ABSTRACT
This paper contributes to the study of a mostly neglected work of the fifteenth-century Italian literature: Sperone Speroni’s collection of short treatises (“trattatelli”) published in the fifth volume of his Opera in 1740. In particular, I focus on Della Pace (On Peace), probably a draft of a never-written longer treatise. I provide a transcription and English translation of the text as well as an analysis of its content and linguistic aspects. The focus of Speroni’s text is the discussion of the meaning of ‘concord’, which goes beyond the classical definition and brings to an unconventional analysis of also its opposite terms: discord and conflict. By reading Speroni’s writing, we discover his original thought nourished by Machiavelli’s and pre-Socratic influences. This paper looks at Speroni not only as an author involved in literary debates, but also as a philosopher with an original perspective to be discovered.
That which scholars consider disruptive in the history of ideas depends not on only on the level of accessibility of primary sources but also on what we decide to draw our attention to. We naturally resist the idea that an author whom the scholarly tradition and textbooks have placed in a specific category could, in fact, surprise us with unexplored writing containing revolutionary ideas that shed new light on his cultural profile and context. This is, I believe, the case of Sperone Speroni (1500–1588) with his short piece *Della pace*, which is one of several unexplored texts written by the Renaissance author which is still under-investigated.

Speroni is usually considered a member of the larger group of Aristotelian authors operating in the sixteenth century Venetian area. He is mostly known for his contribution to the so-called ‘quarrel of language’ in which he argued for the use of the Italian vernacular as a language that deserves to achieve the level of complexity of Latin and Greek, and which should replace them in discussing and writing about high culture and sciences. Speroni argues for this in his *Dialogo delle lingue* and contributes to the development of the vernacular by writing all his work in Italian and requiring the use of the vernacular for the discussions within the ‘Accademia degli Infiammati’ in which he played a central role and which he also led as its *princeps* for several months between 1541 and 1542. His interest and expertise in rhetoric as well as his practice of an exquisite eloquence plaid a central role in allowing him to...
participate in the ‘Accademia delle Notti Vaticane’ in Rome between 1560 and 1564, where he gave speeches under the name of Nestor, the Homerian character which represents excellence in oratory. Speroni is also mostly studied for his literary production of dialogues, collected and published for the first time in 1542, and for the theory of dialogue in his Apologia dei dialoghi written between 1574 and 1575 to defend his dialogues before the Catholic Inquisition which considered some of them, especially the Dialogo della Discordia and Dialogo della Usura, a possible threat to Christian doctrine and public morality. This is, in short, Speroni’s cultural identity according to the scholarly tradition: an Aristotelian author who follows the sixteenth-century preference for the dialogical genre and fights the humanistic tradition to impose the vernacular as a means of cultural communication. Only in recent years have scholars reached a better understanding of some original aspects related to his rhetoric and philosophy which have encouraged the addressing of Speroni’s unexplored texts – in fact the majority of his literary production. The more we explore, the more we discover that Speroni’s intellectual profile is much more complex than what the scholarly tradition had offered to us up until few years ago. He uses, for example, Platonic figures of speech to express his anti-Platonic positions and Aristotelian ideas to go beyond Aristotle and even against him. He supports not only rhetoric but also the most extreme of the sophistic tradition against both the Platonic and Aristotelian condemnation of it, while his political theories seems to have much more place than we assumed in his literary production with a clear critical approach towards any idealistic approach to the subject.

This is an exciting moment in the investigation of the most original aspects of Speroni’s style and philosophy and in order to elaborate further in this direction I will provide a study of his Della pace as an attempt to measure Speroni’s originality using a political subject: the role and definition of concord in the life of a republic. Against the humanist background and beyond the Aristotelian legacy and even Machiavelli’s influence, Speroni’s text reveals aspects that deserve specific attention and stand as a case study to cast a light to a hitherto unexplored part of the Italian Renaissance.

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**SPERONI’S DELLA PACE AS A “TRATTATELLO”**

The Della pace belongs to the collection of so-called “trattatelli”, short treatises gathered in the fifth and last volume of the edition of Speroni’s writings published in Venice in 1740 by Marco Forcellini and Natale Dalle Laste. The “trattatelli” are the part of Speroni’s production which have received the least degree of attention by scholarship thus far, but which nevertheless contain surprising and innovative positions, for example a unique attack

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1. For a general presentation of the author and his work, see Pozzi 1996 and Piantoni 2018.
2. The most recent studies are the monographs Katinis 2018 and Cotugno 2018.
against Socrates (Contra Socrate) and a surprising defense of the sophists (In difesa dei sofisti). These short writings were in all probability drafts for what maybe Speroni intended to develop as more extensive treatises, or speeches to be delivered, or letters, or even dialogues to add to his collection published in 1542. A deeper understanding of the genesis and their final destination in Speroni’s literary and intellectual trajectory would need an exploration and philological study of the 17 volumes of Speroni’s manuscripts in the Biblioteca Capitolare of Padua, which goes beyond the purpose of this contribution.

The transcription that I offer in the Appendix is from the 1740 edition which is much more readable than Speroni’s autograph in manuscript E.13/XI (287r-288v) kept in the Biblioteca Capitolare of Padua, especially if one does not have access to a direct examination of the source. As a matter of fact, the library has been under restoration for a long time and it is currently not possible to consult its archive in person. Nevertheless, the reproduction is enough to verify that there is no relevant difference between Speroni’s autograph and the 1740 edition, and it is also useful to reveal other aspects of the original. First of all, the title Della pace is written in a different hand and pen on the upper left-hand corner of the first page, the same hand that wrote the index of contents at the beginning of volume XI (IIIr-v) of Speroni’s manuscripts. The same hand wrote a note above the index stating that those contents are copied in the 1740 edition. Speroni did not, however, provide any title for his text and the structure and disposition of his sentences suggest that this was mostly a list of private notes. The sequence of the first four sentences follows, for example, a symmetric order in the manuscript and they are ordered as a list of sequential thoughts (“La pace è ... / comunemente .../ la guerra e’ ... / comunemente ....”).

Even the collection title “trattatello” is not in the manuscript but was instead provided by the editors of the 1740 edition (neither by Speroni nor by the later hand mentioned above). Although it is unclear how Speroni viewed this collection of short writings of his, it is worth noticing that for the text entitled (by someone else) Della pace the category “trattatello” fits quite well with what should have been the final result according to an indication in the very text (p. 438) in which Speroni refers to his work (or to the final version that would have emerged) as “questo trattato”. I do not want to speculate about what the final version of this writing would have been, but I do have to admit that I regret that we do not have it. I believe that the implications and the further elaboration of what it is here in nuce would have been of the most interest for the history of Renaissance literature. This would in all probability also be true for several other “trattatelli” by Speroni which propose very original perspectives.

As a draft of some possible never-completed final work, Speroni’s Della
pace presents some ambiguities in the writing and also in the logic of certain passages. These issues cannot be avoided but, nevertheless, the text appears to be quite clear in the points Speroni wants to make and allows for an outline of Speroni’s work.

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**A WORK OUTLINE**

Speroni begins his argumentation with certain clarifications: peace is commonly intended as a union, but not in the sense of unification in one substance of different things, but more in the sense of concord of different things. In particular, since this text focuses on the peace within a city, we deal with the concord of different citizens’ opinions and wills. The internal conflicts between contraries, such as reason and affection or desire, is a natural state of being both in the city as well as in each man, while concord, even the imperfect one, is difficult to achieve. Indeed, the author claims as a universal truth, a Weltanschauung sketched in a few lines that echoes Heraclitus’ idea of polemos as a universal law, that the entire world is ruled by conflict. According to Speroni, the world is made up of contraries, nevertheless concord is an effort to be done for specific political benefit. Speroni also invites us to consider that discord is created by God to give life to the world through contraries (night and day, different seasons, etc). The world would not exist without conflict and discord.

This reasoning echoes the self-defense that the goddess Discord provides in Speroni’s *Dialogo della Discordia* in which Discord presents herself as a universal law that rules the natural and human world, a necessary and beneficial figure that is unjustly condemned by men and gods. This dialogue in Lucian style might have been inspired by Desiderius Erasmus’ *Praise of Folly*, although Speroni replaces Folly with a different character. Scholars have usually viewed the staging of Discord’s self-defense before Jove as a paradoxical work and a rhetorical exercise that demonstrates the power of eloquence against common sense. This paradoxical aspect of Discord’s defense is called into doubt, however, by the *Della pace* in which Speroni clearly recognizes discord as created by God for the benefit of the world at all levels and argues for this directly, involving no dialogical mask. The uncertain date of composition of the *Della pace* does not allow for a determination of the chronological proximity to the *Dialogo della Discordia* but, regardless of the date of composition, the very presence of this “trattatello” in Speroni’s literary production demonstrates that discord was for Speroni not only a mythological figure for a paradoxical mise-en-scène but instead a main factor to take into consideration when we talk about political life in a broader natural context.

In his *Della pace*, Speroni argues that if discord in nature exists for a good reason, one can argue the same about the disagreement between men’s wills; indeed, this gives birth to the virtues. The political peace, in contrast, stems from

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concord – and not from a true unification that is impossible to reach – of different wills, which allow for man's happiness, but only the type of happiness envisaged by the philosopher that looks at the interests of the public sphere, not by the Christian. The latter seeks out a perfect concord and true peace for each man, which is true well-being (“salute” from the Latin “salus” in the double sense of health and salvation) but impossible to achieve in the city and very difficult to reach for any individual. Speroni considers the ideal men proposed by Christianity above human possibilities, while the Christian principle that calls for treating others as you would want them to treat you is against human nature. Each man, as any other animal, wants by nature to control others and use them to satisfy his own desires, while he avoids the opposite. Taking a distance from the humanist ideal of human dignity above instinctual nature (or at least the possibility of that), Speroni does not perceive any difference between human behavior and any other animal that hunts and kills to survive, although men also need to build a republic to survive so that their instinct to subjugate each other has to also confront other needs. Given all this, true peace among men would only be possible in a Christian republic which is above the actual republics as an ideal Christian man is above men’s nature. The actual republics do not strive therefore for true peace but only for the kind of concord that prevents any public harm. The purpose of Speroni’s writing is precisely to clarify the meaning of the only peace possible in nature, a peace that, far from being perfect harmony, aims at establishing a safe environment for the citizens. This is a fictional (“simulata”) and conventional peace which is not true friendship but only refrains from attacking each other.

It is worth noting that this disenchanted perspective does not spare biblical figures such as Job and the Apostles. Speroni wrote that the correct reading of the Sacred Texts to describe the former (“erat timens Deum”) as well as the words pronounced by the latter (“quid erit nobis?”) would demonstrate that even these high examples of sanctity demonstrate that our deeds always aim at obtaining a prize and avoiding a punishment. In other words, even the most religious men follow human nature that encourages them to act in their own interest which consists of avoiding destruction and prolonging life.

As it is for true peace, true friendship, harmony and virtue among men are also impossible to achieve. Indeed, towards the end of his writing, Speroni proposes several examples of earthly, i.e. imperfect, friendship (“mondana amicizia”) among relatively vicious men (“viziosi”, “non boni”), such as Theseus and Pirithous, Pyladen and Orestes, and Patroclus and Achilles, to demonstrate that this kind of friendship is the norm among men. In summary, Speroni suggests being aware that when we talk about peace, friendship, concord, and similar concepts related to human nature and human communities, we should refer not to an ideal form but only to a version of them that is applicable in our imperfect earthly world.
Machiavelli and Beyond

Speroni’s disenchanted representation of human nature and the limits of any idealistic republic is a clear statement of anti-Platonism and suggests that his thought is under the influence of Niccolò Machiavelli’s work. It should not be surprising, however, that Speroni never quotes Machiavelli. The date of Della pace is unknown, but even if Speroni wrote this before the inclusion of Machiavelli’s writings on the Index of Prohibited Books (1559) by the Catholic Inquisition, the condemnation of the evil Segretario would have discouraged any explicit reference even before that date. As is the case for many other authors, however, who wrote about politics after the publication of Machiavelli’s works, his revolutionary theories should not be disregarded and it is almost impossible to overestimate his influence in the fifteen century and beyond. Indeed, Speroni seems to have learned Machiavelli’s lessons on many levels, but more than a repetition of his thought, he seems influenced by his disenchanted pragmatism upon which he built his own discourse. He follows Machiavelli’s so-called “negative anthropology” as it is pictured in the treatise Il principe and in the play La mandragola. He implicitly agrees with Machiavelli’s rejection of any imaginary republic (Il principe XV) and his consideration of conflicts as legitimate and useful aspects of political life (Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio 1, 4 and 6). Speroni also embraces the necessity of considering only the “verità effettuale”, avoiding any discourse on what reality should be and focusing on what it actually is.6 Speroni connects the political conflict to a more general state of being, beyond the political sphere, which consists of a representation of reality that goes beyond human nature and includes it in a broader prospective, a position confirmed in the dialogue on discord published in 1542 and already mentioned above. The entire subject of Della pace is also treated with a constant parallel reflection on the linguistic issues and the shifting meanings of discussing peace. Both these aspects (the almighty discord and the linguistic approach) go beyond Machiavelli’s legacy and represent the most original contribution of Speroni to the subject.

The Ambiguity of Language

Words are misleading and language is haunted by a paradox: it explains and hides, communicates and confuses at the same time. The first lines of Speroni’s text point to a broader linguistic view in the background, and not an optimistic one, starting with the keyword in the title, peace, but also its opposite, war. The less than straightforward relationships between the words and their meaning might depend on the fact that

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6 The most recent study on the role of conflict in Machiavelli is Pedullà 2018, while Vasoli (1996, p. 290) found analogies with Machiavelli’s political thought in Speroni’s Apologia dei dialoghi IV. A wider exploration of Machiavelli’s influence in Speroni is still neglected as well as a study on his political philosophy spread not only in several of his “trattatelli”, but also in his Dialoghi and Apologia dei dialoghi.
any word has several meanings, or nuances within the same meaning, including a common use but also other less common, so that it is impossible to find a permanent stable signification, metaphysically and meta-historically guaranteed, that reassures us on the meaning of each word.

Although the focus of the Della pace is not linguistic, this text begins with a linguistic concern (“la pace è nome equivoco ... La guerra anch’essa è equivoca”) which emphasizes the equivocality of the two key terms that demarcate, as opposites and implying each other, the subject treated in Speroni’s writing. The adjective “equivoca” reappears further in the text to qualify the term “concordia”, while towards the end of the text the substantive “equivocazion” is used to express one of the aims of his text: to distinguish the equivocalness of the term peace.

Due to the frequency of the common misunderstanding and the semantic instability of the terms he is talking about, the author requires from himself and the reader an effort in maintaining an awareness of different meanings of peace, concord and the other main terms of the discourse. Indeed, shifting from the conventional meaning to a different one allows for a reshaping of the entire field of analysis so that we suddenly find ourselves on a new path which leads to unconventional conclusions, far from the humanistic thought. The idea that concord in the city does not have, for example, anything to do with true (in a platonic and Christian sense) harmony, but is rather a counter-instinctual effort to be carried out for the benefit of the community and finally for the survival of the citizens.

A different word meaning can lead to an uncommon thinking path. I do not want to emphasize too much this aspect of the text, but if we avoid the linguistic problem that Speroni himself poses at the beginning, we risk a misunderstanding of the entire text. This entanglement between res and verba leads us back to the dawn of the onto-linguistic problem discussed in Plato’s Cratilus, a text that Speroni should have known, as well as all the rest of Plato’s dialogues, thanks to Marsilio Ficino’s Latin translation, if not directly from the original Greek. An echo of the problematic relationship between language and reality discussed in the Cratilus is clearly involved in Speroni’s thought. It is not the aim of my contribution to investigate in detail the sources and the plurality of possible ancient references - either for the linguistic aspect or for any other aspect of Della pace – that Speroni could have taken into account (mostly to reject them), in writing on the meaning and applicability of peace in a city. But if I had to briefly summarize Speroni’s position before antiquity, I would point to his strong anti-Platonism and anti-Augustinianism along with a more tolerated Aristotelianism, but with a strong taste of so-called pre-Socratic traditions along with the above-mentioned Heraclitism and even more a sophistic component (considering both linguistic concerns, i.e. Gorgias of Leontini, and the political pragmatism, i.e. Protagoras of Abdera). Having said that, I refrain from a deeper
investigation which goes beyond the two aims of my contribution: to provide the reader with direct access to Speronis’ text (in the Appendix below) and shed light on its highlights (in my analysis above).

It is regretful that Speroni’s notes never became a more articulated and refined work. Reading the *Della pace*, as well as many other of Speroni’s “trattatelli”, I regret not having the opportunity to know more extensively what Speroni would have written on the rejection of the simple and naive idea of political concord for a more realistic concept of peace in the context of a pragmatic political theory based on a realistic anthropology which anchors men to their animal nature. Speroni’s “trattatelli” represent a cluster of unaccomplished, potentially revolutionary, writings which are still waiting to be explored. This paper would also like to encourage further investigation in this direction.

**APPENDIX: SPERONI’S DELLA PACE (IN SPERONI 1740, P. 437–8)**

I use modern punctuation in my transcription to facilitate the reading of the original text, while my English translation aims at balancing the literal textual meaning with the need to maintain a logical order and readability throughout Speroni’s argumentation.

La pace è nome equivoco veramente. Comunemente si usa per l’opposto della guerra. La guerra anche essa è equivoca. Comunemente si usa per la battaglia mortale, ove si ammazzano li inimici. La pace significa comunemente anche concordia o di opinioni o di volontà, che è unione. Unione è quando varie cose si uniscono facendo una cosa, come quando gli elementi meschiandosi fanno il misto, o il corpo e l’anima a fare il vivo, o la materia e la forma a fare il composito. E questa unione non è nella pace di che si parla; perciocché questa unione non di contrarii, ma di due cose sostanziali, e per sé sussistenti e perfette. La pace adunque di cui si parla è concordia, la quale è nelli uomini di opinioni o di volontati le quali si accordino come le voci nell’armonia. Concordia di opinioni non ha nome proprio volgar né latino. Concordia di volontati è benevolienza, e quando è compita si può dire amicizia.

Peace is a truly equivocal term, which is usually used as the opposite of war, but also this term is equivocal. War is commonly used to indicate a deadly battle in which one kills one’s enemy. Peace commonly also means concord of opinions or wills, which means union. Union is when different things unify making one thing, which is when the elements blend and make a mix, or body and soul make a living being, or matter and form make a compound. And this union is not in the peace that we are here talking about, because this union is not made by contraries but rather two perfect substances that exist independently. The peace that we are talking about is therefore concord, which is in men’s opinions or wills that can tune with each other like harmonic voices. Concord of opinion has no vernacular or Latin name. Concord of wills is benevolence and can be called friendship when
Ma questa è equivoca, ed anche quella di opinion, secondo le cose intorno alle quali sono le opinione e le volontadi. Alla concordanza di due voleri si reduce quella della ragione e dell'affetto. La ragion vuole, ed appetisce l'affetto. L'uomo è composto di contrari; anzi tutto 'l mondo. Però difficil cosa è trovar pace nell'uomo, cioè concordanza. Ma se la contrarietà o discordia del mondo è fatta dalla natura o da Dio a fin di bene, cioè acciocché ne nascano diverse cose, e la diversità delle stagioni nell'anno, e di giorno e notte, e questo bene sono piante, bestie ed uomini, dovemo anche pensare che le discordie de' voleri delli uomini facciano effetti boni; e che perciò siano permessi e fatti da Dio. Li effetti che ne nascono sono le virtù. Ben considera. E dalla discordia della ragione e degli affetti nascono, benché non si concordino, come è il martirio per la verità. In summa chi vuol ben parlar della pace diversa alla guerra, parli prima della pace di sé medesimo tra la ragione e lo affetto, e come il mondo è composto di contrarii a fin di bene, così qui si cerchi la pace tra li uomini non perché essi si concordino, ché ciò è difficile, se non impossibile, ma acciocché nasca la quiete della città, il che è fine e felicità dell'uomo. E questo basti al presente. Ma cercar pace che veramente sia concordanza e benevolenza e salute dell'uomo particolare partiene a solo il cristiano, perché egli solo va alla salute particolare; ove il filosofo va nella specie, la felicità della quale, tal quale è, partiene alla città. E se 'l filosofo va al particolare, ponendo summa felicità nel filosofo contemplativo; il cristiano va al particolare religioso e di buon volere; e ciò nota bene. Il non fare altrui quello che a noi stessi non vogliamo esser it is complete. But this is equivocal as well as the concord of opinions regarding the objects of these opinions and wills. The concord of reason and appetite is definable as a concord of wills: while reason wants, appetite desires. Not only the human being is made of contraries but also the entire world. This is why it is difficult to make peace, as concord, in the human being. But if contrariety and discord in the world are caused by nature and God for a good end, i.e. for the emergence of a variety of things, the different seasons of the year, day and night, and this good end is the plants, animals and human beings, we must also consider that the discords among different men's wills bring about positive results for which those discords are allowed and made by God, and the virtues derive from this state of being. Consider this carefully. And these virtues are caused by the discord between reason and passions, although they do not agree with it, like martyrdom for the truth. In summary, he who wants to speak correctly about peace different from war should first talk about the peace within oneself between reason and passions, and consider that the world is made of contraries for a good end, and, therefore, one should aim at peace among men not to make them agree (since this is difficult) but rather to build a peaceful city, which is men's aim and happiness. And this is enough at the moment. But looking for peace that truly is concord, benevolence and the health of an individual belongs only to the Christian, because he is the only one who considers the individual health, while the philosopher considers the species whose happiness, in itself, belongs to the city. And while the philosopher looks
fatto è cosa anzi sopra natura che naturale: è ben cosa ragionevole se la ragione domina l’appetito; e anche dominando ella lo affetto, non è vero generalmente; perciocché l’uomo vuol dominare e non esser dominato, massime se è signor, come si dice, per natura; vuol giudicare e non essere giudicato; ed esser uomo tra femmine e non femmina tra uomini. Le fere fanno altrui quel che a sé non vogliono che sia fatto, mangiandole e sforzandole. A far gli uomini particolari per lo comun civile e salute sua, come fa il mondo a ben della specie umana, sarebbe bene quando la repubblica fosse perfetta, ma quale delle tre note è perfetta? Certo niuna: sola la cristiana è perfetta. Dunque filosoficamente parlando, cessa la ragion della città in tutti gli uomini, specialmente ne’ servi e ne’ sudditi; e ciò nota bene. A questa sola si de’ rimetter la vita, la roba, l’onore, e gli altri, ché ciò facendo si acquista la vera ed eterna felicità. È dunque impossibile la vera pace tra gli uomini se non nella repubblica cristiana. Puossi inferire che vera pace per sé non possa essere ne’ cori umani ma solamente per grazia di Dio. Né questa cercano le repubbliche, ma quella sola onde non possa nascere alcun male pubblico evidentemente, non curando dello intrinseco del core umano. E forse anche perciò non può essere in terra vera pace; perché noi facciamo il bene anzi con speranza di premio e timor di pena, che per ben fare, onde si dice di Job erat timens Deum; e dimandavano li apostoli quid erit nobis? (p. 438) E certo se la pace non può esser se non nelli uomini di bona voluta e la bontà del voler nostro sia grazia di Dio, la pace è non è da noi ma da Dio. La vera pace vien da Dio, ma la at the individual when it considers the highest happiness in the contemplative philosopher, the Christian instead looks at a specific believer and his good will; and consider this carefully. Do not do to others what we would not want done to us is something more above nature than natural: it is reasonable if the reason controls the desire; and even if it controls the passions this is not generally true, because man wants to dominate and not be dominated (even more if he is a lord, as we say, by nature). He wants to judge and not be judged, and wants to be male among females and not the opposite. The beasts do to others what they would not want done to them, by eating and forcing the others. It would be good to consider the individuals for common civic life and its well-being, as the world does for the goodness of the human species, if the republic could be perfect, but which of the three that we know is perfect? Certainly there is no perfect one except for the Christian republic. Hence, philosophically speaking, the reason of the city stops in all men, especially in the servants and subjects; and consider this carefully. Therefore, true peace is impossible except for in the Christian republic. One can infer from this that no true peace can come from the human heart but only from God’s grace. And the republics do not look for this true peace but rather only for the peace that means absence of any public harm and, in so doing, does not deal with the intentions of man’s heart. And this is perhaps also why true peace is not possible on earth, because we do good deeds not for ourselves but rather hoping for a prize and fearing a punishment, and this is why one talks about Job erat timens Deum, and the
pace che dà il mondo, la quale è diversa da quella di Dio, è sempre con peccato, perché ha l’occhio o alla vita o all’onore o alla facoltà pubblica e private. Però in questo trattato si doveria distinguere la equivocazion della pace e mostrare che la naturale non è possibile essendo l’uomo composto di cose contrarie e discordanti, ciò sono li elementi, l’anima e il corpo, materia e forma, ragione e affetto, spirito e carne. La civile è simulata e non cordiale. La cordiale è da Dio, ed è nota. Amicizia, mondamente parlando, è più che la pace; perciocché ella è concordia di volontade e di vera benivolenza. Ma parlando per vero, ed in Cristo, non è buona quella amicizia dal mondo bona stimata, e non è virtù anche mondamente, né con virtù. Vedi la ragione perché tal mondana amicizia può esser tra viziosi, il che appar per quella mondana amicizia di doi o tre para di amici: ché Teseo e Pirithoo non furono boni, né Pilade ed Oreste, né Patroco ed Achille. Di Pitia e Damone non trovo vita né opre. E nel far delle paci tali quali possono esser tra noi, bisogna considerare la diversità delle tre o quattro repubbliche, poiché la perfetta non è nota se non al cristiano. Però trattar di pace o guerra o duelli senza questa distinzione è cosa vana. Che le repubbliche diverse siano qui da considerare, Aristotile il dice nella Rettorica parlando della orazione. apostles asked quid erit nobis? (p. 438) And of course if peace can be in men of good will and only this good will can come from God’s grace, than peace comes not from us but from God. Hence true peace comes from God but the peace that comes from this world, which is different from the one from God, is always imperfect, because it aims at the life or honor or public and private spheres. This is the reason why in this treatise the equivocalness of peace should be avoided to demonstrate that peace in nature is impossible, given that man is made of contrary and discordant things: different elements, soul and body, matter and form, reason and passions, spirit and flesh. Civil peace is simulated and not cordial. The cordial one is from God, and note this. Friendship, worldly speaking, is more than peace, because it is concord of wills and true benevolence. But speaking truly, and in Christ, the friendship that the world considers good is not good and it is neither a virtue nor accomplished with virtue even in worldly terms. And the proof is that this worldly friendship could also be between vicious men, which is clear in the worldly friendship of two or three pairs of friends, since Theseus and Pirithous, Pylades and Orestes, and Patroclus and Achilles were not virtuous; while I do not find either life or acts of Pythias and Damon. And to carry out the peace that can be done among us, we have to consider the diversities among the three or four republics, since the perfect republic is known only by the perfect Christian. Therefore, talking about peace or war or duels without this distinction is a vain thing. Also Aristotle says that different republics must be considered when he talks about the oration in his Rhetoric.


