Aither is a double-blind peer review, Open Access online academic journal. It is indexed at ERIH+ and Scopus. It is published by the Faculty of Arts of the Palacký University in Olomouc in cooperation with the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. It comes out twice a year. Every second issue is international and contains foreign-language articles (mainly in English, but also in German and French). The journal is registered under the number ISSN 1803-7860.
Aither 16/2016(International issue no. 4):4-31 | DOI: 10.5507/aither.2016.007
Many informed commonsense discussions about understanding better the still obscure connections between strong emotions and basic values end fruitlessly. Most reflective persons today simply give up on finding a unified account, and others just abandon such matters to the cognitive and computational neuroscientists. Failing philosophically, however, to investigate further the nature of such interconnections is all too often short-sighted.
Here I take up the particular case of interactions between two basic ethical values (human life and personal dignity) and two basic emotions (anger and sympathy). With the suggestiveness of a richly descriptive classical literary representation and some recent empirical work on vision, I try to correct a still widespread, and dangerous, misconception. That misconception is the insufficiently critical view that strong emotional states thoroughly obscure ethical valuations. We need to see better. In contrast, I try to suggest how proper intellectual intuitions of the contents of at least some basic ethical values may sometimes suggest the mutual implications of the evaluative, the cognitive, and the emotive, in both rational representations and emotional presentations.
Published: September 30, 2016 Show citation
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