Aither is a double-blind peer review, Open Access online academic journal. It is indexed at ERIH+ and Scopus. It is published by the Faculty of Arts of the Palacký University in Olomouc in cooperation with the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. It comes out twice a year. Every second issue is international and contains foreign-language articles (mainly in English, but also in German and French). The journal is registered under the number ISSN 1803-7860.

Aither 11/2014:76-83 | DOI: 10.5507/aither.2014.007

Aristotelian Conception of Consiousness in Past and Present

Tomáš Marvan
Výzkumné centrum pro teorii a dějiny vědy, ZČU Plzeň
Filozofická fakulta Západočeské univerzity v Plzni

Aristotle did not have a systematic theory of consciousness, in today's sense of the word. Still, his scattered remarks on conscious perception proved to be extremely influential, and led such thinkers as Franz Brentano and Uriah Kriegel to build a fully fledged theory of consciousness upon them. The paper traces the Aristotelian tradition in the study of consciousness and compares it with some of its main rivals.

Published: March 30, 2014  Show citation

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Marvan, T. (2014). Aristotelian Conception of Consiousness in Past and Present. Aither6(11), 76-83. doi: 10.5507/aither.2014.007
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References

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