Psyche and the earliest Presocratics

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ABSTRACT

The article explores the beginnings of the integration of the term *psyche* into Presocratic philosophy. The author's main aim was to examine whether the traditional authorities with which the new use of *psyche* is usually associated would actually hold up in this role if the doxographic tradition is left aside. The Orphics and Pythagoreans, who are often regarded as the founders of the doctrine of immortal *psyche* in the 6th century BCE, could not have played this role because, on the one hand, it is not attested by authentic texts and, on the other hand, the historical development of the meanings of *psyche* contradicts it. This is also the case for Anaximenes, since the key fragment B 2 is almost certainly inauthentic and compiled from the ideas and terms of Diogenes of Apollonia.

For centuries, the Western tradition has been dominated by the belief that the soul is the centre and core of a person and the basis of human individuality. Exactly when this idea emerged and who was the first to propose it has long been the subject of dispute. One can detect it quite unequivocally in Plato's dialogues from the middle period, where care of the soul (*psyche*) is identified with care of the self.[1] But who came up with this concept first and why remains a matter of debate. The prevailing consensus is more or less that it was Presocratic philosophers (including Socrates), for whom reflections on the subject are attested, who fundamentally contributed to its formulation,[2] while outside the philosophical milieu this notion appeared only later and in a much less developed form.

The interest in *psyche* was very unevenly distributed among the Presocratics. This is not because the issues of animating power, thought, perception, emotion, personality, survival after death, and the presence of the divine element in man, with which *psyche* was later associated, were of interest only to

1 Plato, *Apol.* 30a–b, *Alc.* I, 128a–130c, *Prot.* 313b. Cf. Clarke (1999, 288: *psyche* in Plato = 'myself'); Holmes (2010, p. 207).

2 For more comprehensive overviews, see, e.g., Rohde (1921, II.127–197); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931, I.374–375); Furley (1956, 1–18); Adkins (1970, 97–101); Sarri (1975, I.61–117 and II.169–190); Seligman (1978, 5–17); Kalogerakos (1996, 49–341); Laks (1999, 250–270); Green and Groff (2003, 21–41); Drozdek (2011, 59–189). Cf. further Gill (2001, 169–190); D. Frede and B. Reis (2009, 21–143); Davis (2011, 75–136).

some, or even to a few. Rather, in dealing with these topics, philosophers made use of a whole range of words (e.g. *daimon*, *nous*, *phrenes*, *eidolon*, *pneuma*, etc.), among which *psyche* had no preferential position. *Psyche* is relatively rare in the fragments of the works of the early philosophers; in this respect the extensive entry in the comprehensive index of terms in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* is a completely misleading aid.[3] In fact, the vast majority of occurrences of the word come from: 1) post-Platonic collectors of earlier opinions of famous figures of the past, ahistorically retold by means of their own or foreign terminology (so-called A testimonia, according to Diels); 2) textually and conceptually unreliable retellings that are wrongly kept as authentic records (some B fragments); 3) obvious forgeries that imputed younger conceptions – most often Platonic-Stoic – to older authors (partly so-called C fragments). Moreover, in a considerable number of passages that are disputed, Diels, Kranz, and other historians of Presocratic philosophy translate *psyche* almost automatically as "soul", thereby often obscuring or glossing over the ambiguous and uncertain nature of the thing and pushing the Platonic conception of the soul ahead of Plato, without asking how far such a conception corresponds to the contemporary reception of *psyche* and whether the chosen meaning of "soul" is always the most apt and only possible one.

The doctrines of the Presocratics have generally survived in a very fragmentary state, and it is therefore certainly correct if scholars use the full range of available sources, i.e. both the more reliable and the less reliable ones, to reconstruct them. In contrast, the present paper will use only authentic quotations (i.e. Diels' B fragments), while all other types of sources will be ignored. As it has been repeatedly shown that doxographers relatively often attributed to the Presocratics ideas that they sometimes did not hold at all, or held but in a substantially different form, the author believes that a picture of the Presocratic *psyche* that is completely free of doxographical reports may be interesting and inspiring.

However, such an intention has its consequences and costs. The word *psyche* will primarily be examined in its historical context, which will be the starting point from which the occurrences of *psyche* in philosophy will be analysed. Historicising interpretations of philosophical statements can sometimes seem problematic to those who have become accustomed to seeing them primarily in the context of Presocratic philosophy and firmly embedded in a network of selected sources and their traditional interpretations. Further, all the Presocratics to whom the ancient tradition attributed some doctrine of *psyche* (and sometimes quite a specific one), i.e. Thales, Anaximander, Pherecydes,

3 Diels – Kranz (1993, III. 480-484). How an uncritical approach to the register in the *DK* can lead to misleading conclusions is demonstrated, for example, by Sarri (1975, I.61-117), who, from a mixture of late ahistorical assertions and contemporary historical references, created a completely fanciful model of the evolution of *psyche* that defies all historical probability.

Xenophanes, or Parmenides, will drop out of the analysis; no authentic statement proves such a theory and therefore it will not be mentioned. For authors in whose true statements *psyche* probably or certainly occurred, those parts of their psychological doctrine which do not have the support of B fragments will not be discussed, such as Philolaus' theory of the soul as harmony or Anaxagoras' airy soul.[4]

The paper will not systematically discuss all the passages of all the Presocratics in which *psyche* occurs, but especially 1) the oldest ones (i.e. before Socrates), whether they really are such or are considered to be the oldest only by some experts, and 2) those that could set a new course in the history of *psyche* or mark a significant breakthrough.

I. *A BRIEF HISTORY OF* PSYCHE

In Homer, *psyche* carried two basic meanings, namely 'life' or 'life force'[5] and 'shadow of the dead'.[6] It has also been proposed that in some instances, it also took on the meaning of 'breath',[7] but I would side with those who consider this sense unprovable.[8] During human life, the Homeric *psyche* probably did nothing but animate the body.[9] It certainly did not ensure the unity of the many psycho-physical functions (*ker*, *etor*, *kardia*, *phren*, *menos*, *thymos*, *noos*) with the help of which Homeric man thought and felt, nor did it represent a subject with which he could identify.[10] At the moment of death, though, it became a phantom (*eidolon*) or a sort of shadow (*skia*) of the deceased individual

4 Philolaus, *DK* 44 A 23; Anaxagoras, *DK* 59 A 93. These theories are discussed by, e.g., Sedley (1995, 11–12, 22–26); Huffman (2009, 32–40); Zhmud (2012, 389–390); Hladký (2018, 28–29); Palmer (2018, 30–32). In the authentic sayings of Anaxagoras (*DK* 59 B 4, B 12), *psyche* always means "life"; see, e.g., Palmer (2018, 38–39).

5 *Il.* 9.322, 13.763, 16.453, 22.161, 325, 338, partially also *Il.* 9.401, 14.518, 21.569; *Od.* 1.5, 3.74, 9.255, 423. See, e.g., Jaeger (1947, 74); Onians (1991, 94); Darcus Sullivan (1988, 152, 156–157, 159, 161–163).

6 See, e.g., von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1930, I.370–373); Benveniste (1932, 165–168); Jaeger (1947, 73–89); Snell (1948, 22–23); Harrison (1960, 75–76); Adkins (1970, 13–20); Ingenkamp (1975, 48–54); Darcus (1977, 355–356 and 1979, 30–39); Claus (1981, 1–56, 61, 92–102); Darcus Sullivan (1988, 151–181 and 1989, 242–246); Onians (1991, 93–106); Drozdek (2011, 18–26).

7 See, e.g., Burnet (1916, 245); Halbwachs (1930, 495); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1930, I.370); Snell (1948, 23); Jaeger (1947, 78–82); Meissner (1951, 7); Fränkel (1962, 311); Nussbaum (1972, 2); Darcus (1977, 355, and 1979, 30–34, 39); Darcus Sullivan (1988, 152, and 1989, 242); Bremmer (2010, 14).

8 See, e.g., Benveniste (1932, 165); Furley (1956, 3); Claus (1981, 95–96); Cairns (2003, 47–48).

9 Cf. *Il.* 1.3-4, 21.568-570. See also Otto (1923, 14–22); Arbman (1926, 94–95); Adkins (1970, 14–15); West (1971, 149); Robb (1986, 318); Green and Groff (2003, 4); Bremmer (2010, 12); Drozdek (2011, 19–20). On *psyche* in the sense of life, see further Halbwachs (1930, 495f., 497f., 502f., 525); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1930, I.370); Benveniste (1932, 165–168); Snell (1948, 22–23); Furley (1956, 4); Adkins (1970, 14); Sarri (1975, I.41, 43); Claus (1981, 1, 59, 61); Robb (1986, 317); Jahn (1987, 29); Onians (1991, 93–122); Gundert (2000, 13); Cairns (2003, 46, 48, 54); Hankinson (2006, 40); Drozdek (2011, 19); Jeremiah (2018, 61).

10 Cf. Bickel (1926, 72); Dodds (1951, 15–17); Adkins (1970, 44–47); Claus (1981, 16); Palmer (2018, 35); Jeremiah (2018, 3, 8, 61-64, 212–213); Vítek (2022, 64–65, 330–342).

that looked just like the living model.[11] But because it lacked movement, strength, memory, perception, and all mental faculties,[12] for the most part it just vegetated inertly in the darkness of the underworld. In some passages, *psychai* do appear with a greater resemblance to the living (i.e. with emotions, perception, remembering, activities in the underworld, etc.), but this is rightly considered a marginal anomaly or inconsistency,[13] not a parallel or even dominant stream of contemporary belief.[14] No Homeric hero alive cared about the posthumous fate of his *psyche*, and nor did he express any fears or hopes regarding it. That was apparently because no one identified her- or himself with her or his *psyche*.[15] Nor did anyone have reason to do so, because in Homer's time *psyche* was neither rewarded nor punished after death,[16] and posthumous survival or immortality was guaranteed not by the lifeless shadow in Hades but by the memory and respect of living people.[17]

In post-Homeric authors too, the dominant meaning of *psyche* was 'life', and it remained so until the beginning of the 4th century BCE.[18] In this sense, the expression was also used by sever-

11 Cf., e.g.,Vernant (1991, 187–188); Albinus (2000, 16); partly also Otto (1923, 37, 44); Harrison (1960, 75); Hladký (2018, 22).

12 Cf. Rohde (1921, I.4, 10, n. 1 and 44); Otto (1923, 23); Schnaufer (1970, 66, 68–69); Sarri (1975, I.46–47); Benveniste (1932, 166); Bouvier (1999, 62).

13 This view is held by, e.g., Rohde (1921, I.9, 45–46); Bickel (1926, 12–13, 86, 98–99); Darcus Sullivan (1988, 154, 173); Bremmer 1989, 201; Jahn (1987, 36–37); Cairns (2003, 63–65); Drozdek (2011, 20–22); Edmonds (2014, 8–11); Palmer (2018, 36); Johnston (2021, 13–16). Cf., e.g., *Od.* 11.36, 11.387–288 and 471, 12.385, 22.356, 24.1–190, etc.

14 As, e.g., Edmonds 2014, 8–11, believes. The adherents of such views, however, do not take sufficient account of the fact that sometimes *psychai* were very close to corpses (νέκυες) or the dead (νεκροί); see Clarke (1999, 190–215 or Cairns (2003, 59–62).

15 See, e.g., Bickel (1926, 86); Arbman (1926, 100, 144–145); Sarri (1975, I.46–47); Robb (1986, 317); Green and Groff (2003, 5); Long (2015, 18, 30); Jeremiah (2018, 61); Palmer (2018, 35–36). This point is controversial, because some scholars assume some type of identity of *psyche* with its 'bearer'; see, e.g., Schnaufer (1970, 58–59, 106, 204–205); Jahn (1987, 37); Darcus Sullivan (1991, 164); Bremmer (1989, 198 and 2009, 502).

16 If someone was exceptionally rewarded (Menelaus, Orion, Minos) or punished (Ixion, Tantalus, Sisyphus) in the Homeric underworld (cf. Edmonds 2014, 11, n. 19), it did not concern her or his *psyche*, but the whole person (cf. Obryk 2012, 209 et passim).

17 *Rewards and punishments*: Bouvier (1999, 62). *The memory of the living*: Bremmer (2009, 503, and 2010, 20). Cf. Plato, *Leg.* 721b–c.

18 Hesiod, *Op.* 686, fr. 76.7 and fr. 204.99–100 Merkelbach and West; Tyrtaeus, fr. 10.14, 11.5, and 12.8 West; Hipponax, fr. 39 West; Archilochus, fr. 213 West; Anacreon, fr. 15.3–4 Page; Solon, fr. 13.46 West; *HH Apoll.* 455; *HH Ven.* 272; Simonides, fr. 8.12–13 West and perhaps also *Anth. Palat.* 7.250.2, 7.515.1; *IG* I^{3} 1–2,1517 from Eretria (6th century BCE); Theognis 568, 730; Antiphon, *Tetr.* 2.4, 3.1.6–7, 4.5 and *De caed. Her.* 82, 93; Aeschylus, *Eum.* 115 and perhaps also *Choeph.* 276, 749; Sophocles, *Oed. Col.* 1326, *Oed. Tyr.* 94, *El.* 980; Herodotus 1.24, 1.112, 2.134, 3.119, 3.130, 4.190, 5.92e, 7.39, 7.209, 8.118, 9.37, 9.79; Thucydides 1.136.4, 3.39.8, 8.50.5; Pindar, *Isth.* 1.68, *Pyth.* 3.101, *Ol.* 8.39, *Nem.* 1.47; *IG* I^{1} 442b from Athens (432–428 BCE); Lysias, *in Andoc.* 43; Euripides, *Hec.* 176, 182, *Hel.* 52–53, *Or.* 847, *Andr.* 418–419, fr. 67.7 Nauck; Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 357, *Vesp.* 376, *Pax* 1301, *Plut.* 524, *Thesm.* 864. Cf. Arbman (1926, I.126); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931, I.373); Webster (1957, 149–150); Jarcho (1968, 148); Adkins (1970, 62); Claus (1981, 92–97, 141, n. 1 et passim);

al Presocratics[19] who used other terms (*phrenes*, *noos*, *daimon*, etc.) to describe mental or eschatological functions. It seems that further meanings were gradually derived from the meaning 'life'. For instance, because it was possible to risk *psyche* in the sense of life in battle, in court, etc.,[20] the expression also took on the meaning of 'courage' or 'determination' (in the sense of willingness to risk one's life)[21] and 'perseverance' (in the sense of remaining in a life-threatening position).[22] These meanings appeared already during the Archaic Era, but they do not seem to encompass life in any individualised form. In the same epoch, *psyche* also started being linked to desire and sex,[23] perhaps because one can hold the object of desire as dear as one's life or one's life could be threatened in the case of failure. The first emotions to be associated with *psyche* were thus love and desire,[24] which were only eventually joined by other emotions, such as pleasure and anger.[25]

It was not until the last quarter of the 5th century BCE that *psyche* started to become an alternative emotional centre comparable to other psychophysical functions found in Homer and early epic writings (*kradie/kardia*, *nous*, *phrenes*, *thymos*).[26] Around that time, *psyche* in the general understanding was gradually and inconspicuously transformed into an entity that exists already in life, has particular characteristics, and performs specific tasks. Around the same time, there also appeared new meanings, especially those linking *psyche* with

Darcus Sullivan (1988, 157–158, 162, and 1989, 247–251, 259); Gundert (2000, 14, n. 5).

19 Epicharmus, *DK* 23 B 4.5; Empedocles, *DK* 31 B 138; *Anon. Iambl.* 4.2, 5.1 (*DK* 89.4 and 5); Anaxagoras, *DK* 59 B 4, B 12; perhaps also the Orphics, *DK* 1 B 11. Such uses are sometimes ascribed to Democritus (*DK* 69 B 278), and the Pythagoreans (*DK* 59 B 12), but the authenticity of these fragments is questionable.

20 Euripides, *Hel.* 945–946, *Or.* 846–847; Lysias, *in sit.* 20.

21 Herodotus 7.153, 3.108, 5.124; Thucydides 2.40.3; Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.2.10, 2.1.11, 2.1.21; Aeschylus, *Pers.* 28, *Agam.* 1643; Euripides, *Hec.* 580, *Alc.* 604; Lysias (?), *pro Polystr.* 14; Lysias (?), *Epit.* 4, 15, 31,40, 50, 53, 62; Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 393, *Nub.* 1044–1051, *Eq.* 357, *Pax* 675–676. Hermippus, fr. 46 Kock. Cf. Claus (1981, 63, 85–86, 141).

22 Cf. Tyrtaeus, fr. 12.18 West; Simonides, *Epigr.* 15.2 Campbell (in the version in *Anth. Palat.* 6.50.2; older versions of the fragment and some editors omit the verse as inauthentic). Arbman (1926, I.127: see the alleged Herodotus 3.14 and 108, 5.123, 7.153); Meissner (1951, 67); Webster (1957, 150); Claus (1981, 75–76); and in part also Burnet (1916, 245).

23 Cf. Pindar, fr. 123 Snell and Maehler; Euripides, *Hipp.* 525–527, frg. 323.3–4, Nauck; Xenophon, *Oec.* 10.4; Aristophanes, *Lys.* 959–965. Cf. Adkins (1970, 63); Darcus (1979, 34–39); Claus (1981, 74–75); Dodds (1951, 138).

24 Euripides, *Hipp.* 255, 504–505, *Alc.* 353–354; Anacreon, fr. 15.3–4 Page; Xenophon, *Symp.* 1.9, 8.1.

25 *Pleasure*: Simonides, fr. 8.12–13 West = Semonides, fr. 29.12–13 Diehl; Aeschylus, *Pers.* 841–843; Euripides, *Cycl.* 340, *IT* 839, *Heracl.* 173, *Alc.* 604, fr. 754.1–2 Nauck; Pindar, *Pyth.* 4.122. *Anger*: Euripides, *Hipp.* 1038–1040, fr. 822.1–4 Nauck; cf. also Pindar, *Pyth.* 3.40–42; Sophocles, *Ant.* 929–930. Cf. Claus (1981, 4, n. 15, 63, 76, 80); Burnet (1916, 254); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931, I.373); Halbwachs (1930, 496, n. 5); Meissner (1951, 65, 68); Webster (1957, 150); Jarcho (1968, 149–150).

26 See also Meissner (1951, 65); Darcus (1977, 355); West (1971, 149); Darcus Sullivan (1996, 51); Bremmer (2010, 16).

character[27] and reason.[28] With the increasing complexity of *psyche*, one finds ever more cases where the term was used as a description or a periphrasis of the whole person,[29] though not in the sense of a full identity with human individuality or the 'self' in the Platonic sense.[30]

The process of integrating different mental faculties and functions into a single entity or a single concept was not completed even at the end of the 5th century BCE, although at this time there was a growing interest in human individuality and the importance of the private sphere in general (cf. Bremmer 2010, 23). This continued evolution of meaning is exemplified by the eschatological dimension, which was still weak for *psyche* at that time (in contrast to the terms *daimon*, *noos*, and *phrenes*, which meant largely the same). The connection between the afterlife and *psyche* usually figured only in a mythical context, where the expression retained its Homeric meaning of a shadow in the underworld.[31] But identity between the underworld *psyche* and the self is hardly ever mentioned in the sources, and the few passages where it may have been referenced are obscure and problematic.[32]

II. PSYCHE *AND THE ORPHICS*

Many scholars believe that the Orphics were the first to introduce the doctrine of the immortal incarnating soul to Greece, as early as the 6th century BCE.[33] As for the Orphics, there are no sources to prove that they had any doctrine at all in the 6th century BCE, let alone any theory of the soul.[34] The concept of the wandering soul is only ahistorically attributed to them on the basis of vague references to Plato, the unjustified claim of some of the older Presocratics (notably Empedocles and Pythagoras) and literati (Pherecydes,

27 Herodotus 3.14; Lysias, *in Andoc.* 24; Sophocles, *El.* 217–219; Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.2.1; [Democritus], *DK* 68 B 302, Nr. 181.

28 Sophocles, *El.* 902–904, *Ant.* 225–228; Euripides, *Or.* 1179–1180, *Troad.* 1171–1172, fr. 924.1–2 Nauck. Cf. Meissner (1951, 67–68, 73).

29 *IGD* 30 from Olbia (late 5th century BCE); Sophocles, *El.* 1126–1127, *Philoct.* 712 and 1014, *OT* 64; Euripides, *Hec.* 87–88, *Andr.* 159–160; Xenophon, *Oec.* 21.3, 6.14, *Cyr.* 5.1.27; Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 375–376, *Nub.* 412–419. Cf. also Euripides, *Iph. Taur.* 881–882; Sophocles, *Trach.* 1259–1263. Cf. Meissner (1951, 63, n. 2); Guthrie (1971, 148, n. 4); Claus (1981, 71).

30 Cf., e.g., Meissner (1951, 66). *Pace* Darcus (1977, 353), who assumes the opposite.

31 *Psyche going to the underworld*: cf. [Hesiod], *Scut.* 151–153, 254; Pindar, *Pyth.* 11.20–21; Euripides, *Alc.* 900; Theognis 973–974. *Psyche dwelling in the underworld*: Theognis 709–710; Bacchylides 5.64–67, 76–84; Aeschylus, *Pers.* 841, *Eum.* 114, fr. 273a Radt. Cf. Webster (1957, 150); Adkins (1970, 67); Darcus Sullivan (1991, 176, 178); Clarke (1999, 301, n. 18); Johnston (2021, 17–18).

32 Cf. Pindar, *Ol.* 2.68–70, fr. 133 Snell and Maehler; Herodotus 2.123. See Parts III and IV.

33 See, e.g., Burnet (1916, 249–250, 257); Rohde (1921, II.104-106); Halbwachs (1930, 508–513); Jaeger (1947, 84); Casadio (1991, 126–127); Parker (1995, 484); Kalogerakos (1996, 144–149); Albinus (2000, 16); Mihai (2010, 571f. et passim); Zhmud (2012, 221-223, 227-228). See, critically, Edmonds (2014, 7, n. 4).

34 See Fimmen (1914, 514–515); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1932, II.194); Burkert (1972, 103); Bremmer (2010, 22).

Pindar) to be Orphics or inspired by Orphic ideas,[35] and non-standard interpretations of texts from the golden funerary lamellae, the earliest of which date from the late 5th century BCE and in which Orpheus and the Orphics are not mentioned (which sometimes leads to doubts about their Orphic origin).[36]

Psyche occurs only twice in "Orphic" plates. The first is on a gold plate from Hipponion, dated to approximately 400 BCE. Here it states that "the *psychai* of the dead are refreshed" (ψυχαὶ νεκυῶν ψύχονται) at the fountain of memory in the underworld.[37] Although the text is not entirely clear, it seems that the just-deceased "initiate" should drink from this spring and avoid the spring of oblivion from which other souls drink.[38] On the one hand, the author of the manual attributed to the *psyche* after death a capacity for active dealing and choice that it did not possess in Homer, and believed that the manual itself had magical or ritual powers that would secure the dead a favourable place in the underworld (this was a novelty). On the other hand, the instructions unwittingly reflect the persistence of the traditional (Homeric) concept of the powerless dead who lose their memory and cognitive skills after death. If the soul retained its full identity and memory even after death, the "initiate" could memorise the instructions from the plate while still alive and would not need to carry it with him to the grave (most of the golden lamellae were found near the hands or necks of the dead).

Another occurrence is on one of the bone tablets from Olbia, on which the words *soma* (i.e. "body") and *psyche* stand side by side.[39] Some scholars see in this evidence of the Orphic theory of the transmigration of the soul[40] and the manifestation of body-soul dualism,[41] but a pair of words with no clear relationship to each other do not establish any doctrine, and the antagonism between body and soul is attested only from the second half of the 5th BCE (and in a sharpened form from the following century),[42] while it is not to be found in Homer or the older Presocratics.[43]

35 Cf. Fimmen (1914, 514–515); Parker (1995, 498–499); Kalogerakos (1996, 144–146).

36 See von Wilamowitz-Moellendroff (1931, II.184, n. 1, II.200f.); Zuntz (1971, 337, n. 5, 340f., 392f.); cf. also Graf and Johnston (2007, 55–56, 62). *Contra*: Zhmud (2012, 222).

37 *OF* 474.4 F Bernabé (2005, 5) = L 1.4 Graf and Johnston (2007, 4–5). In a different context, the same sentence also occurs in *OF* 475.6 F of Entella (3rd BCE) = L 8.6; see Graf and Johnston (2007, 16–17).

38 See Graf and Johnston (2007, 100f., 104, 130); Bremmer (2010, 14); Kotansky (2021, 38).

39 *IGD* 94 from Olbia (5th-4th BCE). Cf. Rusjaeva (1978, 87–104); West (1982, 17–29); Vinogradov (1991, 79f.); Zhmud (1992, 159–168); Parker (1995, 485); Bremmer (2009, 504).

40 This view is held, e.g., by West (1982, 18–19); Rusjaeva (1978, 87, 91); Vinogradov (1991, 80); Casadio (1991, 125); Parker (1995, 485, 509, n. 78); Zhmud (1992, 168, and 2012, 225).

41 See Rusjaeva (1978, 92); Laks (1999, 251–252); Hankinson (2006, 42); Casadio (1991, 125); Zhmud (1992, 168, and 2012, 225); Bremmer (2010, 17–18).

42 See von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931, I.373); Holmes (2010, 102–104); Bremmer (2010, 17, 24). Cf. [Hippocrates], *Vict.* 1.28; Aristophanes, *Eq.* 457; Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.3.5, 2.1.9, 3.12.1-8, *Cyr.* 1.6.41 etc.

43 Cf. Jaeger (1947, 223); Sarri (1975, I.44); Claus (1981, 141–142); Holmes (2010, 118). It is true, however, that this antagonism is

Although in the last third of the 5th century BCE the *psyche* and the body were already entering into a relationship, at first they were ascribed more or less equal origin and value.[44] In any case, the gold plates from Hipponion, Olbia, and other places do not originate from the 6th century BCE, but rather from the late 5th or early 4th century BCE.[45]

It may be argued that there is indisputable evidence that the early Orphics were concerned with the soul. According to Aristotle, some of them identified the *psyche* with the air,[46] but neither the immortality of the soul nor its reincarnation follows from this thesis.[47] Because of his sexual purity, Euripides called his hero Hippolytus a "virgin soul" (παρθένον ψυχὴν ἔχων), which may have alluded to the Orphic ideology of which Hippolytus was a follower.[48] The thesis of the body as the grave of the soul, which in antiquity was often associated with the Orphics, occurs several times in Plato,[49] but it can also be found in various variants in many other authors.[50] The "old story", to which Plato relates his doctrine of the immortal soul wandering through bodies, was also already considered Orphic in antiquity,[51] although the view is not supported by any old and valid source (Edmonds 2014, 36).

While it is likely that people claiming Orpheus and his legacy were already active in the second half of the 5th century BCE and may have influenced some with their views, it is almost certain that the Orphics could not have been the first to begin the semantic transformation of the soul, or it cannot be proved (Bremmer 2010, 22).

sometimes thought by some scholars to be found already in Socrates or Democritus.

44 Cf. *IG* I[1] 442.5–6 from Potedaea (432/429 BCE); Euripides, *Suppl.* 521-534. Cf. Claus (1981, 115).

45 The circumstances of the find are murky and apparently not properly documented; see West (1982, 17): "It is not stated whereabouts the tablets were found." The plates seem to have been dated mainly on the basis of a report on the cult of Dionysus in the Crim (Herodotus 4.78–80), which the notoriously inaccurate carbon isotope test "does not contradict" (Rusjaeva 1978, 88). However, the plates, which were allegedly discovered "somewhere" in the embankment of the central temenos (Rusjaeva 1978, 73; Vinogradov 1991, 78), cannot be dated precisely, whether archaeologically, epigraphically, or osteologically. In spite of this, some researchers (Vinogradov 1991, 78; Zhmud 2012, 225) try to push their origin as far back as possible, i.e. to the second or third quarter of the 5th century BCE.

46 Aristotle, *De an.* 419b27 (*OF* 421F Bernabé). Cf. Parker (1995, 487); Polansky (2007, 288–290); Bremmer (2010, 14).

47 This fact is emphasised, e.g., by Edmonds (2014, 38, n. 80).

48 Euripides, *Hipp.* 1006. Shortly before, Orpheus is introduced as the hero's ruler (*Hipp.* 952–954 = *OF* 627 T Bernabé). Cf. Claus (1981, 84–85); Parker (1995, 483, 500).

49 Plato, *Crat.* 400c (*OF* 430i Bernabé), *Phd.* 70c, *Ep.* 335a. See Linforth (1941, 147–148); Claus (1981, 112–113); Casadio (1991, 123–124); Parker (1995, 487, 496); Palmer (2014, 210); Edmonds (2014, 24–35).

50 Cf. Plato, *Phd.* 62b (*OF* 439i Bernabé) and *Schol. in Plat. Phd.* 62b (*OF* 429ii Bernabé): Plato had Orpheus in mind. Cf. Edmonds (2014, 5–6, 24–26, 29–32).

51 Plato, *Phd.* 70c (*OF* 428F Bernabé). Cf. Olympiodorus, *in Plat. Phd.* 10.6, p. 123 Westerink (*OF* 428ii Bernabé); Damascius, *in Plat. Phd.* 1.203, p. 123 Westerink (*OF* 428iii Bernabé).

III. PSYCHE *AND THE PYTHAGOREANS*

Other candidates to whom the origin of the new doctrine of the immortal *psyche* is often attributed are Pythagoras and his disciples.[52] The examination of the Pythagorean doctrine of *psyche* can be discussed here only in rough outline because the sources, though numerous, are very fragmentary, not very reliable, and mostly based on second- and third-hand reports. Pythagoras is said to have left no writings and to have commanded his disciples to keep silent about his teachings.[53] Nevertheless, his doctrine of the immortal soul (*psyche*) which travels through various bodies[54] has been considered the oldest and best documented part of Pythagoreanism since antiquity.[55] Pythagoras is said to have invented this doctrine himself,[56] or merely to have been the first to introduce it to Greece after having learned it in the Orient[57] or from his teachers (i.e. the Pherecydes, shamans, or Orphics).[58]

The basic difficulty is that there are no direct sources for the Pythagorean doctrine until the end of the 5th century BCE. Many interpreters, however, rely heavily on the "unsilent" disciples, especially Empedocles and Philolaus, whom they regard as Pythagoreans or in whom they find key Pythagorean ideas. But the philosophy of Empedocles (c. 495–435) cannot be compared with an older Pythagorean doctrine, because none has survived. Moreover, Empedocles called the incarnating substratum *daimon* or long-living god (*theos*),[59] not *psyche* (he used this word only for "life"; see Part I). It is also a question whether Empedocles' *daimon* or *theos* was really a mere duplicate of the soul (as many doxographers and scholars believed),[60] or rather a divine being, i.e. a kind of eschatological entity which, like Pindar's *eidolon*, was not related to human or animal personality either at

52 See, e.g., Fimmen (1914, 514); Rohde (1921, II.160–162); Jaeger (1947, 83); Burkert (1972, 120–165); Claus (1981, 4–5, 118–120); Casadio (1991, 119–155); Kalogerakos (1996, 98–159); Zhmud (1997, 117–128).

53 Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* 57 (*DK* 46.2); Flavius Josephus, *Contr. Apion.* I.164 (*DK* 14.18); Diogenes Laërtius 9.6 (*DK* 14.19), etc. Cf. Bremmer (2010, 19).

54 Dicaearchus, fr. 33 Wehrli = Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* 19; Hippolytus, *Ref. haer.* 1.2.11; *Schol. in Plat. Remp.* 600b; [Aëtius], *Plac.* 4.7.1 etc. Cf. Zhmud (2012, 221); Palmer (2018, 27).

55 See, e.g., von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1932, II.188–194); Guthrie (1962, I.306); von Fritz (1963, 187); Sedley (1995, 10); Kalogerakos (1996, 99); Palmer (2014, 204f., 212f.); Hladký (2018, 27).

56 See Fimmen (1914, 516–523); Rohde (1921, II.160–162); Halbwachs (1930, 515, n. 1); Guthrie (1952, 306f.); Burkert (1972, 126f.); Zhmud (2012, 221f.).

57 Diodorus Siculus 1.98.2 (*DK* 41.7). Cf. Fimmen (1914, 513, 515, 521–523); Burkert (1972, 133); Zhmud (2012, 228).

58 Cf. Rohde (1921; I.107f.); Claus (1981, 111); Zhmud (1997, 117–125, and 2012, 228); Hladký (2018, 23).

59 *DK* 31 B 21.12, B 23.8, B 115.5, *PStrasb* 1665–1666 aII.2.

60 See Aristotle, *De an.* 408a13–23; Diogenes Laërtius 8.77; Hippolytus, *Ref. haer.* 7.29.14; Stobaeus 1.1.296. See also Zeigler (1942, 1373); Roloff (1970, 193); Bollack (1997, 1014); Hladký (2018, 25–26, n. 18–19). *Contra*: von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1932, II.192: "Ein Gott is keine Seele."); Trépanier (2014, 175); Palmer (2018, 28); Ferella (2024, 139–140, 148-149 et passim).

all or only very loosely and partially.[61] In any case, the view that Empedocles was a mere herald of older Pythagorean views is as unfounded as the belief that Empedocles was a Pythagorean,[62] which is unsubstantiated, similarly to the aforementioned claim that he was an Orphic (see Part II).

Under the name of Philolaus, who was active in the second half of the 5th century BCE, a large number of forgeries circulated in antiquity. According to the Christian theologian Claudianus Mamertus (died c. 473), Philolaus in B 22 assumed the soul (*anima*) to be immortal and incorporeal (*incorporalis*).[63] This is clearly a post-Platonic thesis, since the immateriality of the *psyche* first appears explicitly in Plato and it is barely conceivable in the 5th century BC.[64]

In fr. B 14 the immortal *psyche* is punished by being buried in the body as in the grave.[65] The concept of a soul imprisoned for punishment in the body has been attributed to other Pythagoreans[66] as well as to other and sometimes older thinkers (Pindar, Empedocles).[67] It is also found in Plato, although it is curious that he never mentions the Pythagoreans in this context.[68] The principal problem is that B 14 uses the word *psyche* in a Platonic sense.[69] Another difficulty is that the passage looks more like a reference than a quotation, since the idea is stated in a very brief and general summary, and it is supposed to be attested by "ancient theologians and seers" (μαρτυρέονται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες). Moreover, the word *theologia* was first used by Plato and the word

61 See, e.g., Halbwachs (1930, 519); Dodds (1951, 153–154); Guthrie (1952, 100); Claus (1981, 114); Darcus Sullivan (1989a, 158, n. 24); Vítek (2002, I.297–298); Palmer (2018, 40); cf. also Trépanier (2014, 195–196). Another matter that need not be addressed here is whether the number of *daimones* was the same as the number of living humans or all living beings, or whether it was significantly less.

62 See, e.g., Burkert (1972, 220), who himself subscribes to this thesis. Ancient testimonies of this belief certainly exist, but the fundamental problem is their veracity. In contrast, the independence of Empedocles' doctrine from the Pythagoreans is assumed by Huffman (2009, 36).

63 *DK* 44 B 22. Doubts are expressed, e.g., by Fimmen (1914, 517, n. 6); Claus (1981, 112); Burkert (1972, 247); Renehan (1980, 121–123); Huffman (1993, 404–406, 411–414); Zhmud (1997, 123); Bremmer (2010, 17); Hladký (2018, 28–29); Vítek (2022, 242).

64 Plato, *Soph.* 246b. Cf. Aristotle, *Met.* 990a4–18, who criticises the Pythagoreans for not being able to distinguish between the sensible and the intelligible. On the materiality of the soul among the Presocratics, see Renehan (1980, 112 et passim); Huffman (1993, 329–330, and 2009, 33, 40); Lloyd (2007, 139–140); Holmes (2010, 104–105); Palmer (2018, 40); Hladký (2018, 29–30, 34–35); Vítek (2022, 242–248).

65 Clemens of Alexandria, *Strom.* 3.3.17.1 = *DK* 44 B 14 (transl. by C. A. Huffman): "The ancient theologians and seers also give witness that on account of certain penalties the soul is yoked to the body and is buried in it as in a tomb."

66 Euxitheus in Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 4, 157c (*DK* 44 ad B 14 = *OF* 430vi Bernabé = Clearchus, fr. 38 Wehrli). Euxitheus is probably an invention of Clearchus; see Burkert (1972, 124, n. 21) or Zhmud (1997, 123, and 2012, 231).

67 Pindar, *Ol.* 2.56-77; Empedocles, *DK* 31 B 115. Cf. also Aristotle, fr. 60 Rose = Jamblichus, *Protr.* 8, p. 47.21 Pistelli (*OF* 430v Bernabé). Cf. Burkert (1972, 248, n. 48); Edmonds (2014, 28, n. 54).

68 Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 493a1–3, *Crat.* 400c1–7. Cf. Claus (1981, 112); Palmer (2014, 210).

69 Cf. Huffman (1993, 405–406, and 2009, 24); Zhmud (2012, 230–231); Hladký (2018, 28, n. 32).

theologos by Aristotle,[70] and Clemens, who quotes the statement and was fond of combining the words *theologos* and *theologia* with diviners and divination, introduces it amidst quotations and paraphrases from Plato's *Cratylus*, *Phaedo*, and *Respublica*.[71] The authenticity of this passage is therefore questionable,[72] although it has many adherents.[73]

Another fragment of Philolaus' that is also of debatable authenticity[74] is B 13, in which the *psyche*, together with perception, is placed in the heart.[75] Most scholars prefer the meaning of "soul" here,[76] although there are also suggestions that it should be understood as "life", "life force",[77] or the centre of emotions.[78] Finally, the doctrine of the immortal transmigrating soul is attributed to Philolaus, mainly on the basis of previous questionable fragments and Plato s statement that Philolaus supposedly forbade suicide.[79] How this can imply transmigration escapes me somewhat, since the Greeks were generally very hostile to suicide and applied many restrictive rules to the corpses of suicides.[80]

It can be argued that as early as the 5th century BCE there were authors who associated the Pythagoreans with *psyche*. Herodotus is the first to be cited; according to him, some Greeks, whose names he does not wish to mention, adopted from Egypt the doctrine of the "immortal *psyche* of man" (ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι), which, after death, "always enters into another living creature just born",

70 Plato, *Resp.* 379a; Aristotle, *Met.* 1000a9, 1071b27 etc. Cf. Burkert (1972, 248); Huffman (1993, 405–406); Zhmud (1997, 123, and 2012, 230); Edmonds (2014, 28, n. 52).

71 *Theologos and theologia*: *Strom.* 1.22.150.5, 4.1.2.2, 5.4.24.1. *Quotations and paraphrases of Plato*: *Strom.* 3.3.16.2–3.3.19.3.

72 Cf. Fimmen (1914, 517, n. 6); Claus (1981, 112); Burkert (1972, 248–249); Huffman (1993, 404–406, 411–414); Zhmud (1997, 123); Bremmer (2010, 17); Zhmud (2012, 230).

73 Cf. Burnet (1930, 278, n. 14); Guthrie (1952, 311–312); Kalogerakos (1996, 105–106).

74 Cf. Burkert (1972, 247, 249f., 270); Kahn (1985, 20, n. 40); Huffman (1993, 307–314); Kalogerakos (1996, 106–107).

75 *Theol. arithm.* 25,17 de Falco (*DK* 44 B 13, transl. by Huffman): "The head [is the seat] of intellect, the heart of *psyche* and sensation, the navel of rooting and first growth, the genitals of the sowing of seed and generation."

76 See Sedley (1995, p. 22). Cf. *DK* 58 B 1a, par. 30; or Aristotle, fr. 197 Rose.

77 Cf. Huffman (1993, 312: "life" or "animal vitality"); later, however, the author abandoned this interpretation; see Huffman (2009, 24–26); Zhmud (2012, 230–231, 389: *psyche* = "the principle of life and movement"); Hladký (2018, 27: "the soul ... is a life force"). See also Claus (1981, 118); Palmer (2014, 209). Some support for the meaning of "life" could also be provided by the concept of the heart as the source of life (*bios*); see Democritus, *DK* 68 B 1; Aeschylus, *Agam.* 1121–1123; Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 1 and 480–480 plus *Schol. in Aristoph. Acharn.* 1b; Euripides, *Hec.* 1025–1027 plus *Schol. vet. in Eur. Hec.* 1025.

78 This possibility is defended by Huffman (2009, 25–28, 32–34 (*psyche* = "a seat or a centre of emotions") and accepted by Hladký (2018, 28). This meaning of *psyche* is, according to Huffman, attested, e.g., by Herodotus 3,40, 3.43, 3.108, etc. (cf. part I). *Contra*: Palmer (2018, 32–33).

79 Plato, *Phd.* 61d-e. Cf. Guthrie (1962, 310–311); Huffman (2009, 28–29). *Contra*: Zhmud (2012, 231 and 389: "There is no evidence that he believed in metempsychosis ... There is nothing to indicate that Philolaus regarded the soul as Immortal.").

80 Cf. Rohde (1921, I.217–218, n. 5, II.122, n. 1); Parker (1983, 42, 52). Cf., e.g., Aeschines, *Contra Ctesiph.* 244; or *LSCG* 154 B 33–36 from Cos (3rd BCE).

which takes it 3000 years.[81] Although many ancient and modern scholars are convinced that this highly controversial claim (reincarnation is not attested from Egypt)[82] refers primarily, or even exclusively, to Pythagoras,[83] no one is named; and the time of its formulation (i.e. the beginning of the last third of the 5th century BC) makes it possible to place several authors in this position (in the first place, Pindar and Empedocles, whose doctrines correspond to most of the reported characteristics).[84] Furthermore, 20 of the 21 occurrences of *psyche* in Herodotus do not refer to the soul in the Platonic sense, so it is somewhat odd that *psyche* would have this meaning in this one place.[85] But no other meaning can be conflated with immortality, so it does not help much if the meaning of "character", "person", or "centre of emotion" is assumed.[86]

Secondly, the *psyche* is mentioned in a mocking epigram of Xenophanes (570?–475?), according to which Pythagoras (though not directly named) recognised in an abused puppy the *psyche* of his former companion. He said that when he saw the puppy being maltreated, he cried out: "Stop, do not beat it; for it is the *psyche* of a friend" (παῦσαι, μηδὲ ῥάπιζ', ἐπεὶ ἦ φίλου ἀνέρος ἐστὶν / ψυχή).[87] If these verses – or the story itself – are genuine (which is not certain),[88] they could imply that the *psyche* retains individual traits after death and in the new birth (which would be a big novelty), because otherwise Pythagoras would not have been able to recognise it (Huffman 2009, 37). Moreover, many scholars believe that the epigram proves Pythagoras' doctrine of reincarnation (*metempsychosis*) and/or the Platonic meaning of an individualised "soul".[89]

However, great caution is needed here. First of all, the text says that the *psyche* is not *in* the puppy, but that it *is* a

81 Herodotus 2.123.1 (*DK* 14.1 = *OF* 423F Bernabé). Cf. Herodotus 2.81.

82 See, e.g., Eggers Lan (1981, 205–206, n. 33); Casadio (1991, 128); Lloyd (1993, 59–60); Edmonds (2014, 36, n. 73). The opposite possibility is admitted by West (1971, 62) and Huffman (2009, 28, n. 21).

83 Cf. Fimmen (1914, 518f.); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1932, II.189-190); Burnet (1916, 255); Guthrie (1962, 158); von Fritz (1963, 187f.); Burkret (1972, 126, n. 38); Claus (1981, 116); Kalogerakos (1996, 112–113); Mihai (2010, 569–570); Betegh (2013, 252); Casadio (1991, 128).

84 Cf. Lloyd (1993, 59–60); Huffman (2009, 28); Zhmud (2012, 223–224).

85 Cf., e.g., Powell (1960, 285, s. v. ψυχή: *psyche* in 2.123 = "soul"); Claus (1981, 90).

86 See Huffman (2009, 26–27, 34: *psyche* in 2.123 = "an emotional centre", "the seat of emotions and desires"), who erroneously attributes to Powell the translation "life".

87 *DK* 21 B 7 = Diogenes Laërtius 8.36. Cf. Lesher (1992, 78–81).

88 Cf. Huffman (1993, 313). Other doubters are mentioned by Burkert (1972, 120, n. 1); Eggers Lan (1981, 205–207, n. 33); Kalogerakos (1996, 110, n. 49). Most scholars, however, accept the authenticity of the fragment; see, e.g., Furley (1956, 10); Fränkel (1962, 311); Darcus (1979, 36); Claus (1981, 5, 115–116); Lesher (1992, 79); Zhmud (1997, 117); Schäfer (2009, 46f.).

89 Cf. Fränkel (1962, 311); Burkert (1972, 120–122); Dihle (1982, 9); Kahn (2001, 11); Schäfer (2009, 46–47, 54–55, 69); Bremmer (2010, 18); Zhmud (2012, 30); Edmonds (2014, 37); Hladký (2018, 27, n. 27); Palmer (2018, 26). *Contra*: Furley (1956, 11); Lesher (1992, 79–80).

puppy.[90] This is not the same thing. According to tradition, Pythagoras himself was not reincarnated but reborn (see below). This is not reincarnation (*metempsychosis*), but rebirth (*palingenesis*),[91] which requires no theory of the soul.[92] This could mean that the author of the epigram was mocking the rebirth as a kind of mythical metamorphosis into an animal.[93] Perhaps he was also ironising the senseless randomness of his friend's new birth[94] and the absurd exaggeration of Pythagoras' ability to see what no one else could see.[95] But whatever the case, *psyche* in the last third of the 6th century BCE could not have had the meaning of the Platonic soul. It seems more appropriate, therefore, to look for more traditional meanings in the epigram, such as "life", "ghost" (mockingly, the shadow of the dead), or "person" (periphrastically a companion of Pythagoras),[96] for which there are good parallels (see Part I). In any case, the existence of an entire theory of the soul can hardly be legitimately inferred from one uncertain occurrence of the term.[97]

The last source is Ion of Chios, who was active in the second half of the 5th century BC. According to his verses, Pythagoras' supposed teacher Pherecydes "has in his *psyche* a jouyful life even in death, if indeed Pythagoras, wise in all things, truly knew and understood the views of men".[98] The authenticity of these verses is sometimes questioned, as the wording of verses 3-4 is akward, and as Diogenes Laertius gives them immediately after a quotation from Duris of Samos, a not very reliable historian and fabulist, so they could have been taken from him.[99] The quoted verses certainly do not confirm reincarnation (as often believed) or the identity of the *psyche* with the soul,[100] since in the first half

90 Cf. Fränkel (1962, 310–312); Huffman (1993, 331); Schäfer (2009, 60).

91 According to Servius, *in Verg. Aen.* 3.68, Pythagoras did not use the term *metempsychosis*, but *palingenesis*.

92 Cf. Zhmud (2012, 388): "Pythagoras, it would appear, had no philosophical teaching on the soul."

93 The possibility that Xenophanes presented the identification of a friend's *psyche* with a puppy as a kind of metamorphosis is indicated by Schäfer (2009, 56–59).

94 Aristotle, *De an.* 407b20-24 (*DK* 58 B 38). Aristotle does not name anyone in particular, but it is possible that he was referring to the same thing as Xenophanes, i.e. the contingency of Pythagorean rebirths (Polansky 2007, 100–101; Edmonds 2014, 37–38) and the absence of a concept of guilt and punishment (Zhmud 2012, 232).

95 See Lesher (1992, 80); Schäfer (2009, 48–49, 52, 69); Zhmud (2012, 30–31).

96 *Life*: cf. Schäfer (2009, 58–59: "life force", but according to the author, Pythagoras' *psyche* already had a new meaning of an individualised entity). *Shadow or ghost*: cf. Kahn (2001, 11: *psyche* = the ghost); Huffman (1993, 331: "shade" or "ghost"; Huffman 2009, 35–42, retracted this view); cf. also Claus (1981, 61). *Person*: cf. Furley (1956, 11); Claus (1981, 115–116).

97 See Huffman (1993, 331): "It seems perverse to seize upon the second-hand satirical remark of Xenophanes and use it as the basis on which to reconstruct the Pythagorean doctrine of *psyche*." Cf. similarly Eggers Lan (1981, 205–207, n. 33).

98 *DK* 36 B 4.2-4 (transl. by Guthrie, slightly modified). Cf. Fimmen (1914, 514); Bremmer (2010, 18).

99 See Schwartz (1905, 1854–1856); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1927, 281, n. 1); Diels and Kranz (1992, I.380,21-22 and app. crit. ad 18f.); Burkert (1972, 112, n. 14); cf. also Kahn (2001, 11, n. 20).

100 Cf. Huffman (2009, 38); Zhmud (2012, 226, n. 87, 232, n. 116).

of the 5th century BCE the dead – as in Homer (see part I) – were often called *psychai*.[101] What was new, however, was that the dead could experience a joyful or blissful life after death.[102] Such a possibility was at first (i.e. in Homer) limited to a few individuals chosen by the gods, and it was only at the end of the archaic period that the thesis that after-death rewards and punishments applied to all people emerged in several different settings.[103] This belief, which is not dependent on any theory of the soul, could have been shared by Pythagoras, but it is rather unlikely that he invented it himself.[104]

And this is all from the 5th century BCE. From the scarcity of sources, the interpreters help themselves to references, the earliest of which date from the following century. These sources claim that the Pythagorean *psyche* was a divine entity that did not depend on the body and had a celestial or divine origin.[105] If the immortal *psyche*-soul commits any offence, it is punished by descending into the body, which is its "grave" (*sema*) or "prison" (*froura*) and must incarnate until it is purified again.[106] These terms are already found in Plato, who, however, did not connect them with Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans. Nor did he do so in the case of the doctrine of the immortal incarnating *psyche*.[107] For the first time, the entry of the *psyche* into the body is explicitly attributed to the "Pythagorean myths" by Aristotle, who at the same time found the Pythagorean "soul" in the air and made it the source of movement.[108] The same author considered whether Pythagoras applied reincarnation to all beings or only to himself,[109] since he himself was said to constitute a special category of beings.[110] And it was Aristotle's and Plato's pupils Dicaearchus, Clearchus, and Heraclides of Pontus who first ascribed to Pythagoras and the older Pythagoreans the more developed doctrine of transmigration

101 Cf. [Hesiod], *Scut.* 151–153, 254; Pindar, *Pyth.* 11.20–21; Euripides, *Alc.* 900; Theognis 709–710, 973–974; Bacchylides 5.64–67, 76–84, 171; Aeschylus, *Pers.* 841, *Eum.* 114, fr. 273a Radt. Cf. Webster (1957, 150); Adkins (1970, 67); Solmsen (1984, 267, n. 9); Darcus Sullivan (1991, 176, 178); Clarke (1999, 301, n. 18).

102 See Huffman (2009, 38), who therefore also here interprets *psyche* as the centre and seat of emotions.

103 Cf. *IG* XII.9, 287 from Eretria (c. 520–480 BCE); Epicharmus, *DK* 23 B 45. Cf. Claus (1981, 116).

104 See also Eggers Lan (1981, 206–207, n. 33). *Contra*: Fimmen (1914, 517).

105 Alexander Polyhistor, *Pythagorica hypomnemata* = Diogenes Laërtius 8.24–33 (*DK* 58B1a). Cf. Kalogerakos (1996, 100–104) or Bremmer (2010, 15).

106 *Punishment*: Clearchus, fr. 38 Wehrli (*DK* 44 ad B 14); [Philolaus], *DK* 44 B 14. *Grave and prison*: Platon, *Gorg.* 493a–b (*DK* 44 ad B14), *Crat.* 400c (*DK* 44 ad B14); *Phd.* 62b (*DK* 44 ad B 15). *Incarnation*: Dicaearchus (?) in Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.* 19 (*DK* 14.8a). Cf. Guthrie (1962, I.186); von Fritz (1973, 480); Burkert (1972, 99f.); Kalogerakos (1996, 104–107, 113); Huffman (2009, 36–37); Palmer (2014, 208, 210 et passim).

107 Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 246b, *Meno* 81a–b (here the view is attributed to Pindar), *Leg.* 870d–e. See Palmer (2018, 26).

108 Aristotle, *De an.* 404a16-20 (*DK* 58 B 40). Cf. Alexander Polyhistor, *Pythagorica hypomnemata* = Diogenes Laërtius 8.32 (*DK* 58 B 1a). Cf. Kalogerakos (1996, 116–117); Polansky (2007, 68–69).

109 On this possibility see Aristotle, fr. 192 Rose (*DK* 14.7), and Eggers Lan (1981, 206, n. 33).

110 Aristotle, fr. 192 Rose (*DK* 14.7). Cf. Claus (1981, 115); Kalogerakos (1996, 110–111).

(*metempsychosis*) and the detailed recollections of Pythagoras' individual rebirths (*palingenesis*),[111] since in his verses Empedocles more probably speaks of his own incarnations.[112]

It must be admitted that the 4th-century BCE authors drew primarily on the theories of contemporary philosophers who subscribed to Pythagoreanism, while they were more likely to conjecture about the older sources, which were available to them only to a very limited extent, than to quote them. For their projections, these authors mostly utilised the ideas of Plato and Empedocles as a binding cement, and further modified the resulting image using Platonic-Aristotelian terminology, in which *psyche* unambiguously referred to the soul.[113] That they were wrong in a number of aspects is shown by concepts that the Pythagoreans in the first half of the 5th century BCE almost certainly did not advocate, such as the sharp antagonism of body-soul[114] or the posthumous departure of individual souls to the world soul, since the former idea is first encountered at the end of the 5th century BCE, while there is no trace of the latter idea before Plato (*scil.* in authentic texts).[115]

To these objections it might be replied that the very existence of the doctrine of reincarnation in these sources implies that someone must have first invented and enforced it. Why, then, could it not have been such an extraordinary man as Pythagoras, to whom it was mostly attributed? The answer is that such a step requires certain prerequisites, as otherwise it is very difficult to think of. This is admitted even by the adherents of the traditional interpretation, according to whom the theory of reincarnation must be preceded by the following propositions: 1) the *psyche* is separable from the body; 2) the *psyche* is the bearer of (human) individuality; 3) the *psyche* preexists the body and has a different (i.e. higher) quality; 4) the *psyche* is immortal and is therefore a divine element in man.[116] But with the exception of the first point, at the end of the 6th century the remaining assumptions cannot be substantiated even in a hint. It seems unlikely, therefore, that

111 Heraclides of Pontus, fr. 89 Wehrli (*DK* 14.8); Aristoxenus, fr. 12 Wehrli (*DK* 14.8); Dicaearchus, fr. 36 Wehrli = Clearchus, fr. 10 Wehrli. On the mythical and contradictory nature of these reports see von Fritz (1963, 192); Kalogerakos (1996, 108–109); Zhmud (2012, 232); and partly also Huffman (2009, 24, n. 12).

112 *DK* 31 B 129. Although many scholars assume that Pythagoras is almost certain to be the subject of Empedocles' verses, see, e.g., von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1932, II.188, n. 1); Fränkel (1962, 312–313); Kalogerakos (1996, 109); Zhmud (2012, 226).

113 Cf. Eggers Lan (1981, 206, n. 33); Palmer (2018, 26); or Huffman (2009, 24, n. 12): "The later pseudo-Pythagorean texts typically take Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions and try to assign them back to figures like Philolaus in order to glorify the early Pythagoreans and show that they had anticipated Plato and Aristotle."

114 Cf. Hankinson (2006, 42–43); Long (2015, 97). However, many scholars are convinced otherwise and consider the dualism of the soul-body as the basis of the Pythagorean and Orphic doctrine of the soul; see, e.g., Kalogerakos (1996, 146) or Palmer (2014, 208); see also Part II.

115 It is held, e.g., by Mansfeld (2015, 84).

116 Cf. Casadio (1991, 141–142); Dihle (1982, 9–11); Schäfer (2009, 59–63).

Pythagoras produced any doctrine of an immortal incarnating entity which he called the *psyche*.[117] He may have used a different term (e.g. *daimon*),[118] he may have offered a simpler doctrine of rebirth (*palingenesis*) that does not require the above conditions, but it is impossible to deduce it from the extant texts.

IV. PSYCHE *IN ANAXIMENES*

Anaximenes of Miletus, who lived in the 6th century BCE,[119] is the oldest European author in whose thought the term *psyche* appears in the new sense. He is often viewed as the founder of a philosophical conception of the soul, although his work is recorded in a highly fragmentary form by much later and not very reliable testimonies. The main problem in his case is the authenticity of the only surviving direct statement where *psyche* is mentioned:[120]

> Eurystratus's son Anaximenes of Miletus explained that the initial principle (arche) of all things is air (*aer*). It is said to be the origin of all things, and into it again they perish. He says that as we are governed by our psyche, which is air (*aer*), so breath (*pneuma*) and air include the whole world (οἷον ἡ ψυχή, φησίν, ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀὴρ οὖσα συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον πνεῦμα καὶ ἀὴρ περιέχει). For breath and air are meant to be synonymous.

Leaving aside the credibility of the source of this passage, whom Hermann Diels identified as Aëtius, the compiler of a collection of opinions of Greek philosophers on various philosophical topics,[121] the manuscripts of this [Aëtius]

117 See Eggers Lan (1981, 205–207, n. 33); cf. also, in part, Zhmud (2012, 228, 388 et passim).

118 The possibility that the earliest Pythagoreans used the term *daimon* rather than *psyche* is suggested by Claus (1981, 119). Cf. Pythagoreans, *DK* 58 B 1a, par. 32; and Aristotle, fr. 192 Rose (*DK* 14.7).

119 For more on dating his life, cf. Diels and Kranz (1992, I.90, app. crit. 20); Kerferd (1954, 117–121); Kirk and Raven (1957, 143–144); Guthrie (1962, I.115).

120 [Aëtius], *Plac.* I.3.4 (*DK* 13 B 2). Cf. also *DK* 13 A 23, B 1 and Philoponus, *in De an.* 87,2–5 Hayduck. For the Greek text, see Diels (1879, 298); Lachenaud (2003, 73); Mansfeld and Runia (2020, 201). In the Arabic translation, the passage reads as follows (transl. by Daiber 1980, 99): 'Anaximenes der Milesier vertrat die Ansicht, dass das Prinzip der existierenden Dinge die Luft ist, und dass aus ihr alles wird und zu ihr sich (alles) auflöst. (Das ist) wie (bei) der Seele in uns: denn die Luft ist es, die sie in uns bewahrt. Das Pneuma und die Luft erfassen die ganze Welt. Man verwendet "Pneuma" und "Luft" in derselben Bedeutung.' For an interpretation and overview of the scholarly discussion, see Kerschensteiner (1962, 72–83); Longrigg (1964, 1–5); Alt (1973, 129–164); Wöhrle (1993, 63–66, 80–81).

121 Cf. Diels (1879, 48, 99–100, 224, 273–279: the collection originated in the 1st century BCE); Lachenaud (2003, 16–18: the collection was compiled between the end of the 1st century CE and the middle of the 2nd century CE); Mansfeld and Runia (1997, 320–323 and 2020, 15–17: the collection was created around 50 CE). For a long time, this hypothesis of Diels' was generally accepted but gradually came to be criticised and eventually rejected; see, e.g., Kingsley (1994, 235f.); Lebedev (2016, 573–633). Nevertheless, Mansfeld and Runia, who republished and commented on the doxographic material, offered a significantly different edition of the texts and criticised Diels' hypothesis on various partial points (Mansfeld and Runia 1997, 6–31, 64–108, 175–177, 321, and 2020, 21–23, 28–34, 97–98), but in the main points they fully supported its accuracy.

are preserved in a very poor condition: they contain a minimum of direct quotations and many disputed second- and third-hand reports, some of which are clearly erroneous.[122] As for the passage quoted above, it contains two claims which give rise to doubts both on their own and, especially, in combination. On the one hand, there is air (*aer*) as the basic constitutive and animating element of the world. On the other hand, there is *psyche*, which is identified with it, permeates the body, and rules it just as *pneuma* permeates the whole world and rules over it. It also seems (though it is not stated explicitly) that the soul-breath does not survive death, and that after the cessation of the body it disperses in the surrounding air.[123]

The first objection is that the statement is certainly not a faithful quotation: it most probably mixes older elements with newer ones.[124] The words *kosmos*, *synkratein*, and *pneuma* (and probably also *aer*) seem to be newer, because they are either not attested at all from the 6th century BCE or had a completely different meaning at that time.[125] Many scholars therefore believe that these are obvious anachronisms that could not have been known and used in the 6th century BCE,[126] although certainly not all scholars share this view.[127] Yet even Lachenaud, editor of the [Aëtius] collection, assumes that the entire Book 4, which is dedicated to views on the soul, bears a distinctly Stoic stamp, and finds throughout the text a clear tendency to modernise older philosophical terminology (Lachenaud 2003, 37, 43). This is one of the reasons why some scholars believe that the so-called Aëtius read Anaximenes through Stoic eyes and imputed Stoic ideas and terms to him.[128]

The correspondence between the macrocosm (*air*) and microcosm (*soul*) also looks unlikely, because such a relationship is first attested only from the end of the 5th century BCE[129] and for the

122 Mansfeld and Runia (2020, 45–46) admit this but explain it primarily by the genre and careless interventions of various copyists of the collection (2020, 69–78), not by the inferiority of its author (Mansfeld and Runia 1997, 183–191).

123 See Schäfer (2009, 58) or Palmer (2018, 37–38).

124 According to Mansfeld and Runia (2020, 252), it is not a quotation but a routine interpretation of an idea that was later attributed to the ancient philosophers.

125 The term *kosmos* is attested in the meaning of 'world, cosmos' only from the middle of the 5th century BCE (in earlier times it meant 'ornament, jewel'), although the so-called Aëtius attributed its invention to Pythagoras ([Aëtius], *Plac.* 2.1.1); *synkratein* first appears in sources from the 1st century CE; *pneuma* is found for the first time in the 5th century BCE, but in the meaning of 'permeating the world', it was introduced only by the Stoics at the end of the 4th century BCE. *Aer* first came to be used in the sense of 'air' by Empedocles in about the middle of the 5th century BCE, whereas its earlier meaning was 'a cloud', 'mist', or 'haze' (*LSJ*, s. v. ἀήρ 2); see also Kirk and Raven (1957, 146); Guthrie (1962, I.126).

126 See, e.g., Kirk and Raven (1957, 159); Kerschensteiner (1962, 77); Alt (1974, 130f.); Kirk (1978, 312); Sarri (1975, II.86); Wöhrle (1993, 64–66); Clarke (1999, 288, n. 9).

127 Cf., e.g., Vlastos (1955, 346, n. 19, 363–364, n. 55); Lachenaud (2003, 202, n. 2).

128 See Reinhardt (1926, 209–212); Kerschensteiner (1962, 77–82); Hladký (2024, 221, n. 233).

129 Cf. Empedocles, *DK* 31 B 8, B 17, B 22, B 26, B 82 etc.; [Hippocrates], *Vict.* 1.5, 10–11, 4.89.

cosmos and the soul even later.[130] On top of that, the analogy is inaccurate because air surrounds the world from the outside, while the breath-soul does not surround the body: it is surrounded by it.[131]

Moreover, it does not sound plausible that the *psyche* could have controlled the body, since that possibility opened up only once it was linked to thought and reason,[132] which was attested only in the last third of the 5th century BCE (Parts I and V). Finally, *psyche* in the sense of a personal and world soul had no parallel in contemporary thought and writing and such a meaning would hardly have been imaginable during the Archaic Era (cf. Part I). Such claims appear only in projective doxographical reports whose authors were influenced mainly by Plato (Part III). So, even if Anaximenes did use the word *psyche*, we might expect a more standard meaning of 'life', although even in that sense the passage would not make entirely good sense.[133]

It is certainly possible that Anaximenes regarded air as the substance and guiding principle (*arche*) of individual people and the world.[134] But the claim that he identified this air and breath with *psyche* in the sense of 'soul'[135] has no support in any precedent, analogy, or parallel in authentic and direct sources.[136] It could be argued that in this respect Anaximenes continuously followed both the Homeric concept of the *psyche* as animating breath and the philosophical tradition that had worked with the concept of the airy soul (ἀερώδη) before him (Anaximander, perhaps also Thales and Pherecydes) and after him (Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Archelaos, Democritus, Leucippus, Diogenes of Apollonia and the Pythagoreans).[137] But in Homer the

Cf. Kerschensteiner (1962, 76) and Kirk (1978, 312).

130 Cf. Mansfeld and Runia (2020, 251): "Parallelism between [the] human soul and [the] cosmos should not be dated before the early Hellenistic period." The authors then provide the following references (2020, 285): Chrysippus, *SVF* II.192, fr. 634; Posidonius, fr. 345 Theiler; Diogenes of Babylonia, *SVF* III.218, fr. 33; Cornutus, *Comp.* 2, p. 2,6–10 Torres; Varro, *Rer. div.*, fr. 23 Cardauns = Tertullian, *Adv. nat.* 2.2.19.

131 Perhaps it is possible to interpret the *οἷον* in such a way that the correspondence of the world above and below does not occur; see Guthrie (1962, 131); Longrigg (1965, 3); Wöhrle (1993, 64).

132 See Fränkel (1962, 306, n. 31). *Contra*: Vlastos (1955, 364, n. 55).

133 Cf. Burnet (1930, 75) or Kirk and Raven (1957, 160–161).

134 See Kerschensteiner (1962, 80–81) and Fränkel (1962, 306).

135 Therefore Rappe (1995, p. 105) came up with a hypothesis according to which for Anaximenes the *psyche* was "das Gefühl des durch kraftvolle Spannung zusammengehaltenen Leibes als Ganzem". But he based this interpretation on a rather unusual translation of fr. B 2, the core of which is the following sentence: "Wie also die *psyche* uns zusammenspannt, so halten *pneuma* und *aer* den Kosmos zusammen."

136 This is acknowledged by Rappe (1995, 106), but it does not prevent him from claiming that Anaximenes was the first to connect *psyche* with the wind (*pneuma*) and to identify it with air (*aer*), thus translating the original life force into a more concrete bodily tension.

137 Cf. Thales, *DK* 11 A 1, A 2, A 3, A 22, A 22a; Anaximander, *DK* 12 A 29; Pherecydes, *DK* 7 B 8, A 8 (*anima*); Xenophanes, *DK* 21 A 1; Heraclitus, *DK* 22 A 15; Anaxagoras, *DK* 59 A 93; Archelaus, *DK* 60 A 17; Democritus, *DK* 68 A 106; Leucippus, *DK* 68 A 28; Diogenes of Apollonia ([Aëtius], *Plac.* 4.2.2 and 4.2.8; cf. Laks 2008, 128); Pythagoreans, *DK* 58 B1a, par. 28, 30, B 40. Cf. Altschule (1965, 315); Bremmer (2010, 14); Bartoš (2020,

psyche is probably quite independent of the breath (Part I), which can be well observed in the state of unconsciousness, when the *psyche* "flies away" while the breath remains.[138]

As far as the older philosophical tradition is concerned, the airy soul seems to be a mere construction of the doxographers, which is not supported by a single relevant source. Certainly, *psyche* can be etymologised from *psychein* ("to waft", "to breathe", "to cool"),[139] and in various cultures life or something like the soul was indeed related to breath.[140] Even in Homer, who never associated breath with *psyche*,[141] life force and breath could merge in certain circumstances (especially while dying).[142] But if we leave aside the aforementioned golden funerary plate from Hipponion (Part II)[143] and other dubious occurrences,[144] the first direct connection of *psyche* with breath is hardly attested before Plato's playful etymologisation,[145] which its author himself rejected as silly.[146] Archaic lyric and Attic tragedy saw in the exhalation of *psyche* much more the exhalation of life than of breath,[147] and in the exhalation of breath the description of death, not the departure of the individualised soul.[148] Until the first half of the 5th century BC, the meaning of breath could not be attested for *psyche* despite several hundred occurrences.[149]

26); Palmer (2018, 36–37 et passim: the author assumes that the airy soul was also accepted by Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Philolaus).

138 Cf., e.g., *Il.* 22.467, 14.517–519, 16.109. See Rohde (1921, I.3 and 46); Schnaufer (1970, 204); Bremmer (1983, 74–75). Cf. also, from another perspective, Clarke (1999, 133–143) and Palmer (2018, 35).

139 Cf. Bremmer (1983, 22–24 and 2010, 14); Huffmann (2009, 30); Altschule (1965, 320). See, more critically, Arbman (1926, 195–198).

140 Cf. Jaeger (1947, 82); Snell (1948, 23); Schnaufer (1970, 198); cf. also Otto (1923, 46); Clarke (1999, 144); Long (2015, 208, n. 7). *Contra*: Arbman (1926, 194: *psyche* should not be confused with breath); Claus (1981, 93, n. 3: *psyche* is related to *psychein* only in the sense of "to cool", not "to breathe").

141 Cf. Otto (1923, 14, 16, 46: Homer spoke of breath using the words *autme* or *pnoie*, never *psyche*); Arbman (1926, I.194–195); Benveniste (1932, 165); Furley (1956, 3); Claus (1981, 95–96); Rappe (1995, 48); Albinus (2000, 51, n. 24).

142 *Od.* 9.523-524; partly also *Il.* 10.89–90. Cf. also Plato, *Phd.* 70a4–5; Saake (1974, 579); Meyer (2008, 12–14).

143 The meaning of "breathe" in ψύχονται is erroneously asserted by Bremmer (1983, 21, n. 21, 2009, 501, and 2010, 4: "breath"; "atmen"), but the context contradicts this; see Bernabé (2005, 22–23: "se refrigerant"); Graf and Johnston (2007, 4: "refresh"); Johnston (2021, 21: "refresh"); Kotansky (2021, 38: "are refreshed").

144 According to Sedley (1995, 24), Philolaus almost certainly etymologised *psyche* from breathing (see *DK* 44 A 27: καταψύχηται), although in A 27 breath is not called *psyche* but *pneuma*. Cf. also Schäfer (2009, 58) and Palmer (2018, 31, 36).

145 Diogenes, *DK* 64 B 4, B 5; *PDerv.* 18.3-4 and 8. Cf. Hladký (2024, 135–138).

146 Plato, *Crat.* 399d-400a. Cf. also [Plato], *Axioch.* 366a6–7; Aristotle, *De an.* 405b28-29 (*DK* 38 A 10).

147 Cf. Aeschylus, *Agam.* 1493; Euripides, fr. 370.67 Nauck; Bacchylides 5.151–154. Cf. Otto (1923, 18); Bickel (1926, 50); Meissner (1951, 63, n. 2); Claus (1981, 63); Darcus Sullivan (1991, 175).

148 See., e.g., Euripides, *Hec.* 571, *Hel.* 1123, and *Phoen.* 1454. Cf. Garland (1981, 60, n. 62).

149 By the end of the 6th century BC, I have discovered no trace in approximately 130 occurrences of *psyche* (including Homer). In the 5th century BC only Diogenes of Apollonia and his followers are found, while in the other three hundred-plus occurrences of *psyche* this meaning is

In the second half of the 5th century BC, the breath or soul-breath was much more often linked to the term *pneuma*, especially in the treatises of the Hippocratics,[150] but at the same time *pneuma* also appears in philosophical, medical, religious, and eschatological contexts in the roles usually assigned to *psyche*.[151] Subsequently, the two terms began to be massively linked, especially by the Stoics,[152] which later led to their frequent identification and interchange.[153] Doxographers, too, have not escaped this terminological intermingling,[154] which could be one of the main reasons why they retroactively attributed the meaning of "breath" to the term *psyche*.

Therefore, the linking of air with breath and the soul was certainly not a given, and its application to *psyche* would have to be sought later, especially in the thought of Diogenes of Apollonia. Indeed, the ideas and terms of Diogenes, who was sometimes seen as

not documented. The numbers given are only indicative, since many texts are not precisely datable (e.g. the Hippocratics or the fragments of some poets).

150 These physicians sometimes distinguished the external air and wind (*pneuma*, *aer*, *anemos*) from the internal wind (*fysa*), which was primarily but not exclusively breath (*Flat.* 3, LCL 2. 229–230 Jones), but they were not consistent in doing so (Lloyd 2007, 138; Frixione 2012, 511; Bartoš 2018, 74, n. 14, and 2020, 26, n. 21). *Pneuma* thus sometimes denotes (outside) air (*Carn.* 18, LCL 8.154 Potter) and outside wind (*Flat.* 3, 6, 8, LCL 2.230, 234, 238 Jones; *Carn.* 17, LCL 8.152–154 Potter; *Morb. sacr.* 13, 14 and 16, LCL 2.166, 168, 170–171 Jones; *Vict.* 2.38, LCL 4.302–304), but at other times breath (*Flat.* 4, 7 and 10, LCL 2.232, 234 and 242 Jones; *Carn.* 5, 18, LCL 8.136 and 15 Potter; *Morb. sacr.* 9, 10, 13 and 19, LCL 2.156, 158, 160, 166 and 178 Jones; see further *LSJ*, s.v. πνεῦμα II.2) or internal wind (*Flat.* 10 and 14, LCL 2.244 and 250 Jones; *Carn.* 9, LSL 8.144 Potter; *Morb. sacr.* 7, LCL 2.154 Jones; *Nat. puer.* 1, 6, 8, 11, 19, LCL 10.30–34, 42, 52, 62, 82-86 Henderson); occasionally, one may also encounter the meanings warm breath (*Carn.* 5, LCL 8.138 Potter; *Aph.* 7 Appendix, LCL 4.211 Jones; cf. *Vict.* 2.38, LCL 4.304: τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς θερμῷ), vapour (*Nat. puer.* 14, LCL 10.70–74 Henderson) or innate heat (*Hebd.* 13, 9.439 Littré: *animam … originalem calidum*; cf. Bartoš 2020, 23-25). See further Lloyd (2007, 138–139); Frixione (2012, 505–528); Bartoš (2020, 26–27).

151 Euripides, *Suppl.* 531–534, fr. 971 Nauck and fr. 65.71–72 Austin; Epicharmus, *DK* 23 B 9 and B 22. Cf. also [Hippocrates], *Morb. sacr.* 16-19 (LCL 2.170-178 Henderson), *Nat. puer.* 1 (LCL 10.30 Potter) and *Aph.* 7 Appendix, LCL 4.211 Jones (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς θερμὸν = τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θερμοῦ = τὸ ζῆν); Plato, *Phd.* 70a4–5. Cf. Diels and Kranz (1993, III.359, s.v. πνεύμα: *Hauch = Seele*); Burkert (1972, 361, n. 55); Frixione (2012, 518–522); Bartoš (2018, 76–78 and 2020, 27–28). On the difference between *psyche* and *pneuma* see Hüffmeier (1961, 75–76) or Bartoš (2020, 21–32).

152 Chrysippus, *SVF* II.217, fr. 774, II.218, fr. 785, II.222, fr. 806, II.235, fr. 879, II.238–239, fr. 885; *SVF* I.108, fr. 484; [Plutarch], *Vit. Hom.* 2.127. Cf. Sedley (1995, 24); Lloyd (2007, 138, 141–142).

153 See, e.g., *Etym. Magn.* 439,24–30, s.v. ἄτορ (πνεῦμα ἡ ψυχή); Hesychius, s.v. ψυχή· πνεύμα; Suda, s.v. πνεῦμα; Pollux 2.226; Lactantius, *De opif. Dei* 17; Servius, *in Verg. Aen.* 4.705; *Schol. vet. B in Hom. Il.* 16.856: "*Psyche* is an acting *pneuma* that inhabits the entire body" (πνεῦμα ποιὸν ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ παντὸς οἰκοῦν τοῦ σώματος). Probably the greatest interchangeability of the two words is evidenced by tomb inscriptions from the Roman period, where the role of *psyche* is often played by *pneuma*; see, e.g., *GVI* 1049.7, 1233.6, 1770, 1816.3–4, 1942.7, 2005.40 and 47; *SEG* VI.414.3–4. Cf. Vítek (2022, 309–310, 316–318).

154 A good example seems to be Diogenes Laërtius 9.19 (*DK* 21 A 1): "Xenophanes was the first to express the view that the soul is air/breath" (ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμα).

Anaximenes' disciple,[155] bear a striking resemblance to the content of fr. 2. See, for example, the identification of *psyche* with air and life (*DK* 64 B 4, B 5), the controlling function of *psyche*-air (B 4), air as the fundamental principle (B 2) from which everything arises and into which everything dissolves,[156] and the use of the terms *kratein* ("to rule") and *kosmos* in the sense of "world".[157] It is therefore possible that [Aëtius] mixed Anaximenes' theses with the teachings of Diogenes[158] and that the thesis in B 2 is in fact Diogenes' one.[159] Although many scholars accept the authenticity of the passage either unquestioningly or with some reservations because of the use of ahistorical terms,[160] the circumstances speak quite clearly in favour of rejecting it.[161]

V. PSYCHE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE 5TH CENTURY BC

Of philosophers, the names most frequently mentioned in connection with the soul or *psyche* are Socrates, Democritus, Gorgias, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Heraclitus. But not always rightly so. Anaxagoras must be excluded because *psyche* in his authentic fragments means "life" and the meaning of "soul" in the Platonic sense appears only in the reports of the doxographers. This seems to have occurred on the basis of the identification of *nous* ("reason", "intellect") with *psyche*,[162] which is, however, completely undocumented.

The oldest Presocratic philosopher for whom the word *psyche* is quite

155 Diogenes Laërtius 9.57 (*DK* 64 A 1). Cf. Vlastos (1955, 364, n. 55–56); Harris (1973, 20).

156 Cf. *DK* 13 B 2 (ἐκ γὰρ τούτου πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν πάλιν ἀναλύεσθαι) and *DK* 64 B 4, B 7, A 1, A 5. This thesis, which Aristotle attributes to almost all the Presocratics, first appears with certainty in Diogenes (Kirk and Raven 1957, 432).

157 Cf. *DK* 13 B 2 (ἀήρ … συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς) and *DK* 64 B 4 (ὁ ἀήρ … πάντων κρατεῖν); cf. *PDerv.* 19.3 (πάντας γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ἐπικρατεῖ) and Hladký (2024, 222–223); *DK* 13 B 2 (ὅλον τὸν κόσμον) and *DK* 64 B 2 (τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κοσμῷ). Further terminological correspondences are found in the testimonies; see *DK* 13 B 2 (ἀὴρ περιέχει) and *DK* 64 A 27 (περιεχόμενον ἀέρα); *DK* 13 B 2 (λέγεται δὲ συνωνύμως ἀὴρ καὶ πνεῦμα) and A 19, par. 44 (τὸ πνεῦμα οὐ διιέναι διὰ παντός); or *DK* 13 B 2 (ὅλον τὸν κόσμον) and A 8 (Διογένης … τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν [θεόν φασιν]; according to Laks 2008, 237, this thesis is Stoic) and A 9 (ἀέρα γενέσθαι καὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν αὐξηθῆναι, καὶ τοῦτον πνεύματά τε παρέχεσθαι).

158 See Alt 1973 (154–160). *Contra*: Wöhrle (1993, 65).

159 See Claus (1981, 139–140). *Contra*: Adkins (1970, 98).

160 Cf. Burnet (1916, 251); Bickel (1926, 22, 51); Jaeger (1947, 79–80, 84–85); Dodds (1951, 175, n. 112); Guthrie (1962, I.128); Vlastos (1955, 363–364); Kirk and Raven (1957, 159, 206); Longrigg (1964, 1–2); Altschule (1965, 314); Adkins (1970, 98); Harris (1973, 20, 28); Kirk (1978, 312); Sarri (1975, I.65–66, II.85–86); Seligman (1978, 5–7); Wöhrle (1993, 65–66); Laks (1999, 252); Gundert (2000, 14); Bremmer (1989, 200 and 2009, 501); Mihai (2010, 565); Bremmer (2010, 14); Betegh (2013, 254–256); Palmer (2018, 37).

161 See also von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931, I.374, n. 3); Furley (1956, 10); Alt (1973, 29–164). Cf. further Holmes (2010, 31, n. 108) and partly also Onians (1991, 115, n. 7).

162 Cf. Aristotle, *De an.* 404a24–25 (*DK* 58 A 99), 405a13–19, and especially 404b1–3 (*DK* 58 A 100: λέγει ἐτέρωθι δὲ τοῦτον [scil. τὸν νοῦν] εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν). This identity was also attributed to Parmenides (*DK* 28 A 1, A 45), Democritus (*DK* 68 A 100, A 113), and Ecphantus (*DK* 51 A 1); see Zhmud (2012, 391–392).

securely attested is Heraclitus.[163] This position is also suggested by the influence his doctrine of *psyche* had on other Presocratics, which is certain in the case of Democritus and probable in the cases of Gorgias and Diogenes of Apollonia (see below). Some scholars accept the importance of Heraclitus' doctrine of *psyche*, although they acknowledge his novel contribution to the subject rather than his completely pioneering it.[164] It would certainly be welcome if an analysis of the occurrences of *psyche* in Heraclitus could now follow, but given the limited scope of this paper, a separate article will have to be devoted to this purpose.[165]

The position of Plato's teacher Socrates (470–399) in the history of *psyche* is highly controversial. Socrates is often considered the father of care of the soul and inventor of philosophical ethics, which he based on identifying the self and personality with the soul.[166] But he left no writings, and the shape of his thought in the works of his many disciples, followers, and opponents reflects primarily their own opinions, interests, and needs, so that many accounts of him and his teachings are inconsistent or even contradictory (see, e.g., Dover 1968, xlvi). There are many attempts to reconstruct Socrates' psychology, but they are often very different in terms of their results.[167] Some scholars therefore believe that Socrates' doctrine of the soul cannot be more accurately reconstructed.[168] It is neither possible nor necessary to enter into this debate here; it is sufficient to acknowledge that Socrates probably did mark a significant breakthrough in the history of *psyche*, but as someone who was philosophically active mainly in the second half of the 5th century BCE, he certainly could not have been the first philosopher to initiate the transformation of *psyche*.

Other Presocratics also contributed more or less to the shift or transformation of earlier meanings of *psyche*, but they could not have been pioneers because of the time when they lived and worked. This is especially true of Democritus and Gorgias, who undoubtedly operated with the concept of *psyche*,[169]

163 *DK* 22 B 12, B 36, B 45, B 77, B 85, B 98, B 107, B 115, B 117, B 118 and B 136. The authenticity of the other fragments (B 12, B 67a, B 136, and partly also B 77) is questionable; see Vítek (2012, 180, 182, 186–187).

164 Cf. Snell (1948, 32); West (1971, 149–150); Claus (1981, 125f.); partly also Nussbaum (1971, 14–15, 168–169), although, according to her, "the novelty of Heraclitus' usage was (not) as great as the available evidence might lead us to suppose" (1971, 14).

165 See T. Vítek 2005. "Heraclitus' *psyche*: The first centre of personality?" *Arethusa* (forthcoming).

166 See Burnet (1916, 245, 257–259); Robb (1986, 321, 325); Drozdek (2011, 179, 182–188).

167 Cf. Burnet (1916, 235–259); Guthrie (1971, 147–164); Sarri (1975, I.111–181); Claus (1981, 156–163); Robb (1986, 320–325); Drozdek (2011, 179–189). See further Jackson (1997, 167-176); McPherran (1994, 1–22 and 2010, 247–271); Brickhouse and Smith (2007, 337–356); Broackes (2009, 46–59); McNeill (2010).

168 Cf. Kahn (1985, 2); Lacey (1971, 24–25); partially also Guthrie (1971, 5–6).

169 *Gorgias*: cf. Sarri (1975, I.108–110); Claus (1981, 148–150); Holmes (2010, 211–216); Long (2015, 98–105); Vítek (2022, 167–168). *Democritus*: cf. Guthrie (1965, II.430–436); Adkins (1970, 100); Ingenkamp (1975, 52–53); Sarri (1975, I.104–107); Claus (1981, 142–148); Kahn (1985, 1–31); Green and Groff (2003, 34–37); Holmes (2010, 202–206, 216–225);

but they almost certainly worked after Heraclitus, whose statements about *psyche* they knew. This is likely in the case of Gorgias and certain in the case of Democritus.[170]

The same applies to some extent to Diogenes of Apollonia, who was active around the second half of the 5th century BCE. However, since he discussed *psyche* in undoubtedly authentic passages, which became more important after the exclusion of Anaximenes from the history of *psyche* (Part IV), I will mention his doctrine here in more detail. In his view,[171]

> Men and the other animals live on air, by breathing, and this is to them both soul and mind, as will be clearly demonstrated in this treatise; and if this leaves them, they die and their mind fails ... That which has intelligence is what men call air (τὴν νόησιν ἔχον εἶναι ὁ ἀὴρ). All men are guided by it, and it masters all things (ὑπὸ τούτου πάντας καὶ κυβερνᾶσθαι καὶ πάντων κρατεῖν). I hold that this same thing is God, and that it reaches everything and disposes all things and is in everything. There is not one thing that does not have a share of it. Yet no one thing shares in it just as another does, but there are many forms both of air itself and of intelligence, for it is multiform.

It is the air (ἀήρ) by which everything is governed and controlled and which is, at the same time, the life, soul/breath (*psyche*) and thought (νόησις).[172] This air, to which Diogenes attributed the divine nature, immortality, and much knowledge (B 7, B 8), is present as a substratum in all beings, so that "the *psyche* of all animals is the same, namely air, warmer than the air outside in which we are, but much colder than that near the sun. No animal has the same heat as any other, nor even one man the same as another, but the difference is not great, no more than is compatible with their being similar."[173] The differences between species and individual living beings are provided by the intelligible air and its ability to transform itself (ἑτεροίωσις). Diogenes does not specify how this happens, but the heterogeneity of things, phenomena, and beings was probably caused, on the one hand, by the kind of measures (μέτρα) present in the intelligible air, and on the other by the different density and temperature of the air-*psyche* within the animals.[174] According to Theophrastus

Drozdek (2011, 153–160); Palmer (2018, 39–40); Vítek (2022, 176–184); partly also Jeremiah (2018, 100–110).

170 Cf. *DK* 22 B 85 and *DK* 68 B 236, B 298a; *DK* 22 B 40 and *DK* 68 B 64, B 65; *DK* 22 B 49 and *DK* 68 B 98; *DK* 22 B 6, B 12, B 91, and *DK* 68 B 158; *DK* 22 (ad) B 12, B 91, and *DK* 68 B 7; *DK* 22 B 119 and *DK* 68 B 171. Cf. Kahn (1985, 4–5, 11, 15–16, 18–19).

171 *DK* 64 B 4 and B 5 (1st part), transl. by Guthrie.

172 Simplicius, *in Arist. Phys.* 152,17 Diels (*DK* 64 ad B 4). Cf. Diller (1941, 369); Kirk and Raven (1957, 436); Guthrie (1965, 365–367); Claus (1981, 139); Kalogerakos (1996, 93); Laks (2008, 78–79); Palmer (2018, 40).

173 *DK* 64 B 5, transl. by Guthrie. Cf. Diller (1941, 369–370); Kirk and Raven (1957, 431, 437).

174 Theophrastus, *Phys. op.* 2 Diels = *DK* 64 A 5 (rarefaction and condensation); cf. Diller (1941, 369: "Verdichtung und Verdünnung der Luft"); Kirk and Raven (1957, 437–438:

and Aristotle, proper or functional reasoning (νόησις) was caused by air that is subtle, warm, clean, and dry, whereas dampness in the form of sleep, drunkenness, or satiety weakens reason; for these reasons, damp air equals dysfunctional reason.[175]

Diogenes, like fr. B 2 attributed to Anaximenes, did not claim that the *psyche* is the bearer of one's permanent individuality. For him, air was the common ground and animating principle of everything, which made thought possible and, by its capacity for transformation, made the differences between species and individuals possible. This conception, however, did little to enable Diogenes to see in *psyche* the equivalent of the interior or core of the human personality.[176] Rather, he thought that the *psyche* does not survive the death of the body and returns to the intelligible air with its last breath.[177]

The crucial question is when Diogenes formulated his thesis and how original he was in doing so. Ever since Theophrastus – and especially because of him – he has usually been regarded as a not very original and important eclectic[178] who owed most of his ideas to his philosophical predecessors or contemporaries, especially Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Melissus, and the Hippocratics.[179] This view also applies to Diogenes' theses on *psyche* and its nature, which are said to have survived in direct quotations only by coincidence, while his like-minded older and more eminent colleagues who provided the models for them were not so fortunate (cf. Part IV).

But if Diogenes' ideas coincide to a high degree with the doctrine attributed to Anaximenes in B 2, which its alleged

mainly temperature, not only density); Guthrie (1965, 369: density). Cf. further Natorp (1886, 360–361); Laks (2008, 83); Hladký (2024, 220).

175 Theophrastus, *Sens.* 42–45 (*DK* 64 A 19); Aristotle, *De an.* 405a21–23 (*DK* 64 A 20). Cf. Diller (1941, 374); Guthrie (1952, 91–92 and 1965, 369); Waszink (1950, 152); Harris (1973, 26–27); Claus (1981, 139–140); Kalogerakos (1996, 94); Nussbaum (2003, 520); Polansky (2007, 79); Mihai (2010, 565).

176 See Burnet (1916, 251); von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931, I.375); Claus (1981, 139).

177 See von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1931, I.375); Palmer (2018, 40–41). According to [Aëtius], *Plac.* 4.7.1 (*DK* 64 A 20), Diogenes' *psyche* is indestructible (ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν), but by this he may have meant the eternal intelligible air (Laks 2008, 129) from which the individual *psychai* arise.

178 Theophrastus, *Phys. op.* 2 Diels (*DK* 64 A 5): πλεῖστα συμπεφορημένως γέγραφε. A similar view is common; see, e.g., Kirk and Raven (1957, 430) or Diller (1941, 360, 369). For a more objective treatment of Diogenes' eclecticism, see Laks (2008, 28–31). Cf. also Natorp (1886, 350–352, 355 et passim).

179 *Anaximenes*: Simplicius, *in Arist. Phys.* 151,20 Diels (*DK* 64 ad A 4); cf. Diller (1941, 360); Kirk and Raven (1957, 436, 438); Guthrie (1965, 366–367, 369). *Heraclitus*: cf. *DK* 22 B 30 and B 94 (μέτρα) and *DK* 64 B 3 (πάντων μέτρα ἔχειν); ad B 12 (ψυχαὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμιῶνται), B 117, B 118; cf. Natorp (1886, 359–360); Diller (1941, 370–381); Kirk and Raven (1957, 430, 433, 436–437); Claus (1981, 139); Palmer (2018, 40). *Anaxagoras*: Theophrastus, *Phys. op.* 2 Diels (*DK* 64 A 5); [Aëtius] 4.7.1 (*DK* 64 A 20); cf. Diller (1941, 360–361, 369–370); Kirk and Raven (1957, 437); Guthrie (1965, 366, 369). *Leukippus*: Theophrastus, *Phys. op.* 2 Diels (*DK* 64 A 5); Guthrie (1965, 368). *Melissus*: see Diller (1941, 360–366). *Hippocratics*: cf. *Carn.* 2 and 6; cf. Bartoš (2018, 66–67). See further Burnet (1916, 259); Guthrie (1952, 91–92); Furley (1956, 15–16); Kalogerakos (1996, 94–95).

author was almost certainly not familiar with (Part IV), this does not necessarily make Diogenes its first discoverer, but it does relieve him of the main burden of unoriginality and eclecticism. Whether other sources prove the same thing is not so sure. Diogenes was almost certainly well aware of Heraclitus' ideas, but he could not have taken the airy *psyche* from him, because the concept is not found in authentic sayings of Heraclitus, but only in doxographers and interpretations.[180] Nor does the extant material clearly confirm Diogenes' indebtedness to Anaxagoras (i.e. his doctrine of Mind),[181] though it does not rule it out. It is even more untenable to speculate on the influence of the philosophy of Leucippus, which is almost entirely unpreserved.[182] Additionally, the similarities between Diogenes' doctrine and some Hippocratic writings do not prove that Diogenes borrowed ideas from them, because from the point of view of chronology the opposite influence would be more likely.[183] Rather, however, it seems that in the last third of the 5th century BCE, the combination of air, life, breath, and thought "hung in the air" and inspired various authors to similar ideas, so that the word "influence" or Diels' term "imitation" is not appropriate.[184]

Unless one can rely on the doxographical tradition that has attributed an airy soul to a large number of Presocratics (Part IV), Diogenes' contribution to the history of *psyche* may appear in a somewhat different light, all the more so since the paucity and unreliability of the philosopher's life data allows his philosophical activity and the formulation of his doctrine to be pushed deeper into the 5th century BCE.[185] In any case, Diogenes is the first Presocratic philosopher for whom the connection between *psyche* and breath is securely attested. And he is also one of the first recorded authors to acknowledge the *psyche*'s ability to think (cf. Part I).

CONCLUSION

The widespread hypothesis that the term *psyche* and the theory of the soul were introduced into Presocratic philosophy by the Orphics, Pythagoreans, and Anaximenes as early as the 6th century BCE is hardly tenable, since it is mostly unsupported by authentic citations

180 Cf. Eusebius, *Praep. evan.* 15.20.2 (*DK* 22 ad B 12); Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* 7.129 (*DK* 22 A 16); [Aristotle], *Probl.* 908a28–34. The origin of this theory, however, is almost certainly Stoic; see Burnet (1930, 151); Kirk (1978, 367–380); and especially Mansfeld (2015, 65–69, 72–73, 80–83).

181 See especially Natorp (1886, 355–358, 362).

182 See Natorp (1886, 356); Diller (1941, 360, 366 et passim); Kirk and Raven (1957, 432–433).

183 Cf. *Flat.* 3 (*DK* 64 C 2), *Carn.* 2 (*DK* 64 C 3), *Morb. sacr.* 16–17 (*DK* 64 C 3a), *Epid.* 4.34.1 (*DK* 64 C 3b). In addition to H. Diels, this view is also shared by, e.g., Diller (1941, 360, 372); Hüffmeier (1961, 54, 60); Gundert (2000, 22); Vítek (2022, 294).

184 Cf., in detail, Laks (2008, 261, 255–265); Bartoš (2018, 65–80); partly also Altschule (1965, 314–315).

185 Most often, the beginning of Diogenes' philosophical activity is situated in the years 440-430 BC (Diller 1941, 368; Kirk and Raven 1957, 427; Guthrie 1965, 262, n. 2; Laks 2008, 21), but some older scholars who took his apprenticeship to Anaximenes seriously (e.g. F. Schleiermacher, F. Panzerbieter, or Natorp 1886, 356) have assumed his appearance as early as the early 5th century BCE (on this see also Laks 2008, 22).

and contradicts contemporary meanings of *psyche*. Such a doctrine tends to be reconstructed retrospectively (i) by "Orphicising" or "Pythagoreanising" philosophers and literati whose membership of these movements is highly disputed (Empedocles, Pindar, Pherecydes, and perhaps also Philolaus); (ii) by accepting highly questionable statements and falsehoods of doxographers (Diels' A testimonia); and (iii) by assembling historically, formally, and substantively disparate fragments into one coherent whole that is known in advance from elsewhere (especially from Empedocles and Plato).

The proponents of these projections often overlook that the numerous sources on which they rely were almost certainly distorted in terminology and meaning by the teachings of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. The most significant role in this was certainly played by Plato, many of whose ideas were considered Orphic or Pythagorean; but Aristotle's and Plato's pupils, i.e. Heraclides of Pontus, Aristoxenus, Clearchus and Dicaearchus, also played a large part in propagating the resulting picture. Since antiquity, many interpreters have shown a strong tendency to project the Platonic conception of the soul into older Presocratic philosophy and to ascribe meanings to *psyche* that do not necessarily follow from the context and which the documented contemporary occurrences make not very likely.

Thus, the first philosopher to change the traditional meanings of *psyche* was probably not Pythagoras, because at the end of the 6th century BCE, the *psyche* was a mere semi-finished product, loosely encompassing emotions and desires, but in no way related to reason or human individuality. Pythagoras' primacy is based on a single disputed occurrence of the word *psyche* in Xenophanes' epigram, while all other evidence comes from the second half of the 5th century BC, when there were probably already people who were espousing Pythagoreanism and adopting some such doctrine.

The thoughts of the long-underrated Diogenes of Apollonia may raise some surprise in the context of *psyche*. If the theses attributed to Anaximenes were indeed his, this would make Diogenes the first documented author to link *psyche* to air, breath, and thought. Thus a fundamental contradiction emerges between this view and the doxographical tradition, which attributes the airy soul to many older Presocratics without being able to confirm it with authentic texts. The image of Diogenes as the last Presocratic and eclectic, promoted by Theophrastus, is also controversial, since Diogenes' life and work could probably be placed before some of the authors he was supposedly influenced by. But before drawing more definite conclusions, it would be necessary to analyse Diogenes' doctrine in the context of Presocratic philosophy much more thoroughly than could be done in this article.

An important author in the history of *psyche* was undoubtedly Socrates, but the methodology of this article, which focuses exclusively on authentic texts, unfortunately did not allow for a more detailed presentation of his views. As a result, the oldest Presocratic

philosopher for whom a doctrine on *psyche* is securely attested is Heraclitus. This conclusion is also suggested by the influence his doctrine of *psyche* had on other Presocratics, which is certain in the case of Democritus and very probable in the cases of Gorgias and Diogenes of Apollonia. However, what Heraclitus' non-philosophical contemporaries or predecessors, of whom Pindar in particular should be mentioned, contributed to the history of the *psyche*, would still need to be clarified.

If the overall picture of the *psyche* in the Presocratics, which is not helped by the reports of doxographers and later thought models, differs somewhat from the majority interpretive tradition, it does not mean that this picture is necessarily better or truer or that it is completely free of all distortions. If all the reports of the doxographers are excluded, on the one hand it greatly impoverishes the knowledge we have about the Presocratics, while on the other hand it obliterates the obvious differences between the scholarship, credibility, and applicability of individual doxographers (Aristotle's testimonies are not commensurable with those of Claudianus Mamertus). Another consequence of this reduction is increased pressure on the significance of the remaining sources, i.e. in the first place on their authenticity, which for some of the key fragments in which *psyche* occurs is still not resolved. Further, the "positivist" insistence on only what is actually documented has difficulty in accounting adequately for sources that may have existed but have not survived, although there can be no dispute about the incomplete preservation of Presocratic doctrines. Another weakness of the historical approach taken here is perhaps the inadequate consideration of the extraordinary individual who can break the existing standard of thought and come up with something truly new. But while the present article may seem somewhat deconstructivist and reductive, it could perhaps provide a counterbalance to approaches that are too creative and willing to work with anything in interpretation.

ABBREVIATIONS

Aeschines
Contra Ctesiph. – *Contra Ctesiphontem*

Aeschylus
Agam. – *Agamemnon*
Eum. – *Eumenides*
Choeph. – *Choephoroi*
Pers. – *Persae*

Aëtius
Plac. – *Placitae*

Anon. Iambl. – *Anonymus Iamblichus*

Anth. Palat. – *Anthologia Palatina*

Antiphon
Tetr. – *Tetralogiae*
De caed. Her. – *De caede Herodis*

Aristophanes
Acharn. – *Acharnenses*
Eq. – *Equites*
Lys. – *Lysistrata*
Nub. – *Nubes*
Plut. – *Pluto*
Thesm. – *Thesmophoriazusae*
Vesp. – *Vespes*

Aristotle
De an. – *De anima*
Met. – *Metaphysica*

[Aristotle]
Probl. – *Problemata*

Athenaeus
Deipn. – *Deipnosophistae*

Clemens of Alexandria
Strom. – *Stromata*

Cornutus
Comp. – *Compendium de Graecae Theologiae traditionibus*

Damascius
in Plat. Phd. – *in Platonis Phaedonem commentaria*

DK = Diels and Kranz 1992-1993.

Etym. Magn. – *Etymologicum Magnum*

Euripides
Alc. – *Alcestis*
Andr. – *Andromache*
Cycl. – *Cyclops*
Hec. – *Hecuba*
Hel. – *Helena*
Heracl. – *Heraclidae*
Hipp. – *Hippolytus*
Iph. Taur. – *Iphigenia Taurica*
Or. – *Orestes*
Phoen. – *Phoenisae*
Suppl. – *Supplices*
Troad. – *Troades*

Eusebius
Praep. evan. – *Praeparatio evangelica*

Flavius Iosephus
Contr. Apion. – *Contra Apionem*

GVI – Peek. W. 1955. *Griechische Versinschriften*, Vol. I. Berlin.

Hesiod
Op. 686 – *Opera*

[Hesiod]
Scut. – *Scutum*

[Hippocrates]
Aph. – *Aphorismi*
Carn. – *De carnibus*
Flat. – *De flatibus*
Hebd. – *De hebdomadibus*
Morb. sacr. – *De morbo sacro*
Nat. puer. – *De natura pueri*
Vict. – *De victu*

Homer
Il. – *Ilias*
Od. – *Odyssea*

HH – Hymni Homerici
Apoll. – *in Apollinem*
Ven. – *in Venerem*

Hippolytus
Ref. haer. – *Refutationes omnium haeresiorum*

IG – *Inscriptiones Graecae*
IGD – Dubois, L. 1996. *Inscriptions grecques dialectales d´Olbia du Pont*. Paris.

Jamblichus
Protr. – *Protrepticus*

Lactantius
De opif. Dei – *De opificio Dei*

LCL – Loeb Classical Library

LSCG – Sokolowski, F. 1969. *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*. Paris.

LSJ – Liddell, H. G. Scott R., Jones. S. 1996. *A Greek – English Lexicon with revised Supplement*. Oxford.

Lysias
Epit. – *Epitaphius*
in Andoc. – *in Andocidem*
in sit. – κατὰ τῶν σιτοπωλῶν
pro Polystr. – *pro Polystrato*

OF – *Orphicorum fragmenta* = Bernabé 2005.
F – *fragmenta*
T – *testimonia*

Olympiodorus
in Plat. Phd. – *in Platonis Phaedonem commentaria*

Papyri
PDerv – *Papyrus Derveni*
PStrasb – *Papyrus Strasbourg*

Pindar
Isth. – *Isthmia*
Nem. – *Nemea*
Ol. – *Olympia*
Pyth. – *Pythia*

Philoponus
in De an. – *Cin Aristotelis De anima commentaria*

Plato
Alc. I – *Alcibiades* I
Apol.– *Apologia*
Crat. – *Cratylus*
Ep. – *Epistulae*
Gorg. – *Gorgias*
Leg. – *Leges*
Phd. – *Phaedo*
Phaedr. – *Phaedrus*
Prot. – *Protagoras*
Resp. – *Respublica*
Soph. – *Sophistes*

[Plato]
Axioch. – *Axiochus*

[Plutarch]
Vit. Hom. – *Vita Homeri*

Porphyry
Vit. Pyth. – *Vita Pythagorae*

RE – Pauly, W., Wissowa, G. (eds.). 1896–1972. *Real Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*. Stuttgart.

RE Suppl. – Pauly, W., Wissowa, G. (eds.). 1896–1972. *Real Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft: Supplementbände* I-XVI. Stuttgart.

Scholia
Schol. vet. in Eur. Hec. – *Scholia vetera in Euripidis Hecubam*
Schol. vet. B in Hom. Il. – *Scholia vetera in Homeris Iliadem*
Schol. in Plat. Phd. – *Scholia in Platonis Phaedonem*
Schol. in Plat. Remp. – *Scholia in Platonis Rempublicam*

SEG – *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* I–LXVIII. 1923–2023. Leiden – Amsterdam.

Servius
in Verg. Aen. – *in Vergilii Aeneidem commentaria*

Sextus Empiricus
Adv. math. – *Adversus mathematicos*

Simplicius,
in Arist. Phys. – *in Aristotelis Physicorum libri commentaria*

Sophocles
Ant. – *Antigone*
El. – *Electra*
Oed. Col. – *Oedipus Coloneus*
Oed. Tyr. – *Oedipus Tyrannus*
Philoct. – *Philoctetes*
Trach. – *Trachiniae*

s.v. = sub vocem

SVF – von Arnim, J. von (ed.). 1903–1924. *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, Vols. I–IV. Lipsiae.

Tertullian
Adv. nat. – *Adversus nationes*

Theol. arithm. – *Theologoumena arithmeticae*

Varro
Rer. div. – *Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum*

Theophrastus
Phys. op. – *Physicorum opiniones*
Sens. – *De sensu*

Xenophon
Cyr. – *Cyropaedia*
Mem. – *Memorabilia*
Oec. – *Oeconomicus*
Symp. – *Symposium*

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