Aither 22/2019 (International issue no. 6):88-100 | DOI: 10.5507/aither.2019.008

On Aristotle's Conception of Fear

Apostolos N. Stavelas

Research Centre on Greek Philosophy, Academy of Athens

Aristotle had not treated autonomously the subject of fear and he had not formulated an independent theory for it. Instead, he chose to handle fear within the differentiated framework of four of his treatises: Poetica, Ethica Nicomachea, Rhetorica and De Anima, so as to illuminate the varied aspects of it. In Poetica, fear is a singularly emotional situation, aiming at the production of sentiments on behalf of (every kind of) an audience. In Ethica Nicomachea, the emotion of fear is related to acts of violence and is defined as the anticipation of the fearful and the evil. In Rhetorica, it is defined as the thought, feeling or even instinct of an imminent evil, damaging or able to bring up sorrow, being a product of our fantasy. In De Anima, Aristotle elucidates the nature of the physical conditions of fear and classifies it among the passions or affections of the soul. In his scattered references in these works, Aristotle treated the subject of fear as a mental, a psychological and, even, a physical condition - as an emotion, a passion, an act and an action. Aristotle's obscure argumentation in the last two works can be examined and reformulated, so as to reduce the possible inconsistencies and some incomprehensible points found in each case.

Zveřejněno: 30. září 2019  Zobrazit citaci