Aither is a double-blind peer review, Open Access online academic journal. It is indexed at ERIH+ and Scopus. It is published by the Faculty of Arts of the Palacký University in Olomouc in cooperation with the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. It comes out twice a year. Every second issue is international and contains foreign-language articles (mainly in English, but also in German and French). The journal is registered under the number ISSN 1803-7860.

Aither 22/2019 (International issue no. 6):74-86 | DOI: 10.5507/aither.2019.007

Key Aspects of Moral Character in the Situationist Challenge

Jan Brázdil
Department of Philosophy, Masaryk University, Faculty of Arts

Situationist Challenge in moral philosophy refers to the contemporary criticism of Aristotle's concept of moral character. It is based on a different area than the previous criticism, and thus presents a new challenge to the classical theory. Whether or not this critique is successful in challenging the empirical and normative adequacy of the Aristotelian concept, it is linked with an extensive discussion. I considered it important to explore what we can learn about the classical theory in the mirror of contemporary moral psychology. In this paper, I will introduce some of the aspects which constitute the Aristotelian concept of moral character, but have not been taken into account in the situationist criticism: the moral reasoning, the cultivation based on experience and the aspiration to self-improvement. These aspects are of course based on the general features of moral character (they are implied by them), and the argumentation which fails to appreciate them, fails in proper understanding of its object of criticism.

Published: September 30, 2019  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago Chicago Notes IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Brázdil, J. (2019). Key Aspects of Moral Character in the Situationist Challenge. Aither11(22), 74-86. doi: 10.5507/aither.2019.007
Download citation

References

  1. Alfano, M. (2013). Character as moral fiction: excellence in being for the good. Oxford: Cambridge University Press. Go to original source...
  2. Annas, J. (2003). "Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology". A Priori 2, pp. 20-34.
  3. Annas, J. (2005). "Comments on John Doris's 'Lack of Character'". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(3), pp. 636-42. Go to original source...
  4. Annas, J. (2006). "Virtue Ethics". In: D. Copp (ed.), The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 515-36. Go to original source...
  5. Annas, J. (2011). Intelligent virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. Go to original source...
  6. Aristotle (1991). Nicomachean Ethics (trans. by W. D. Ross). In: J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  7. Badhwar, N. (2009). "The Milgram Experiments, Learned Helplessness, and Character Traits". The Journal of Ethics 13(2/3), pp. 257-89. Go to original source...
  8. Doris, J. (1998). "Persons, situations, and virtue ethics". Nous 32, pp. 504-530. Go to original source...
  9. Doris, J. (2002). Lack of character: personality and moral behavior. New York: Cambridge University Press. Go to original source...
  10. Doris, J. (2005). "Replies: Evidence and Sensibility". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71(3), pp. 656-677. Go to original source...
  11. Doris, J. (2010). "Heated Agreement: Lack of Character As Being for the Good". Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 148(1), pp. 135-46. Go to original source...
  12. Doris, J. & Stich, S. (2006). "Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), 2006. URL:
  13. Harman, G. (2003). "No Character or Personality". Business Ethics Quarterly 13(1), pp. 87-94. Go to original source...
  14. Hartshorne, H. and May, M. (1928). Studies in the Nature of Character, vol. I: Studies in Deceit. New York: Macmillan.
  15. Kamtekar, R. (2004). "Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character". Ethics 114(3), pp. 458-91. Go to original source...
  16. Magundayao, J. (2013). "Dispositions and Skills: An Argument for Virtue Ethics against Situationism". Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 7(1), pp. 96-114. Go to original source...
  17. Merritt, M. et al (2010). "Character". In: J. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds.), The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 355-401. Go to original source...
  18. Milgram, S. (1963). "Behavioral Study of obedience: A study of situational and dispositional variables in helping behavior". The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67(4), pp. 371-8. Go to original source...
  19. Prinz, J. (2009). "The normativity challenge: Cultural psychology provides the real threat to virtue ethics". The Journal of Ethics 13, pp. 117-144. Go to original source...
  20. Reeve, J. (2009). Understanding motivation and emotion. 5th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
  21. Ross, L. and Nisbett, R. (1991). The person and the situation: perspectives of social psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
  22. Sabini, J. & Silver, M. (2005). "Lack of character? Situationism critiqued". Ethics 115, pp. 535-62. Go to original source...
  23. Sreenivasan, G. (2002). "Errors about errors: Virtue theory and trait attribution". Mind 111, pp. 47-68. Go to original source...
  24. Sreenivasan, G. (2014). "The situationist critique of virtue ethics". In: D. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 290-314. Go to original source...
  25. Swanton, Ch. (2005). Virtue ethics: a pluralistic view. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0), which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.