, sect. 3, §§. 24, 26).

37 “Autoritas est excellentia, qua aliquis est illustris. Ita homines graues, et conspicui dicuntur esse viri autoritate. Aliquando autoritas capitur a nobilitate, obquam homines magni fiunt, et dicuntur illustres, idest lucidi, atque conspicui. Est autem autoritas vniuersim ratio physice, aut

Similarly, when related to testimony, authority translates to the quality of a witness which causes our assent to the testimony of that witness; such authority is typically tied to their virtuosity and expertise in the relevant field.³⁸ Witness authority breaks down into two conditions, namely epistemic competence and trustworthiness; as an example used by Hurtado, children and cognitively impaired persons are held to be of little value as witnesses (e.g. in a court of law) on the basis of their lack of epistemic competence.³⁹ Conjoined,

moraliter existens in aliquo, obquam illum aut honoramus, aut ei obedimus, aut credimus." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 317r (disp. 4, sect. 1, §. 2).

38 "Est igitur autoritas testimonij ratio existens in teste a nobis extorquens assensum ipsius testimonij. Saepe credimus hominibus e media plebe, re ipsa propter illorum auctoritatem, quae est frugalitas, et scientia rei dictae; vulgo tamen non dicimur credere propter eorum auctoritatem, quia non excellent sapientia, aut probitate, quamvis habent quod requiritur, vt sint fide digni. Quapropter testes ingenti doctrina, aut sanctitate dicuntur omni exceptione maiores: quia nulli prudenti est locus dubitandi de veritate illorum testimonij." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 317r-v (disp. 4, sect. 1, §. 2).

39 "Haec autoritas primo includit infalibilem sapientiam Dei, per quam ita cognoscit omnia, vt nihil eum possit latere. (...) Eam ob causam difficile credimus pueris, et alijs malo intellectui, quia quantumvis sint homines frugi, longeque absint a voluntate mentiendi, facile tamen decipiuntur. Quam ob rem eorum testimonium parum valet apud iudices. Exigit ergo autoritas sapientiam ex parte intellectus. Praeterea requiritur in voluntate virtus veracitatis, quae inclinat ad dicendum quod sentitur, quomodo sentitur, sine cauillo, et fraude." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 317v (disp. 4, sect. 1, §§. 4–5).

these two conditions are held sufficient in the sense of implying assent to the object of the testimony, and, taken separately, each of them appears to be necessary.⁴⁰

In another context (the ninth disputation, which also discusses the problem of divine revelation), testimonial knowledge is related to another interesting epistemological issue, namely moral evidence and moral certainty, in the sense of lower-degree forms of evidence and certainty. (Knebel 2000 and 2003 and Hanke 2021 and 2022) Moral evidence is based on a substantial number of testimonies in favour of a certain statement, such that the negation of the statement has virtually no probability, i.e. is deeply implausible.⁴¹ This form of evidence relates to contingent situations which may not have happened, but the sheer possibility of things being otherwise does not allow a reasonable person to doubt them, thus discarding reliable testimonies. As with Hurtado's own

40 "Illa principia sunt autoritas sufficiens, quae necessario deducunt ad assensum testimonij, sed nec sola voluntas dicendi verum, nec sapientia sola sufficient, ergo neutra sola est adaequate autoritas. Probatur minor, quia est mala consequentia, Petrus scit quae gesta sunt, et hoc dicit, ergo hoc ita gestum est, nam potuit dicere aliter ac scit. Item haec est mala consequentia, Petrus vult dicere verum, et hoc dicit, ergo dicit verum, nam volens id dicere potuerit decipi. At vero a sapientia, et inclinatione dicendi rem, vt est, bona est consequentia ad rem ipsam, quia sapientia, et inclinatio conflant auctoritatem." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 318r (disp. 4, sect. 1, §§. 6–7).

41 See Schüssler (2019) for this interpretation of probability.

example, this applies to data related by historical accounts, for which direct evidence is not available in principle.⁴²

3.3 EPISTEMIC SOPHISM

Hurtado defines “credibility” (*credibilitas*) as the property of being believable, wise to believe, or obligatory to believe. In the eighteenth disputation of *De fide*, Hurtado asks whether the mysteries of faith are evidently credible, i.e. whether it is evident that they are credible, which ultimately reduces to the question of whether it is evident that the belief in the truth of such mysteries is backed up by the (publicly stated) position of epistemic authorities.⁴³

42 “Evidentia moralis dicitur ratio assentiendi innixa tot hominum testimoniis, ac circumstantijs, vt nulla sit probabilitas partis oppositae. Quamvis enim res secundum se, et physice possint absolute aliter contingere, ac circumferuntur, tamen nullo probabili fundamento ostendi potest id re ipsa contingere. Sola enim potentia vt res aliter contingant, non potest prudentem mouere ad dubium, si graui hominum testimonio aliquid confirmatur. V.g. certum est moraliter Concil. generale annis superioribus coactum esse Tridentij, ibique definitum gratiam esse inhaerentem. Nam tot authores id dicunt verbo, et scripto, nullo reclamante iisdem ipsis temporibus, vt nullus nisi amens possi dissentiri, aut titubare. Ec quis dubitet de Caesarum gestis, de Pompei, Luculli, et aliorum, quae tamen accepimus per hystorias, et traditiones humanas (...) Idem dixerim de Concilio Nizeno, et alijs, quorum memoria deriuata est ab ipsis ad nos sine vlla controversia inter authores.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 374r (disp. 9, sect. 3, §. 16).

43 “Item potest esse triplex quaestio. Prima, vtrum sit evidens posse mysteria credi, idque fide diuina, aut humana. Est enim valde diuersa quaestio, vtrum possimus credere fide humana, an vero diuina. Secunda, vtrum sit evidens ea mysteria

We now turn to the opening argument from the fourth section of the eighteenth disputation. It is interesting for several reasons. First, the passage contains an argument that keeps reappearing in Hurtado’s writings.⁴⁴ Second,

posse prudenter credi. Tertia, vtrum sit evidens ea debere credi. Nec enim omnia quae possunt credi, possunt credi prudenter; nec omnia, quae possunt prudenter credere, tenemur credere sub peccato.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 441r (disp. 18, sect. 1, §. 3). For credibility in scholastic debates on probability, see Knebel (2011, 174–176) and Schüssler (2019a, *passim*).

44 The parallel passage from Hurtado’s philosophical *cursus* is as follows: “Dices hanc regulam esse falsam, vt patet in praesenti, *res euidenter est impossibilis, ergo euidenter est incredibilis. Impossibilitas euidentis, est antecedens, incredibilitas euidentis, est consequens, ex opposito huius consequentis, non sequitur oppositum sui antecedentis, est enim mala consequentia, est euidenter credibile, ergo est euidenter possibile*, vt patet in mysterijs Fidei. Respondeo, regulam esse optimam, res enim sunt tam euidenter possibiles, quam credibiles si euidentia eodem modo sumatur. Nam si ego haberem euidentiam physicam de credibilitate mysteriorum, eadem haberem de mysterijs ipsis: ostendi enim in 3. part. disp. 42. mysterium Trinitatis euidenter cognosci, quod *ad an* est, ab eo qui euidenter cognoscit diuinam reuelationem. Nostra autem mysteria sunt credibilia euidenter, non euidentia physica, alioquin nullus posset illis dissentire, quia euidentia physica necessitate intellectum, saltem quo ad speciem actus: sunt tamen credibilia euidenter moraliter, id est tot argumentis proponi, vt a nullo absque peccato possint non credi, quo genere euidentiae potiuntur mysteria ipsa, nullus enim opinari potest ea posse aliter contingere, quam proponuntur ab Ecclesia, sed quia euidentia in ipsis mysterijs sumitur pro euidentia physica, credibilitas autem sumitur pro morali, ea ratione ex vna non sequitur alia.” (Hurtado de Mendoza 1615, 187). In the 1624 edition, the parallel passage contains a reference to

similar arguments have already been studied regarding other authors. Hurtado himself references Domingo Bañez, which suggests that this is a well-established argument in the scholastic era and potentially a good source for comparative analysis.⁴⁵ Third, the argument is labelled as a sophism, a point which relates to Hurtado's dependence on Bañez. In the context of Baroque scholasticism, this seems a rather rare example of analysing sophistical arguments, moreover in a theological context. Lastly, and this is the primary motivation here, Hurtado's analysis of a sophistical argument is an interesting cross-section of logic, epistemology, and theology (or, perhaps, meta-theology). Specifically, the argument bears on the logic of compound modalities as it discusses the relation between "evident possibility" (the combination of epistemic and alethic modalities) and "evident credibility" (the combination of epistemic and doxastic modalities).

The subject matter of the controversy is the inference that "the mysteries of faith are evidently credible; therefore, they are evidently possible." As long as the truth of the antecedent is granted, this argument amounts to a proof that

the possibility of the mysteries of faith is evident and, by extension, that the mysteries of faith are possible. Two arguments support the validity of such inferences, the first of which is directly relevant to this paper. The proof of the aforementioned inference goes as follows: if the mysteries of faith were evidently impossible, they would be evidently non-credible. Therefore, since they are evidently credible, they are evidently possible (or: since it is evident that they are credible, it is evident that they are possible). The argument is held to be an instance of the principle of contraposition (if A implies B, then non-B implies non-A): as long as impossibility entails non-credibility, credibility entails possibility.⁴⁶

The objection attributed to Bañez is that the entire argument is sophistical as, in fact, it does not instantiate the principle of contraposition, since all sentences are actually affirmative (i.e. statements that the mysteries of faith are evidently credible, evidently

disputations *De fide*: "Hic solet obijci contra hanc regulam: *est euidenter credibile, ergo est euidenter possibile*: quia *quod est euidenter impossibile, est euidenter incredibile*. **Qua de re egi disput. de fide.** Nunc breuiter dico *credibile* non esse antecedens ad *possibile*: quia sumuntur ex capitibus diuersis, multa enim impossibilia possumus credere." (Hurtado de Mendoza 1624, 44, emphasis mine).

45 See Vohánka (2013, 202) for other examples of this debate.

46 "Primo, si mysteria fidei sunt euidenter credibilia, ergo sunt euidenter possibilia. Patet consequentia primo, quia si essent euidenter impossibilia, essent euidenter incredibilia. Ergo e contra, quia sunt euidenter credibilia, sunt euidenter possibilia; ideo quia evidens est ea esse credibilia, evidens est ea esse possibilia. Probo consequentiam, quia ab opposito consequentis ad oppositum antecedentis valet consequentia. V.g. currit, ergo mouetur. Cursus est terminus antecedens; motus autem consequens. A negatione autem motus est consequentia ad negationem cursus. Eâdem ratione credibile est terminus antecedens ad possibile: impossibile autem opponitur possibili; et incredibile credibili." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 445r (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 15).

possible, evidently impossible, and evidently non-credible).⁴⁷ The objection is dismissed by pointing out that on a certain reading of the relevant modal statement, such an argument is an instance of the principle of contraposition, namely when analysed “*de dicto*”, i.e. if the statements which are within the scope of the modal term “evident” are taken into consideration. Moreover, note that the modal term “evident” is, apparently, held to distribute over implication. As an example, both “it is evident that Peter is running; therefore it is evident that he is moving” and “it is evident that Peter is not running; therefore, it is evident that he is not moving” are held to be evident; the first is so since the evident knowledge regarding (Peter’s) running is held to apply to (his) motion as well, and the second because denying a specific statement is held to be covered by the

same evidence as denying the respective generic statement.⁴⁸

Hurtado starts with two general notes. First, he explains the principle of contraposition and its theoretical presuppositions, i.e. the notions of antecedence and consequence introduced in terms of deducibility, and insists that we focus on the logical relations between the relevant terms.⁴⁹ Second, he lays out

47 To judge from Hurtado’s reference, he had the following passage in mind: “Quintò arguitur. Bene sequitur, Deum esse trinum et vnum est evidens esse credibile, ergo evidens est, esse possibile, sed in perpetuis idem est esse et posse, ergo evidens est esse trinum et vnum, consequens est falsum, ergo et illud ex quo sequitur. (...) Ad quintum nego primam consequentiam. Nam multa falsa sunt probabiliora veris. Vnde non sequitur, Deum esse trinum et vnum est evidens credibile, ergo evidens est, non esse impossibile. Et si quis contra objiciat, Deum esse trinum non est evidens esse impossibile, ergo est evidens esse non impossibile. Patet consequentia à negatiua ad affirmatiuam variato praedicato penes finitum et infinitum, et si opus fuerit, ponatur constantia subiecti, scilicet, Deus trinus et vnus est. Respondetur hoc esse evidens sophisma.” (Báñez 1615, 25–26). Hurtado’s report seems to be relatively loose.

48 “Bannes quaestione 1^a. art. 4. ad 5. respondet hoc esse sophysma, quia vtraque propositio est affirmatiua: at altera debet esse affirmatiua, altera negatiua, vt ea, currit, ergo mouetur; non mouetur, ergo non currit. Non attinet difficultatem argumenti, nam hae nostrae propositiones sunt modales: affirmatiuae quidem de modo; de dicto autem altera affirmatiua, altera negatiua: in quibus valet consequentia ab opposito consequentis ad oppositum antecedentis: sicut valet ab antecedenti ad consequens. Exempli gratia, evidens est Petrum currere, ergo evidens est moueri, Haec consequentia est evidens, quia cognitio evidens de cursu est etiam evidens de motu, vnde tam bona est illa consequentia modalis, quam haec currit, ergo mouetur. E contra vero haec est evidens consequentia, evidens est Petrum non moueri, ergo evidens est non currere, quia eadem evidentia cognoscitur negatio speciei, qua negatio generis. Ratio a priori, quia inter terminos antecedentes, et consequentes seruantur affirmatio, et negatio, vt credibile, et possibile; incredibile, et impossibile. Affirmatio autem modi non obest huic oppositioni, sed fauet: tantum enim reduplicat modum euidenter cognoscendi vim consequentiae inter illos terminos: consequentiam autem euidenter cognosci non tollit, sed supponit consequentiam ipsam, ergo inter euidenter credibile, et possibile est legitima consequentia, quia ea est inter euidenter incredibile, et impossibile.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 445r–v (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 16).

49 “Adverte terminum antecedentem illum esse, ex quo sequitur necessaria [necessaria] necessaria[?] ante correctionem MS] consequentia ad alium, qui propterea est consequens. Consequentia enim est nota

the logic of the modal operators used in the argument. Firstly, the terms “credible” and “possible” are said not to imply one another, as impossibles are held to be believable if (mistakenly) regarded as possibles. The reason is that possibility (and, presumably, other alethic modalities as well) is ultimately grounded in objective reality, whereas credibility can be a matter of epistemic authority alone. As an extreme example, the entire community of experts (or, at least, a sufficient number of experts) can either be wrong about something or even conspire to deceive the public; in such a situation, it would be wise but misleading to follow their suggestions. This also means, secondly, that “evidently credible” and “evidently possible” do not imply one another: in such a situation a statement would evidently be backed up by authorities, and thus evidently credible, yet false or even impossible, in which case it could not be evidently

possible (provided that evidence is considered veridical in this context).⁵⁰

Finally, the original argument is dismantled. First, the fundamental inference is rejected as an attempt to deduce the evidence relating to a statement from the evidence relating to our obligation to believe a statement, while these two are logically independent.⁵¹ The solution to the argument is thus a simple extension of the preliminary notes.

50 “Moneo secundo *evidenter credibile*, et *evidenter possibile* non esse terminos antecedentem, et consequentem: sicut *credibile* et *possibile* non sunt antecedens, et consequens. Ratio a priori, quia *credibilitas* non habet necessariam connexionem physicam cum *possibilitate*. Possunt enim multa *credi* vt *possibilia*, vel *existentia*, quae vel non sunt *possibilia*, vel non *existunt*. Ratio a priori huius est, quia *possibilitas* sumitur ex rebus ipsis, vel ex alijs, quae necessario illis nectuntur, quia ab iisdem originem sumunt. V.g. ex scientia de obiectis ipsis cognoscuntur obiecta *evidenter*, quia scientia est cognitio illorum, vt sunt, idque necessario. *Credibilitas* autem nec sumitur ex obiectis, nec ex aliquo inde orto, sed ex alijs principijs omnino per accidens respectu obiecti, v.g. ex *authoritate loquentis*, quae valde per accidens est obiecto quod loquitur. Nam tot viri graues possunt conspirare ad affirmandum aliquid, vt nisi temere negari non possit assensus: quid autem vetat eos omnes mentiri, aut decipi. Itaque est *evidens* nos posse credere prudenter; assensus tamen ille prudens est falsus. Nam *prudencia* sumitur respectu *authoritatis loquentis*, falsitas autem a disonantia cum obiecto. Ita potest esse *evidens obligatio credendi*, sicut est *evidens prudencia*, et esse falsum, quod creditur.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 446r–v (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 18).

51 “Ad argumentum ex §. 15. nego consequentiam: quia infertur ex *evidentia obligationis* ad credendum ad *evidentiam rei in se*: quae sunt disparata, id est, nullam habent necessariam connexionem.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 446v (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 19).

illationis consequentis ex antecedenti: id est significat consequens duci necessario ex antecedenti, v.g. *currit, ergo mouetur*. Cursus, ex quo sequitur necessario motus, est antecedens, quia est species motus: ab specie autem ad genus affirmatiue est bona consequentia, vt a toto actuali ad partem actuale. Opus igitur est ad valorem consequentiae a negatione consequentis [consequentis] antecedentis ante correctionem MS] ad negationem antecedentis, vt termini sint vere antecedens, et consequens: nam si nec sunt antecedens, nec consequens, argumentum est de subiecto, vt aiunt, non supponente, quod quia non animadverunt aliqui, implicantur his modalibus terminis.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 445v–446r (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 17).

Interestingly, Hurtado agrees with the argument that as long as it is evident that Peter is running, everyone denying it can no longer be trusted by us as such a person would appear to be either wrong or lying, thus losing credibility; in such a way, the two types of evidence could be related.⁵² That said, credibility is said not to imply possibility, and the argument is held to fail to instantiate the principle of contraposition.⁵³

Furthermore, a reformulation of the opening argument is presented to refine the logical point of the analysis. The reformulated argument goes as follows: if it is evident that something is impossible, it is evident that it is non-credible, in other words “evidently impossible” implies “evidently non-credible”. As a consequence, the inference “the credibility of X is evident; therefore, the possibility of X is evident” should be valid by contraposition.⁵⁴ Hurtado’s re-

ply is straightforward: neither is the argument validated by the principle of contraposition. First, impossibility does not entail non-credibility, since many impossible things are, in fact, credible. Second, the arguments do not have the appropriate logical structure, since all relevant statements are affirmative. For the argument to instantiate the principle of contraposition, the negations would have to apply to the modal terms “evidently”, as in the compound modality “non-evidently credible”, rather than being in their scope, as in the modality “evidently non-credible”.⁵⁵ However, the evidence of impossibility is held to entail the evidence of non-credibility, which is justified by explaining that credibility requires that a statement be backed up both by authority and by the absence of evidence to the contrary. By the same token, evidence of credibility does not entail evidence of the statement itself.⁵⁶

52 “Ad primam probationem concedo antecedens, quia qui habet evidentiam de cursu Petri, aperte videt decipi, aut mentiri omnes, qui negant eum currere. Vnde non potest illis credere, quia deficit obiectum assensus, nempe veritas apparens, vel realis.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 446v (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 19).

53 “Ad primam probationem consequentiae respondeo, non sumi argumentum ab opposito consequentis ad oppositum antecedentis, quia credibile non esse antecedens ad possibile patet ex §. 18.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 446v (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 19).

54 “Imo quamvis argumentum inverso ordine constituitur, est inefficax. V.g. si quis arguat, evidens est hoc esse impossibile, ergo evidens est hoc esse incredibile, ergo evidenter impossibile est antecedens ad evidenter incredibile. Tunc sic: ergo haec est bona consequentia, evidens

est esse credibile, ergo evidens est esse possibile. Patet consequentia ab opposito consequentis ad oppositum antecedentis, quia iam dixi evidenter impossibile esse antecedens ad evidenter incredibile: evidenter autem credibile est oppositum.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 446v (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 19).

55 “Respondeo nec hoc argumentum sumi ab opposito consequentis, quia impossibile non est antecedens ad incredibile, quia multa impossibilia sunt credibilia. Itaque illae propositiones modales non sunt de dictis antecedentibus, et consequentibus: modi autem sunt affirmativi, ac propterea non sunt oppositi.” Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fol. 446v (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 19).

56 “Evidentia autem impossibilitatis infert evidentiam incredibilitatis, quia credibilitas dependet a duobus, et ab autoritate loquentis, et a carentia persuasionis

4 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

The 1619 manuscript of *De fide* has been proved to be a copy of Hurtado's authentic work, including his disputations of the theological virtue of faith, corresponding in its structure to the opening *quaestiones* of Aquinas' *Secunda secundae*. In addressing primarily theological issues related to the problems of faith, revelation, and theological authority, several interesting philosophical problems are addressed. The present analysis of the notions of evidence, certainty, and authority thus contributes to our knowledge of the philosophical background of Hurtado de Mendoza's early theological doctrines. No doubt, the results leave us with a long list of new questions. With the recent scholarship relating to Hurtado's philosophical and theological work in mind, three baskets of issues seem particularly promising.

First, the discussion upon the authenticity of *De fide* based on the analysis of references uncovered a number of references to currently unknown texts

evidentis de opposito, quia sine tali carentia non potest veritas obiecti apparere. Vnde ex defectu vnus partis recte negatur totum. Evidentia autem credibilitatis satis est, si sit circa auctoritatem cum carentia evidentiae oppositi: haec autem non inferunt evidentiam rei. Sunt autem hae propositiones sequentes [sequentes] *supra lineam MS*] ab opposito consequentis ad oppositum antecedentis ratione modi, quamvis non ratione dicti, est evidenter impossibile, ergo est evidenter incredibile, vbi evidentia vnus est antecedens ad evidentiam alterius. Evidentia autem est modus in illa propositione. Hae autem sequentes sunt ab opposito consequentis, non est evidenter impossibile, ergo non est evidenter incredibile, vbi non evidentia opponitur evidentiae." Hurtado de Mendoza, *De fide*, MS Dublin, TCD, ms. 298, fols. 446v–447r (disp. 18, sect. 4, §. 19).

which must have originated in the early years of his theological career (the existence of which is confirmed by the printed works of Hurtado). This further motivates the search for Hurtado's manuscripts. As a side-note, that could serve more than merely purely bibliographical purposes: it would certainly be interesting to compare the early and late versions of *De actibus humanis*, which must have been finished at least twenty years apart.

Second, a detailed comparative analysis of the two versions of Hurtado's *De fide* is required (as opposed to the present monographic approach) for at least two reasons. The first reason is that while undoubtedly interesting, a text surviving only in the form of a manuscript seems to have had a relatively limited impact, especially if it turned out that its having survived only in a single copy, similar to other theological texts by Hurtado from his later years, is indicative of its original rarity. Admittedly, the text is related to Hurtado's teaching career, which means that there must have been at least some influence on the Salamanca theology students. In contrast, the 1631 printed edition of Hurtado's disputations on theological virtues can be expected to have been significantly more influential, even though it is known that it sparked a controversy which led to its prohibition, and thus it seems significant to have a better understanding of how much of the printed edition records the earlier form of the text or how much of the doctrines preserved in the manuscript would become publicly available through the printed

edition.⁵⁷ The second reason is that there are some documented shifts between the 1615 and the 1624 editions of Hurtado's philosophical *cursus*, and these include Hurtado's general epistemology. (Hanke 2021) Therefore, it seems promising to explore the manuscript of *De fide* which was produced between the two versions of Hurtado's philosophical *cursus*.

Third, there are other promising, under-researched philosophical topics based on Hurtado's *De fide* which can be explored, not only from the manuscript under discussion but also the later printed edition of the disputations on

theological virtues, plus Hurtado's philosophical publications. One such topic is Hurtado's contribution to semiotics, including his account of the conditions of successful communication and his discussion of truthfulness and lying (discussed in disputations 11 and 16, respectively). While semiotics is part of Hurtado's philosophical *cursus* (which, as documented in 2.3 above, was referenced in *De fide*), the theological context plus perhaps other factors as well led Hurtado to address a wide range of topics, including (attempted or apparent) human communication with animals, angels, and God.

57 For the controversy, see Astraín (1916, 86); Schmutz (forth.) gives the most recent account of this controversy, referencing Astraín.

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